N222BE
Registered owner: N222BE INC TRUSTEE, WY (owner ≠ operator)
Operators of this aircraft
Who operated this tail, and how firmly we know it.
No operator established for this aircraft.
Accident & incident history
No NTSB accidents or incidents on file for this aircraft.
Maintenance disclosures
Service Difficulty Reports filed with the FAA for this airframe. Filing is largely voluntary — the number of reports is not a measure of reliability. To verify a report, search its control number at the FAA SDRS site.
14 reports on file, 2001-09-28 – 2006-09-07.
Part: CHECK VALVE — FAILED (BLEED AIR) · airframe 10,711 hrs · 8,170 cycles
DURING MAINTENANCE OF THE BLEED AIR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DUCTING IN THE AFTER EQUIPMENT BAY AREA OF THE AIRCRAFT, SPECIFICALLY REMOVAL OF THE 3 WAY VALVE IN ORDER TO REPLACE SOME LEAKING SEALS, THE CHECK VALVE FOR THE RT ENGINE BLEED AIR SOURCE AIR WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. THE CHECK VALVE PLATE WAS FOUND TO BE DOWN STREAM OF THE CHECK VALVE AGAINST THE 3 WAY VALVE. THE CHECK VALVE PLATE IS ATTACHED TO A SPRING ARM IN A RIVET TYPE MANOR. THE ATTACH POINT OF THE PLATE HAD WORN TO A POINT WHERE IT FELL THROUGH THE HOLE IN THE SPRING ARM. THERE IS AN (OPERATIONAL CHECK OF BLEED AIR CHECK VALVE) IN THE MFG MM UNDER CHAPTER 36-10-02 WHICH IS TO BE PERFORMED AS PART OF THE PHASE D3 INSPECTION EVERY 2400 HOURS. E
Earlier reports · 2001–2005 · 13 reports
2005
Part: CONNECTOR — BROKEN · airframe 10,033 hrs · 7,660 cycles
THE STALL WARNING ACCELEROMETER WAS BEING USED TO TROUBLESHOOT A PROBLEM ON ANOTHER AIRCRAFT. DURING THE REMOVAL OF THE ACCELEROMETER, THE WIRE BROKE ON PIN B OF THE CANNON PLUG. AS PART OF THE TROUBLESHOOTING IT WAS DETERMINED THE PROBLEM ON THE OTHER AIRCRAFT WAS ALSO A BROKEN WIRE ON THE CANNON PLUG FOR THE ACCELEROMETER AS WELL. THE WIRES TO THE CANNON PLUG ARE VERY SMALL. DURING COMPLIANCE OF AD 82-01-05 R2, THE WIRES ARE FLEXED AS PART OF THE CHECK. THIS AD HAS A RECURRING INTERVAL OF 220 HOURS. THE CONTINUED TESTING OF THE ACCELEROMETER IS GOING TO RESULT IN MORE WIRE FAILURES.
2004
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (PRESS CONTROLLER) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FEET. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (CABIN PRESSURE) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FEET. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESSURIZATION CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FEET. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (CABIN PRESSURE) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FEET. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (CABIN PRESSURE) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FEET. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (CABIN PRESSURE) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. THEY SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FT. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — DEFECTIVE (PRESS CONTROLLER) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FT + OR - 250 FT. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (PRESS CONTROLLER) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FEET. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (CABIN PRESSURE) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION, THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH FOR THE PRESS CONTROLLER WAS FOUND TO BE DEFECTIVE. A REPLACEMENT UNIT WAS PURCHASED FROM THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER AND WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. A TOTAL OF 9 UNITS WERE PURCHASED AND ALL WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER WAS CONTACTED TO ASSIST IN RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. SENT SEVERAL UNITS TO THEIR LAB AND WERE ABLE TO SHIP US A TOTAL OF TWO UNITS WITHIN ALLOWED LIMITS. THESE UNITS ARE TO CLOSE THE SWITCH DURING CLIMB AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FEET. THE SWITCH IS TO REOPEN PRIOR TO 7,200 FEET DURING THE DESCENT. SUSPECT THERE ARE SEVERAL UNITS REPLACED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2001.
Part: PRESSURE SWITCH — OUT OF LIMITS (CABIN PRESSURE) · airframe 9,442 hrs · 7,268 cycles
DURING PERFORMANCE OF A 2400 HOUR INSPECTION THE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE SWITCH FOR THE AURAL WARNING ON THE PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, FAILED FUNCTION CHECK. THE UNIT IS TOO CLOSE THE SWITCH AND PROVIDE AURAL WARNING TO THE FLIGHT CREW AT 8,750 FEET + OR - 250 FT. THE SWITCH THEN OPENS DURING DESCENT PRIOR TO 7200 FEET. THE TEST ON THIS UNIT RESULTED IN THE SWITCH CLOSING AT 9,250 FT. THE POSITION WHEN THE SWITCH REOPENED WAS AT 8,400 FEET. THIS IS NOT A NORMAL STATUS REPLACEMENT TRACKED ITEM, THEREFORE REPLACEMENT DATE AND TIME WERE NOT CONFIRMED. REPLACEMENT WAS AFTER 4-9-01 AS THAT IS THE MANUFACTURED DATE OF THE SWITCH.
2003
Part: SEAL — TORN (PAX DOOR) · airframe 8,670 hrs · 6,757 cycles
DURING CLIMB TO ASSIGNED ALTITUDE, PILOT HEARD AN AUDIBLE AIR LEAK FROM AROUND ENTRY DOOR AT APPROXIMATELY 4.5 CABIN PSI. THE CABIN WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE BEYOND 5.5 CABIN PSI. AIRCRAFT RETURNED AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. CABIN DID NOT DEPRESSURIZE. LOWER AFT SECTION OF ENTRY DOOR SEAL WAS FOUND TO BE ROLLED AND TORN. SUSPECT SEAL WAS ROLLED DURING CLOSURE OF LOWER DOOR. DAMAGED SECTION OF THE DOOR SEAL WAS REPLACED IAW MM. AIRCRAFT WAS PRESSURIZED ON THE GROUND AND CHECKED GOOD.
2001
Part: SHUTOFF VALVE — LEAKING (DEICE SYSTEM) · airframe 8,073 hrs · 6,325 cycles
AT CRUISE ALT 43,000 FT PILOT NOTICE CABIN ALT WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE PILOT INITIATED A DESCENT TO 27,000 FT PRESSURIZATION STARTED WORKING NORMAL. FLT CONTINUED AT 35,000 FT & WORKED NORMAL REST OF FLT. AFTER TROUBLESHOOTING SYS THE WINDSHIELD DEICE SHUTOFF VALVE WAS FOUND LEAKING AT FLANGE OF THE VALVE. VALVE WAS REPLACED & SYS WAS CHECKED FOR OPERATION, SYS CHECKED NORMAL. POSSIBLE FACTORS EFFECTING THE SYS, ACFT WAS IN A HEAVY RAIN STORM PRIOR TO TAKEOFF 3-4 HRS & WAS FLOWN IN HEAVY RAIN FOR ABOUT 45 MIN PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE. A LOT OF MOISTURE IN NOSE AVIONICS UPON LANDING. DRAINS WERE FOUND CLEAR. THE AVIONICS DOOR SEALS INSPECTED, NO DEFECTS NOTED. TIME ON VALVE UNKNOWN, ESTIMATED 5300 HRS.