N330QS
Operators of this aircraft
Who operated this tail, and how firmly we know it.
| Operator | Role | Period | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| NETJETS AVIATION, INC. (DXTA) | Certificate holder | — | Matched by certificate designator |
Accident & incident history
No NTSB accidents or incidents on file for this aircraft.
Maintenance disclosures
DURING CLIMB OUT WE RECEIVED THE EMER LT NOT ARM CAS MESSAGE AND OUR BATTERIES BEGAN TO DISCHARGE. DURING THE SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST THE AIRCRAFT WENT INTO ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY ONCE THE ENGINES WERE SHUT DOWN. REPEAT WRITEUP. FOUND GROUND WIRE AT GS0389 NOT CORRECTLY INSTALLED. A RING TERMINAL WAS NOT INSTALLED ON THE SCREW. RECONNECTED THE RING TERMTNAL WITH NEW HARDWARE. OPS CHECKS GOOD WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED. REF AMM 20-13-21.
REPEAT WRITE UP: IMMEDIATELY AFTER GEAR RETRACTION, WE RECEIVED EMER LIGHT NOT ARMED CAS MESSAGE. THE EMERGENCY LIGHTS WERE ALL ILLUMINATED IN THE CABIN. THE BATTERY VOLTAGE WENT FROM 28 V TO AMBER 25 V AND IT VERY SLOWLY DECREASED AFTER. THE SCHEMATIC PAGE SHOWED THE BATTERIES WERE SUPPLYING POWER TO THE EMER, THE CENTRAL AND THE HOT BUSES. THE GENERATORS WERE SUPPLYING POWER SOLELY TO THE RESPECTIVE DC BUS. ESSENTIALLY IT WAS TRYING TO PUT ITSELF INTO AN ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY. UPON LANDING, I PUSHED IN THE ELECTRICAL EMER BUTTON AND NOTHING HAPPENED. AS SOON AS I SHUT THE AIRCRAFT DOWN, THE AIRPLANE WENT INTO ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY MODE. AS PER CONTACT CENTER INSTRUCTIONS THE GROUNDS AT GS0185 HAVE BEEN REBUILT BY REMOVING, CLEANING CONTACT AREAS, AND REINSTALLING. REMOVED SUSPECT EDPU, THAT IS CAUSING ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY CAS MESSAGE UPON GEAR UP IN FLIGHT. INSTALLED NEW EDPU. COMPLETED ALL FOLLOW ON CHECKS. ALL CHECKS GOOD. ALL WORK ACCOMPLISHED IAW AMM 24-65-03 AND 20-13-21.
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER GEAR RETRACTION, WE REVEIVED EMER LIGHT NOT ARMED CAS MESSAGE. THE EMERGENCY LIGHTS WERE ALL ILLUMINATED IN THE CABIN. THE BATTERY VOLTAGE WENT FROM GREEN 28.5 VOLTS TO AMBER 25.3 VOLTS AND VERY SLOWLY DECREASED. THE SCHEMATIC SHOWED THAT THE BATTERIES WERE SUPPLYING POWER TO THE EMER, CENTRAL, AND HOT BUSSES. THE GENERATORS WERE SUPPLYING POWER SOLELY TO THEIR RESPECTIVE DC BUS. ESSENTIALLY, IT WAS IN ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY MODE EXCEPT EVERYTHING WAS BEING POWERED. AFTER LANDING, WE TRIED TO THE ELEC EMER SWITCH TO SEE IF WE COULD GET IT OUT OF THE EMER CONDITION. THE SWITCH HAD NO EFFECT. WE SHUT DOWN THE ENGINES AND THE AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATELY WENT INTO ELEC EMER MODE BECAUSE THE BATTERIES COULD NOT SUPPLY POWER TO THE DC BUSSES. DISCOVERED THE J1 PLUG BACK SHELL WAS VERY LOOSE, ALLOWING THE ASSOCIATED WIRE BUNDLE TO MOVE FREELY. I REMOVED THE EODU TO GAIN ACCESS, SECURED THE J1PLUG TO BACK SHELL, AND REINSTALLED THE UNIT IN REF WITH EMB505 AMM 24-65-03. OPS CHECK GOOD. EMERGENCY BATTERIES FOUND DEPLETED AND UNABLE TO HOLD CHARGE. REMOVED AND REPLACED BOTH #1 AND #2 EMERGENCY BATTERIES WITH NEW UNITS IAW EMB505 AMM 33-52-01. OPS CHECK GOOD.
DEPARTING KTYQ, RECEIVED AN EMER LT NOT ARM CAS MESSAGED AT 400FT EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE ARMED & NOTICED BOTH BATTERIES WERE YELLOW & DISCHARGING. DID NOT HAVE A BATT DISCHARGE CASS MESSAGE. PULLED UP THE ELECTRICAL SYNOPTIC AND IT APPEARED THAT IT WAS IN ELEC EMER MODE. VERIFIED ELEC EMER SWITCH NOT PRESSED IN. BOTH GENS WERE POWERING THE DC BUSSES BUT NOT CHARGING BATTERIES. ONCE ON GROUND WHEN WE SHUT THE EMER LTS OFF & THE SYS WENT INTO ELEC EMER MODE ON ITS OWN. PERFORMED AN OPS CHECK OF POWER UP SYS WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED, PERFORMED AN INSPECTION OF EMERG SYS WIRING WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED. ACCOMPLISHED CMC DOWNLOADS & SUBMITTED TO CONTACT CENTER & PERFORMED FIM TASK 24-61-00-810-813-A WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED AT THIS TIME. AFTER PERFORMING CVDR DOWNLOAD, FOUND ACFT HAD GONE INTO EMERG MODE WITH NOTHING BEING TOUCHED. ABLE TO GET ACFT OUT OF EMER MODE & SUBMITTED ANOTHER CMC DOWNLOAD TO MCC AND CONTACT CENTER. CONTACT CENTER SUGGESTED REPLACING THE ELECTRICAL CONTROL PANEL & BC2 CONTACTOR R & R ELECTRICAL CONTROL PANEL REF AMM 24-01-01 R & R BC2 CONTACTOR REF AMM 24-36-03. ORIGINAL SUBMISSION DATE: 7/3/2025.
CABIN EMERGENCY LIGHT: CABIN EMERGENCY LIGHTS STAY ON OR ARE FLASHING WITH THE SWITCH IN THE ARMED POSITION CORRECTIVE ACTION; REPLACED FORWARD AND AFT EMERGENCY BATTERIES IAW EMB 505 MM 33-52-01/400. OPS CHECK GOOD.
LEFT ENGINE HUNG START: 80-10-06-01 WHEN STARTING ENGINE 1 OBSERVED IGNITION B FUEL FLOW, AND N1 HANG AT 4% ABORTED THE START, RAN THE ENGINE START MALFUNCTION QRC CONTACTED MCC. CORRECTIVE ACTION: REPLACED ENGINE IGNITION EXCITER. OPS CHECK GOOD. IAW P-300 EMM CH. 74-10-01
CABIN OXYGEN MASK STORAGE COMPARTMENT: THE PAX OXYGEN MASK COVER WILL NOT STAY ON. FOUND MASK COVER VELCRO WORN OR MISSING AND TAPE APPLIED AS A TEMPORARY FIX. VERIFEID FAULT AND REOMVED TEMPORARY TAPE. REMOVED DAMAGED VELCRO FROM PANEL. CLEANED PREPPED AND APPLIED NEW VELCRO TO THE ARE AS REQUIRED. REINSTALLED OXYGEN MASK COVER AND RESTORED NC BACK TO ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION. NO DEFECTS NOTED. REF. PHENOM 300 AM 35-00-00
FAINT BURNING ELECTRICAL SMELL COMING FROM RIGHT SIDE OF THE COCKPIT. ON THE PREVIOUS FLIGHT WINDSHIELD HEAT REMAINED OFF, THERE WAS NO SMELL. ON THIS FLIGHT THE SMELL DID NOT START UNTIL LATER IN THE FLIGHT. IT SEEMS LIKE IT IS WORSE WHEN THE WINDSHIELD HEAT HAS TO WORK HARDER IN THE COLD AIR AT ALTITUDE. ALSO THE RIGHT 1/4 OF THE RIGHT WINDSHIELD WAS VERY HOT, MUCH HOTTER THAN THE REST. NOTICED A FAINT ELECTRICAL SMELL FROM THE COCKPIT WHEN FIRST ENTERING THE AIRCRAFT. RAN BOTH ENGINES AND VCS AND DID NOT NOTICE ANY FAULTS OR ODOR THROUGHOUT THE AIRCRAFT COCKPIT AND CABIN. TRIED THE WINDSHIELD HEAT AND DID NOT GET ANY FAULTS, BUT IT IS VERY WARM TODAY AND THE WINDSHIELDS ARE NOT ACTUALLY HEATING. RAN OUT ALL THE WINDSHIELD HEAT SENSORS ON BOTH WINDSHIELDS AND THEY ARE ALL BETWEEN 336 AND 346 OHMS. RANG OUT BOTH HEATING ELEMENTS ON BOTH WINDSHIELDS AND THEY ARE ALL READING 1.0 OHM. I DON'T THINK THE WINDSHI ELDS THEMSELVES ARE THE ISSUE. THE WIRING TO THE WINDSHIELDS AND CONTROLLERS RE SECURE. IT LOOKS LIKE ONE OF THE WINDSHIELD HEAT CONTROLLERS MAY NOT BE CYCLING PROPERLY. EACH WINDSHIELD CONTROLLER CONTROLS ONE HEATING ELEMENT IN EACH WINDSHIELD. ORDERED 2 EACH WINDSHIELD HEAT CONTROLLERS PN EPM112-4 (IPC 30-42-01-01, FIGURE 1, ITEM 10), THROUGH MCC. PFD 1 AND PFD 2 ARE REMOVED AND THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS PULLED. BOTH WINDSHIELD HEAT CONTROLLER CONNECTORS ARE REMOVED. (06 05 SL). REMOVED # 1 WINDSHIELD HEAT CONTROLLER AND REPLACED WITH NEW CONNECTOR IAW EMB 505 AMM 30-42-01. OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD. REMOVED # 2 WINDSHIELD HEAT CONTROLLER AND REPLACED WITH NEW CONTROLLER IAW EMB 505 AMM 30-42-01. OPERATIONAL CHECKS GOOD. ORIGINAL SUBMISSION DATE: 6/5/2024
INTERMITTENT BURNING ELECTRICAL ODOR IN COCKPIT. ODOR STRONGEST TOWARDS RT END OF INSTRUMENT PANEL. REMOVED INSTRUMENT SCREENS & INSPECTED WIRING BEHIND PANEL, NO DEFECTS, INSPECTED NEW AVIONICS COOLING FAN, NO DEFECTS, INSPECTED COPILOT'S WINDSHIELD WIRE TERMINAL BLOCK, NO DEFECTS. APPLIED POWER & LET SIT OVER AN HOUR, NO ODOR, TOOK ACFT OUTSIDE & RAN EACH ENG FOR AN HOUR, NO ODOR. HAD VCS SYS GOING ENTIRE TIME, NO ODORS. TURNED OFF VCS & RAN COCKPIT & CABIN FULL HOT, NO ODOR. HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REPRODUCE ODOR. COMPLETED FIM TASK 21-20-00-810-801-A, NO DEFECTS & COMPLETED WINDSHIELD HEATING SYS OPS CHECK, OPS CHECKED GOOD IAW EMO 30-2-00-710-BOLâ¢A, NO ABNORMAL ODORS NOTED DURING TROUBELSHOOTING.
ON POST FLIGHT NOTICED EMERGENCY LIGHT UNDER SEAT FOUR NOT SECURED. OPERATIONAL CHECK REVEALED NOT WORKING. REMOVED LED ESCAPE PATH MARKING P/N 0434LS00-01 DUE TO EMER LT UNDER SEAT 4 NOT SECURED AND INOP. INSTALLED CUSTOMER SUPPLIED NEW LED ESCAPE PATH MARKING P/N 0434LS00-01. ALL WORK DONE IAW EMB-505 AMM 33-52-11. OPS CHECK GOOD
RIGHT MLG BRAKE: RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR BRAKE WEAR INDICATOR NEARING LIMIT WHILE LEFT MAIN BRAKE WEAR INDICATOR ALMOST FULLY EXTENDED. BRAKES SEEM TO GO FROM VERY SENSITIVE (PULLS HARD LEFT..THEN RIGHT)..TO TRAKING STRAIGHT TO SPONGY..NEVER KNOWN WHAT TO EXPECT..ANTI -SKID JERKS AFTER MEDIUM/FIRM BREAKING AT LOWER SPEEDS. COMPLETED DETAILED INSPECTION ON BRAKE SYSTEM. BRAKE WEAR PIN IS WITHIN LIMITS. NO DISCREPANOES NOTED. COMPLETED ENG RUN AND TAXI. BRAKE FELT FIRM AND RESPONSIVE. NO DISCREPANQES NOTED. REF: EMB-505 POH, AMM 32-41-00-720-801-A.
AVIONICS POWER: AS WE WERE CLIMBING THROUGH THE MID 20S WE STARTED TO NOTICE A STRANGE SMELL, IT WAS FAINT BUT IT DEFINITELY SMELLED ELECTRICAL. IT CONTINUED AS WE CLIMBED INTO THE 30S. WE WENT TO THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE AND THERE WAS NO SMELL BACK THERE AND THE FO SAID THAT WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE FRONT THAT IT WAS AN ELECTRICAL BURN SMELL. THE WINDSHIELD HEAT WAS ON ALONG WITH THE STROBE AND NAV LIGHTS.
FIRST OFFICER COCKPIT WINDOW: COPILOT SIDE WINDSCREEN SHATTERED SHORTLY AFTER LEVELING OFF AT CRUISE ALTITUDE OF FLIGHT LEVEL 330. AFTER A NORMAL LANDING AND SHUT DOWN WE NOTED NO OTHER STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO ANY OTHER SURROUNDING PARTS OF THE AIRPLANE. // SIGNOFF // REMOVED RH SHATTERED WINDSHIELD PN-195301-4 SN 15028H1936. INSTALLED INSPECTED RH WINDSHIELD PN NP-195301-6 SN 18334H6337 FROM EMBRAER EXECUTIVE JET SERVICED WO X1999 CERT 6EER154C IAW# PHENOM 300 AMM 56-11-00 ALL OPS CHECKS GOOD AT THIS TIME
DURING ACCOMPLISHMENT OF EMBRAER SERVICE BULLETIN 505-55-0004 REV 01 (DATED 06/24/2020) WE NOTED THE FOLLOWING MASS BALANCE WEIGHTS BELOW TOLERANCE AT LEFT ELEVATOR: ADJUSTABLE WEIGHTS PART NUMBER PE915109-L33 (9 EACH BELOW MINIMUM OF 84G), HORN MASS WEIGHT PART NUMBER PE915109-L42 (1 EACH BELOW MINIMUM OF 1095G), MASS WEIGHT OUTBOARD PART NUMBER PE915109-L41 (1 EACH BELOW MINIMUM OF 2049G). ALL WEIGHTS HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH A NEW MASS WEIGHTS AND THE ELEVATOR BALANCING WAS PERFORMED WITH NO FURTHER DEFECTS NOTED.THE ELEVATOR WAS RE-IDENTIFIED TO PART NUMBER 505-11094-615 AS PER SERVICE BULLETIN INSTRUCTIONS. WE ALSO NOTED THE FOLLOWING RIGHT ELEVATOR MASS BALANCE WEIGHTS BELOW TOLERANCE: ADJUSTABLE WEIGHTS PART NUMBER PE915109-L33 (9 EACH BELOW MINIMUM OF 84G), HORN MASS WEIGHT PART NUMBER PE915109-L42 (1 EACH BELOW MINIMUM OF 1095G), ALL WEIGHTS HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH A NEW MASS WEIGHTS AND THE ELEVATOR BALANCING WAS PERFORMED WITH NO FURTHER DEFECTS NOTED.THE ELEVATOR WAS RE-IDENTIFIED TO PART NUMBER 505-11094-616 AS PER SERVICE BULLETIN INSTRUCTIONS. THIS REPORT COMPLIES WITH FAA 14 CFR PART 135 OPERATORâS GMM REQUIREMENTS
CRUISING AT FL380 A GEA 1 FAIL ILLUMINATED. ALSO HAD NUMEROUS OTHER CAS MESSAGES. PRESN AUTO FAIL ADS 2 SLIP FAIL ADS 1 SLIP FAIL ENG NO DISPATCH THE AUTO PILOT WAS NOT FUNCTIONING NORMALLY NEEDED TO DO AND ALTERNATE GEAR EXTENSION. WERE NEVER ABLE TO GET A GEAR DOWN AND LOCK INDICATION. POWERED UP AIRCRAFT SENT CMC DOWNLOAD TO CONTACT CENTER. REMOVED LOWER COWLING, REMOVED HYD PUMP, JACKED AIRCRAFT INSTALLED MULE, RESET EMERGENCY GEAR HANDLE PERFORMED. 5 NORMAL GEAR SWINGS, NO DEFECTS NOTED IAW AMM 32-31-00. DOWN JACKED A/C REMOVED MULE INSTALLED HYD PUMP IAW AMM 29-12-01 OPS CHECKED GOOD, AND REINSTALLED COWLING IAW 71-12-20. SERVICED HYD RESERVOIR IAW AMM 12-13-00 08-05-20. REMOVED FAULTY NR 1 GEA AND INSTALLED REPAIRED GEA. LOADED SOFTWARE, OPS CHECKED GOOD IAW AMM 31-41-03-470-801-A.
OXY LO PRES YELLOW CAS - UNABLE TO COMPLETE PRE-FLIGHT OF OXYGEN MASK/SYSTEM. OXYGEN PRESS ON MFD SHOWS 1900 PSI / FULL. AMBER CAS MSG APPEARS DURING TEST AND SYSTEM WILL NOT TEST BUT ONCE. TRIED TO RESET CUT OUT SEVERAL TIMES BUT MSG REMAINS ILLUMINATED FOR AWHILE THEN GOES OUT BUT REAPPEARS WHEN STARTING TO TEST SYSTEM. TROUBLE SHOT OXYGEN SHUT OFF AND FOUND ACTUATOR CABLE TO SHORT TO RIG CORRECTLY. INSTALLED REPLACEMENT CABLE PER PHENOM 300 MM 35-01-04 AND FOUND THAT CABLE DID NOT EXTEND THROUGH THE OXYGEN BOTTLE ON/OFF LEVER NUT 1 MM AS PER MM INSTRUCTIONS. ADJUSTING CABLE TO ACHIEVE 1 MM OF FEED THROUGH CAUSES CABLE NOT TO ACHIEVE FULLY "ON" DETENT OF THE OXYGEN BOTTLE. ORDERED ANOTHER CABLE. REMOVED AND REPLACED OXYGEN CONTROL CABLE IAW EMBRAER PHENOM 300 MM 35-01-04. OPS CHECK GOOD IAW PHENOM 300 MM 35-01-04. P/N OFF AND ON - 4441708-000.
GEA 1 FAIL CAS DISPLAYED. FOLLOWED BY: PRESN AUTO FAIL/OXY LO PRES CAUTIONS. ALSO ENG NO DISPATCH/ADS 1-2 SLIP ADVISORY MESSAGES. LOSS OF #1 ENG OIL PRESS/OIL TEMPERATURE/FUEL FLOW/BATT VOLT/OXYGEN QUANTITY INDICATORS. ALSO THE GEAR INDICATOR TURNED RED ON THE MAINS AND RED SLASHES ON THE NOSE GEAR. USED THE MANUAL GEAR RELEASE HANDLE AS A PRECAUTION. SUBSEQUENT: REMOVED AND REPLACED GEA1 IAW PHENOM 300 AMM CH 31-41-03. OPS CHECK GOOD. NO FURTHER DEFECTS NOTED. PART NUMBER OFF: 011-00831-00 SN OFF: 46705067 PART NUMBER ON: 011-00831-00 SN ON: 46705685
SWPS FAULT & SPOILER FAULT EICAS IN FLIGHT. ASSOCIATED NO FLAP INDICATION YELLOW X'S & NO PITCH INDICATION YELLOW X'S. FOLLOWED QRH PROCEDURE & EXECUTED FLAPLESS APPROACH. REMOVED & INSTALLED NR 1 FCE. OPS CHECKED GOOD IAW AMM 27-03-01.
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HOLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE PERFORMING THE PHASE 1-5 INSP, CRACKS WERE NOTICED IN SEVERAL RIBS LOCATED INSIDE THE LT AND RT HORIZ STABILIZERS. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE TOP SKINS ON BOTH STABILIZERS, 8 CRACKED RIBS ON THE RT SIDE AND 13 CRACKED RIBS ON THE LT SIDE WERE FOUND. ALL OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE LOWER PORTION OF THE FLANGED AREAS OF THE RIBS IN THE CUT-OUT AREA. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE RIVETS, SOME OF THE CRACKS WERE FOUND TO BE GOING TO THE RIVET HLES BUT MOST OF THE CRACKS CONTINUED PAST THE RIVET HOLES. THE CRACKS WERE PARALLEL TO THE EDGE OF THE RIBS. THE CRACKS WERE LOCATED IN AREAS NOT NORMALLY INSPECTED AND ACCESS IS VERY LIMITED. (K)
WHILE COMPLETING A LUBRICATION SEVERAL CRACKS HAVE BEEN FOUND IN HORZ STAB RIBS, P/N 65320XX-XXX.
AFTER RETRACTING THE GEAR, THE HYD PRESS ON LIGHT AS WELL AS THE GEAR UNLOCKED LIGHTS WERE ON. WE RAN THE CHECKLISTS BROUGHT THE GEAR DOWN AND USED THE BLOW DOWN AS A PRECAUTION. INSPECTED AND ADJUSTED UP-LOCK SWITCH. OPS CHECKED GOOD IAW CESSNA 560 MM 32-31-05
ON TAKE-OFF CABIN CONTROLLER FAILED TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURIZATION. TROUBLESHOT TO VENT BLOCKAGE ON CONTROLLER. CLEARED BLOCKAGE AND PERFORMED OPS CHECK. OPS CHECK GOOD. IAW CE 560 MM CH 21-31-00.
ON DEPARTURE, LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. AUXILLARY GEAR CONTROL WAS ACTIVATED AS A PRECAUTION. [07-12-07] T/S FOUND LEFT GEAR SQUAT SWITCH OUT OF ADJUSTMENT. ADJUSTED SWITCH. IAW CESSNA 560 MM. CH. 32-30-01. OPS. CHECK SATISFACTORY. ALSO BLED MLG. RESET BLOWDOWN BOTTLE. SAFTIED AND SERVICED.
ON TAXI OUT PFD NR 2 FAILED. BURNED ELECTRONIC SMELL WAS OBSERVED. [07-10-07] REMOVED AND REPLACED NR 1 PFD IAW CESSNA 560 MM 34-23-02. PFD OPS CHECKS SERVICEABLE.
CO-PILOTS SIDE RT BRAKE PEDAL IS SOFT. WILL STOP AIRCRAFT HOWEVER WILL TRAVEL APPROX 1.5 INCHES BEFORE PRESSURE IS FULL. WHEN APPLYING BRAKES LEFT SIDE WILL HOLD WHILE RT SIDE WILL TRAVEL FORWARD BEFORE SAME AMOUNT OF PRESSURE IS FELT. PERFORMED ANTI-SKID BRAKE BLEEDING PROCEDURE IAW CESSNA 560 M/M 32-42-00. CO-PILOTS RT BRAKE PEDAL HAS SAME TRAVEL AND PRESSURE FEEL AS LT PEDAL. ALSO FEELS THE SAME AS PILOTS LT AND RT PEDALS. LEAK CHECK OF BRAKE BLEED PORTS CHECK GOOD.
AFTER TAKEOFF, GEAR RETRACTION THE GEAR HORN WARNING SOUNDED. IT LASTED FOR A COUPLE SECONDS, THEN THE GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT WENT OUT AS WELL AS THE HORN STOPPED. ALL GEAR INDICATIONS AFTER LANDING WERE NORMAL. FOUND INOPERATIVE RIGHT THROTTLE 70 PERCENT SWITCH, REMOVED AND REPLACED SWITCH WITH NEW. RIG AND OPERATIONAL CHECK NORMAL, MAINTENANCE PERORMED IAW THE CESSNA 560 M/M CHAPTER 32-61-00.
AFTER TAKEOFF UPON GEAR RETRACTION, THE GEAR WARNING HORN SOUNDED. IT LASTED FOR A COUPLE SECONDS THEN GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT (RED LIGHT) WENT OUT AS WELL AS THE HORN STOPPPED. ALL GEAR INDICATIONS AFTERWARDS WERE NORMAL INCLUDING THE 150K HORN WARNING CHECK.
AFTER DEPARTURE GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT REMAINED LIT AND HYD PRESS LIGHT ALSO REMAINED ILLUMINATED. GEAR RETURNED TO DOWN AND LOCKED AFTER PERFORMING CHECK LIST ITEMS. REPLACED ALL PARTS OF BRACKET ASSY PER CE500 SERIES COMPONENT M/M 32-20-01, PERFORMED LANDING GEAR RETRACTION/EXTENSION WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED.
AFTER POSITIVE RATE OF CLIMB DURING TAKEOFF THE GEAR WOULD NOT FULLY RETRACT, WHEN THE GEAR SELECTOR WAS MOVED TO THE UP POSITION THE MAIN GEARS WOULD NOT STOW AND THE RED GEAR UNLOCK LIGHT REMAINED ILLUMINATED. TROUBLESHOT LANDING GEAR SYSTEM, FOUND GEAR HANDLE WAS NOT ACTIVATING THE MICRO SWITCHES (LEVER HANGING UP). ACCESS GEAR HANDLE, LUBED MICRO SWITCH RAMP AND LEVER. CYCLED GEAR APPROX 12 TIMES, ALL OPS CHECKS GOOD REF THE CESSNA 560 MM CHAPTER 32-31-01 & 32-30-00.
LOUD BANG WAS HEARD AND FELT WHILE CLIMBING THROUGH FL 37 AN ODOR WAS MOMENTARILY ASSOCIATED WITH IT. AN EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED AND THE AIRCRAFT DIVERTED TO LAS. UPON LANDING THE FIRE PERSONNEL REPORTED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SMOKE EMANATING FROM THE ENGINE AREA. O2 MASKS WERE DEPLOYED. THIS IS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION.
AFTER SELECTING GEAR DOWN, POWER BRAKE LOW PRESS, ANTI SKID INOP ANNUNICATORS CAME ON, NO BRAKE PRESS EITHER SIDE. GO AROUND, ON SECOND APPROACH BOTH LIGHTS REMAINED ON FOR 5 SECONDS THEN EXTINGUISHED. BOTH PILOTS HAD POSITIVE BRAKE PRESSURE, NORMAL LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED. BACK UP AIR BRAKING NOT USED, ALSO NOTICED BRAKE HYD PUMP VERY NOISY. - JACKED A/C TO TROUBLESHOOT AND FOUND NORMAL TRANSITION OF BRAKE OPER GEAR UP/ DOWN NO DUP OF PILOT SQUAWK. BRAKE PRESSURE PUMP OPER SOUND NORMAL. INSPECTED SYS COMPONENTS FOUND SKID CONTROL RELAY KN002 SOAKED WITH SKYDROL REPLACED RELAY OPERATIONAL CHECK OF GEAR TRANSITION/ BRAKE SYS ENERGIZING SYS DETERMINED SATISFACTORY WORK PERFORMED WITH REFERENCE TO MFG 560 MM.
AFTER LANDING AT BUY, BRAKES FAILED ON BOTH PILOTâS AND FIRST OFFICERâS SIDES, HAD TO USE EMERGENCY BRAKE TO STOP AIRCRAFT. FOUND LOOSE SCREW ON RT SPEED TRANSDUCER AND PINS LOOSE, ALSO FOUND LT SPEED TRANSDUCER VERY HARD TO TURN AND DRIVE CAP BAD. REMOVED AND REPLACED RT SPEED TRANSDUCERS, RH ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR AND LT DRIVE CAP. ALL MAINTENANCE DONE IAW CESSNA 560 MM CHAPTER 32-42-07.
ON TAXI OUT FIRST 5 BRAKE APPLICATIONS WERE NORMAL, ON THE SIXTH APPLICATION BRAKE PEDALS WENT TO THE FLOOR, CO-PILOTS BRAKES WERE SPONGY BUT AFTER PUMPING BRAKES WAS ABLE TO STOP AIRCRAFT, TAXI AIRCRAFT AND APPLIED BRAKES 30-40 TIMES FOUND BRAKES TO OPERATE NORMALLY, CHECKED BRAKE PRE-CHARGE AND RESERVOIR, FOUND BRAKES FIRM, BLED BRAKES IAW CE-560 MM CHAPTER 32-42-00 NO AIR DETECTED. OPERATIONAL CHECKED GOOD.
COPILOT'S BRAKE FAILED ON TAXI, PILOT'S BRAKES PULSATING DURING SLOW TAXI. - PERFORMED BRAKE BLEED PROCEDURE IAW CE560 MM CHAPTER 32-42-01 LEAK CHECK GOOD. FUNCTIONAL TEST GOOD.
ON LANDING, BRAKE PRESSURE AVAILABLE BUT SLOW TO APPLY. DURING TAXI IN, ABOUT 10 MPH, BRAKES RELEASE AND ENGAGE INTERMITTENTLY. TROUBLESHOT AND FOUND RT ANTI-SKID WIRING HARNESS DEFECTIVE. REMOVED & REPLACED HARNESS IAW 560 M/M CH 32-42-07, OPS CHECKED GOOD.
ON TAXI IN DEPRESSED BRAKE AND AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT STOP FOR 2-3 SECOND . WITH BRAKE PEDALS DEPRESSED AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO ROLL FOR SHORT DISTANCE. ITEM IS UNDER INVESTIGATION. INSPECTED BRAKE RESEVIOR, ACUMULATOR, MASTER CYLINDERS AND BREAK ASSY'S ALL CHECKED NORMAL. CHECKED FOR LEAKS AND CONDITION, ALL WERE GOOD- BLED BRAKES AND CARRIED OUT TAXI CHECK ON AND STATIC BRAKE TOE CHECK WITH N1=60 PERCENT ALL WERE GOOD- ALL WORK DONE I.A.W. CE-560 MM CHAP 32-42-01.
DURING INSPECTION, AN 8 GAGE DC POWER DISTRIBUTION CABLE WAS FOUND TO HAVE CHAFED AND ARCING AGAINST A RELAY. THIS CABLE IS ENCLOSED BEHIND A PANEL AND DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO A SHROUDED FUEL CROSSFEED LINE, AND CABIN OUTFLOW VALVES. SHOULD A FIRE START, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT COULD GO UNNOTICED UNTIL THE CROSSFEED SHROUD AND LINE IS BREACHED.
DURING INSPECTION, AN 8 GAGE DC POWER DISTRIBUTION CABLE WAS FOUND TO HAVE CHAFED AND ARCING AGAINST A RELAY. THIS CABLE IS ENCLOSED BEHIND A PANEL AND DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO A SHROUDED FUEL CROSSFEED LINE, AND CABIN OUTFLOW VALVES. SHOULD A FIRE START, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT COULD GO UNNOTICED UNTIL THE CROSSFEED SHROUD AND LINE IS BREACHED.
DURING INSPECTION, AN 8 GAGE DC POWER DISTRIBUTION CABLE WAS FOUND TO HAVE CHAFED AND ARCING AGAINST A RELAY. THIS CABLE IS ENCLOSED BEHIND A PANEL AND DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO A SHROUDED FUEL CROSSFEED LINE, AND CABIN OUTFLOW VALVES. SHOULD A FIRE START, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT COULD GO UNNOTICED UNTIL THE CROSSFEED SHROUD AND LINE IS BREACHED.
SMOKE OBSERVED COMING FROM THE AFT LAVATORY AREA. BATTERY SWITCH WAS TURNED OFF, AND GROUND POWER UNIT DISCONNECTED FROM ACFT. A CHECK OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN THE COCKPIT AND AFT POWER JUNCTION BOXES SHOWED ALL CB' S WERE ENGAGED. FOUND WIRE GOING FROM K55 RELAY TO GND 33 HAD MELTED INSULATION AND BURNED WIRES. UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHICH WIRES SHORTED TO GROUND FIRST, UNABLE TO LOCATE CHAFE OR SHORT TO GROUND DUE TO DAMAGE TO ALL WIRES IN THE AREA. PERFORMED RESISTANCE CHECK OF K55 RELAY. RELAY CHK GOOD. ALL DAMAGED WIRING REPLACED. K55 RELAY REPLACED AS PRECAUTIONARY. PERFORMED FUNCTIONAL CHECK OF THE TEMP CONTROL CIRCUIT AND SYS CHECKED NORMAL. ACFT APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE.
FLT 72905 - NR 2 INVERTER INOPERATIVE. (X)
LT RUDDER SKIN HAS 2 INCH CRACK APPROX 3 INCHES BELOW TRIM TAB FWD OF HINGE LINE. THIS IS THE SECOND DISCOVERED VERTICAL CRACK, AND THE SIXTH RUDDER SKIN CRACK OVERALL. CESSNA WAS NOTIFIED BY SERVICE CONDITION REPORT.