N534LN
Registered owner: AIR METHODS LLC, CO (owner ≠ operator)
Operators of this aircraft
Who operated this tail, and how firmly we know it.
| Operator | Role | Period | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIR METHODS LLC (QMLA) | Certificate holder | — | Matched by certificate designator |
Accident & incident history
No NTSB accidents or incidents on file for this aircraft.
Maintenance disclosures
MAIN TRANSMISSION CHIP LIGHT DETECTOR ILLUMINATED. OIL PRESSURE STEADY
FASTENER HOLE DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE TRANSMISSION DECK PANEL (PN: L533M1017293) UNDER THE AFT OUTBOARD SECTION OF THE RH XY FITTING. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND AN APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURE IS PROVIDED IN AIRBUS REPAIR DESIGN APPROVAL SHEET RDAS-EC135-53-2024-1849, ISSUE A DATED 14 JUN 2024
CORROSION DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LOWER ANGLE (PN: L533M1043427) AT APPROXIMATELY FUSELAGE STATION 2,675MM. REPLACEMENT PARTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE; THEREFORE, A REPLACEMENT ANGLE WAS FABRICATED OUT OF 0.050â 2024-T3 PER AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-4765, INITIAL REVISION DATED 06 JUN 2024 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3 BY RYAN D. LEE, DER-Y # 905240204, DATED 10 JUN 2024 WITH DER SPECIFIC SEQUENCE # 24RL017AM.
CORROSION DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON FRAME 3 (PN: L533M1028221) AND ON THE FRAME 3 UPPER T CAP (PN: L533M1028203) AT APPROXIMATELY FUSELAGE STATION 3,150MM. REPLACEMENT PARTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE; THEREFORE, A REPLACEMENT FRAME AND T CAP WERE FABRICATED OUT OF 0.032â 2024-T3 AND 7075-T6511 RESPECTIVELY. THE FRAME 3 WEB FABRICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED PER AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-4757, INITIAL REVISION DATED 17 MAY 2024 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3 BY RYAN D. LEE, DER-Y # 905240204, DATED 22 MAY 2024 WITH DER SPECIFIC SEQUENCE # 24RL014AM. THE T CAP FABRICATION IS ACCOMPLISHED PER AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-4760, INITIAL REVISION DATED 30 MAY 2024 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3 BY RYAN D. LEE, DER-Y # 905240204, DATED 31 MAY 2024 WITH DER SPECIFIC SEQUENCE # 24RL015AM.
CORROSION DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LOWER ANGLE (PN: L311M1060235) AT APPROXIMATELY FUSELAGE STATION 1,730MM. REPLACEMENT PARTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE; THEREFORE, A REPLACEMENT ANGLE WAS FABRICATED OUT OF 0.080â 2024-T3511 PER AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-4753, INITIAL REVISION DATED 14 MAY 2024 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3 BY RYAN D. LEE, DER-Y # 905240204, DATED 16 MAY 2024 WITH DER SPECIFIC SEQUENCE # 24RL013AM.
CORROSION DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LH FORWARD LANDING GEAR FITTING (PN: L533M1006228) ON THE INBOARD SURFACE AT THE LOWER EDGE OF THE CENTER SECTION OF THE FITTING. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND AN APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURE IS PROVIDED IN AIRBUS REPAIR DESIGN APPROVAL AHI 135 53 007 24, ISSUE A DATED 08 MAY 2024 WITH AIRWORTHINESS APPROVAL VIA FAA FORM 8110-3 BY MICHAEL JOHN GARDINER (DER-T # 976778826) DATED 08 MAY 2024.
NOTE: PLEASE LIMIT YOUR DESCRIPTION TO 1500 CHARACTERS) DAMAGE WAS NOTED TO THE RH KEEL BEAM CAP (P/N: L533M1010203) HORIZONTAL FLANGE IN THE FORM OF SEVERAL AREAS OF CORROSION. THE AREA WAS REPAIRED VIA REINFORCING REPAIR DOUBLER IAW AIRBUS RDAS-EC135-53-2024-1411A.
CRACK DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE TAIL CONE SKIN (PN: L533M1022262) ON THE RH SIDE. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND AN APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURE IS PROVIDED IN AIRBUS REPAIR DESIGN APPROVAL SHEET RDAS-EC135-53-2024-1344, ISSUE A DATED 06 MAY 2024.
PICKED UP THE HELICOPTER IN A HOVER FOR A MAINTENANCE CHECK FLIGHT AND HOVERED OVER TO THE GRASS AREA BETWEEN THE RAMP AND TAXI WAY, CHECKED FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR NORMAL MOVEMENT AND THEN HOVERED TAXIED TO THE RUNWAY FOR A NORMAL DEPARTURE. MADE A LEFT TURN FOR A LEFT CROSSWIND WITH NO ISSUE, THEN TRIED TO TURN LEFT FOR A LEFT DOWNWIND . WAS UNABLE TO MOVE THE CYCLIC LEFT MORE THAN A HALF INCH. NEUTRALIZED THE CONTROLS, AND WAS ABLE TO MOVE THE CYCLIC RIGHT, FORWARD, AND AFT. DEPRESSED THE FORCE TRIM RELEASE AND WAS STILL UNABLE TO MOVE THE CYCLIC LEFT MORE THAN A HALF INCH. AFTER LANDING AND SHUTDOWN MAINTENANCE CONFIRMED THE SERVO WAS STICKING, ABLE TO FREE IT UP AND THEN IT WOULD MOVE LEFT.
PILOT REPORT. UPON START OF ENGINES 1 & 2 AND AT GROUND IDLE, HAD A TRANSMISSION CHIP CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED. SHUTDOWN ACFT, NOTIFIED MECHANIC(S) AND COMM CENTER OF AIRCRAFT STATUS. APPROX. 1800 LOCAL TIME WAS DETERMINED ACFT COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHOUT A PARTS ORDER. PERSONNEL ARRIVED APPROX 2000 LOCAL TIME WITH GROUND HANDLING WHEELS AND TOWBAR. ACFT WAS RELOCATED TO HOSPITAL LANDING PAD. AIRCRAFT WAS SECURED AND LOCKED AND A HOSPITAL SECURITY GUARD IN PLACE TO WATCH ACFT OVERNIGHT. AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE FOLLOWING DAY APPROX 1200 LOCAL TIME AND BASE PLACED BACK IN SERVICE. PERFORMED INSPECTION OF MRGB CHIP PLUG (VERY LIGHT MUD NOT BRIDGING GAP) & FILTER, INSTALLED NEW FILTER & CLEANED CHIP PLUG, CHIP LIGHT REMAINED ON. REPLACED CHIP PLUG WITH NEW NO MRGB CHIP LIGHT, GROUND RUN NO MRGB CHIP LIGHT NO LEAKS, FUNCTION CHECKED NORMAL, AIRCRAFT APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE.
DURING SHUTDOWN OF AC TRANSMISSION CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. CHIP PLUG WAS INSPECTED AND FOUND A SLIGHT STRAN OF DEBRIS. INSPECTED FILTER ASSY AND FOUND NO UNUSUAL CONTAMINATION. ELECTED TO REPLACE THE FILTER. ALL WORK WAS PERFORMED IAW EC 135-63A-012, REV 5. CONCLUDED THAT RESULTS OF INSPECTION, WERE OF STAGE "A" TYPE WITH NO FURTHER REQUIREMENTS.
WHILE ENROUTE, APPROX 10 MINUTES INTO THE FLIGHT, THE NR 1 GEN DISCONNECTED LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE CAD. COMPLETED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE IAW THE RFM. THE GENERATOR WOULD NOT RESET. PLACED THE NR 1 GENERATOR ON THE OFF POSITION AND REDUCED ALL NON-ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT. ACFT WAS RETURNED TO BASE WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENTS. ON INSPECTION, NOTICED A CONNECTING WIRE WAS LOOSE. MECHANIC TIGHTENED CONNECTOR AND GEN DISCON LIGHT NO LONGER ILLUMINATED.
DURING PRE FLIGHT, THE PILOT FOUND THAT WHEN HE TURNED THE TAIL ROTOR IN THE DIRECTION OF ROTATION HE HEARD A POPPING NOISE COMING FROM THE TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT. UPON FURTHER INSPECTION FOUND THAT ONE OF THE BEARINGS THAT HOLDS THE TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT WAS BAD.
DURING A HEMS FLIGHT WITH PATIENT ON BOARD, THE CREW SMELLED AN ELECTRICAL BURNING ODOR. THE AC WAS LANDED SAFELY. OTHER TRANSPORT WAS ARRANGED AND MAINT CALLED. THE ONLY FAILURE THE MECHANIC FOUND WAS A 110 VAC TO 28 VDC CONVERTER, THAT WAS USED WITH THE IV WARMER, THAT HAD FAILED AND WAS SUSPECTED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE ODOR. THE EXTERIOR OF THE CONVERTER WAS NOT SHOWING SIGNS OF OVERHEATING. THE CONVERTER WAS REPLACED AND THE AC WAS RELEASED FOR SERVICE.