N626N
Registered owner: DAY WILLIAM B, TX (owner ≠ operator)
Operators of this aircraft
Who operated this tail, and how firmly we know it.
No operator established for this aircraft.
Accident & incident history
Maintenance disclosures
MALFUNCTION: GOUGING ON AFT EDGE OF LEVER ASSY WHERE LEVER CONTACTS CONTROL STAND, WHICH MAY CAUSE AN OVER CENTER OF LINKAGE CONTROLS ALONG THE THRUST CONTROL SYSTEM. PROBABLE CAUSE: METAL TO METAL CONTACT AND/OR VIBRATION WHEN THE THROTTLE LEVER IS PULLED INTO THE LOW POWER SETTING AND THE THRUST REVERSER LEVER IS PULLED UP TO ACTIVATE REVERSERS. RECOMMENDATION: ADDING A RUBBER BUMPER OR A PHENOLIC LAMINATE TO THE SECTION OF THE CONTROL STAND WHERE THE LEVER ASSY MATE.
5TH STAGE ENGINE BLEED CHECK VALVE WAS OVERHAUL AND SENT TO CUSTOMER IN FEB 2021. UNIT WAS RETURNED IN JUN 2022 WITH SEVERE CORROSION. THERE IS CURRENTLY AN SB 3202222-36-1888 THAT ADDRESSED CRACKED BUSHING SLEEVES AND TO REWORK THE FLAPPERS FOR AVOID VALVE FLAPPERS BEING STUCK IN A POSITION. THERE IS ALSO AN AD 2020-16-51 THAT ADDRESSED CORROSION ON THESE UNITS AND TO CARRY OUT INSPECTION ON THE UNITS ALONG WITH MOVEMENT AND DIMENSIONAL CHECKS. COMPLYING WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CMM, SB AND AD STILL ALLOWS SEVERE CORROSION ON THESE UNITS CAUSING REMOVAL FROM THE AIRCRAFT. THE CURRENT INFORMATION IS NOT ADEQUATE TO AVOID THIS ISSUE AND IT IS EVIDENT THAT CORROSION IS STILL AN ONSET ISSUE.
5TH STAGE ENGINE BLEED CHECK VALVE WAS OVERHAUL WITH NEW BUSHING FROM BOEING AND SENT TO CUSTOMER IN SEP 2021. UNIT WAS RETURNED IN MAR 2022 WITH SEVERED CORROSION. THERE IS CURRENTLY AN SB 3202222-36-1888 THAT ADDRESSED CRACKED BUSHING SLEEVES AND TO REWORK THE FLAPPERS FOR AVOID VALVE FLAPPERS BEING STUCK IN A POSITION. THERE IS ALSO AN AD 2020-16-51 THAT ADDRESSED CORROSION ON THESE UNITS AND TO CARRY OUT INSPECTION ON THE UNITS ALONG WITH MOVEMENT AND DIMENSIONAL CHECKS. COMPLYING WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CMM, SB AND AD STILL ALLOWS SEVERE CORROSION ON THESE UNITS CAUSING REMOVAL FROM THE AIRCRAFT. BOEING WAS CONTACTED AND THE RESPONSE WAS TO CONTINUE COMPLYING WITH THE WORK, STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS CALLED OUT IN THE CMM. THE CURRENT INFORMATION IS NOT ADEQUATE TO AVOID THIS ISSUE AND IT IS EVIDENT THAT CORROSION IS STILL AN ONSET ISSUE.
MALFUNCTION: FLAPPERS PN 3170719-2 WERE MODIFIED AS PER INSTRUCTIONS IN HONEYWELL SB 3202222-36-1888 IAW FAA AD 2020-16-51 IN FEB 2021, AND WERE INSTALLED ON CUSTOMERS AIRCRAFT. UNIT WAS RETURNED TO REPAIR FACILITY SHOWING SIGNS OF BINDING AND CORROSION. PROBABLE CAUSE: CORROSION AROUND THE SLEEVE BEARINGS. RECOMMENDATION: REPLACE ALL CORRODED PARTS AND UPDATE RECOMMENDED INSPECTION, CORRECTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE ACTIONS.
MALFUNCTION: BALL SCREW ASSY. P/N 07322P000-05 S/N 0540C IS LEAKING GREASE FROM RETURN TUBES AND LOWER WIPERS. PROBABLE CAUSE: INCORRECTLY SEALED. RECOMMENDATION: REMOVE FROM HSTA AND SEND TO MFG FOR REPAIR.
MALFUNCTION â CORRODED SEALING SURFACES AND OTHER SURFACES OF THE ARTICLE. THIS INCLUDES THE MOUNTING FACE. PROBABLE CAUSE â LOCATION OF THE ARTICLE ON THE AIRCRAFT AND THE TYPE OF THE MATERIAL. RECOMMENDATION â MANUFACTURE WITH A DIFFERENT MATERIAL.
MALFUNCTION: CORROSION ON THE SEAL SURFACE. PROBABLE CAUSE: FLUID OTHER THAN SPECIFIED GETTING IN AFFECTED AREA. RECOMMENDATION: MAKE SLEEVES FOR MANIFOLD OR OTHER MATERIAL THAT WONâT BE AFFECTED.
MALFUNCTION: BALL SCREW ASSY. P/N 07322P000-05 S/N 3671 IS LEAKING GREASE FROM LOWER WIPER. PROBABLE CAUSE: WIPER FAILURE, WORN. RECOMMENDATION: SEND TO MFG FOR REPAIR.
BALL SCREW ASSY P/N 07322P000-04 S/N 0361 IS LEAKING GREASE FROM THE RETURN TUBES. SEALANT LIFTED AROUND RETURN TUBES. SEND TO MFG FOR REPAIR. THIS IS THE THIRD SIMILAR FINDING IN THE SHORT RECENT HISTORY.
MALFUNCTION - FOUR CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE CENTER OF THE CYLINDER UNDER THE DATA PLATE. PROBABLE CAUSE - CORROSION, MOISTURE / FLUID TRAPPED BETWEEN CYLINDER AND DATA PLATE.
APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR INTO THE FLIGHT & WITHOUT WARNING CREW EXPERIENCED A VERY LOUD, FULL VOL STATIC SQUELCH COMING THROUGH THE OVERHEAD SPEAKERS. AFTER SWITCHING FROM COMM 2 TO COMM 1 THE SQUELCH NOISE WENT AWAY BRIEFLY. HOWEVER, IT CAME BACK A FEW SECONDS LATER. SWITCHED FREQUENCIES TO 121.5 TO VERIFY IT WASN'T JUST A BAD ATC FREQUENCY OR RECEPTION AREA. ATTEMPTED TO REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ATC ON COMM 3, BUT AS SOON AS THE YOKE MOUNTED TRANSMIT BUTTON WAS PRESSED, THE SQUELCH NOISE RESUMED. CREW AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ATC ON 121.5, BUT STILL GOT THE LOUD SQUELCH NOISE. THE NOISE BECAME PROGRESSIVELY WORSE AS THE FLIGHT CONTINUED. IT FINALLY BECAME NECESSARY TO DESELECT ALL COMMS, BECAUSE THE SQUELCH NOISE BECAME CONTINUOUS, EVEN WITHOUT DEPRESSING EITHER THE YOKE MOUNTED MICROPHONE TRANSMIT BUTTON OR THE HANDHELD MICROPHONE TRANSMIT BUTTON. WE REALIZED WE WERE IN A TOTAL COMM FAILURE SITUATION, SQUAWKED 7600 & MADE AN UNSCHEDULED LANDING. UPON INITIAL INVESTIGATION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT BOTH NETWORK INTERFACE MODULES, NIM 1 & NIM 2, WERE SUSPECT OF CAUSING THE COMM FAILURE. FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS UNDERWAY & RESULTS WILL BE PROVIDED AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.