N673BF
Operators of this aircraft
Who operated this tail, and how firmly we know it.
No operator established for this aircraft.
Accident & incident history
No NTSB accidents or incidents on file for this aircraft.
Maintenance disclosures
LW UPPER SKIN PANEL CORRODED.
LW UPPER SKIN PANEL CORRODED.
FUSELAGE EXTERNAL LONGERON SPLICE FITTING CORRODED.
UPPER CHORD ON FLOOR SUPPORT INTERCOSTAL CRACKED.
RW LOWER RIB ATTACH ANGLE ON WING TRAILING EDGE IS CORRODED.
LW UPPER CHORD CORRODED AT TRAILING EDGE.
RW SKIN CORRODED AT OVERWING FILL PORT.
LW AIRLOAD RIB CORRODED.
LW SKIN CORRODED AT OVERWING FILL PORT.
LW TRAILING EDGE PANEL SUPPORT CORRODED.
LW UPPER SKIN CORRODED.
TAKEOFF & 0:30 CREW OBSERVED LT ENG OIL QTY DECREASING ABNORMALLY. ENG WAS SHUT DOWN & ACFT RETURNED. DISCOVERED A FAILED FACE SEAL AT THE FUEL PUMP DRIVE PAD ON THE ACCESSORY GEAR BOX. A GVI OF THE SEAL WAS COMPLIED WITH PRIOR TO THE PUMP INSTALLATION THE DAY PRIOR & NO LEAKS WERE DETECTED ON THE GND RUNS FOR THE PUMP REPLACEMENT.
DEFECTS BEYOND SRM LIMITS FOUND IN FLAP SUPPORT HOLES FOR FLAP SUPPORTS 1, 7 & 8 WHILE ACCOMPLISHING SB 767-57A0131. HOLES WERE OVERSIZED, OVERSIZE BOLTS INSTALLED.
FOUND LOOSE BUSHINGS IN FLAP SUPPORT LINKAGE 9 - 10 BEAM. BUSHINGS WERE REMOVED, HOLES IN LINKAGE OVERSIZED & OVERSIZED BUSHINGS WERE INSTALLED.
DURING A-CHECK, OVERWING ESCAPE SLIDE FAILED TO OPEN WHILE PERFORMING OPS CHECK. FOUND BROKEN SHAFT ON INTEGRATER. REPLACED INTEGRATER. OPS CHECKED GOOD.
DURING 'A' CHECK FOUND AFT LOWER CARGO DOOR JAMB AFT LOWER CORNER CORRODED. REPAIRED IAW AMES REA 47048REA02.
DURING A ROUTINE SCHEDULED C2 INSPECTION,FOUND AFT PRESSURE BULKHEAD BS 1582 AFT SIDE DENT INBD OF RADIAL STIFFENER 16, ABOVE TEAR STRAP 3. CUT OUT DENT DAMAGE IN WEB AND LAYED OUT AND INSTALLED REPAIR REF SRM 53-80-03, AND EXTENDED FASTENER ROWS PAST RADIAL 16, TWO ROWS.
DURING A ROUTINE SCHEDULED C2 INSPECTION, DISCOVERED AFT PRESSURE BULKHEAD BS 1582 AFT SIDE HAS A DENT INBD OF RADIAL STRAP 17 BETWEEN TEAR STRAP 4 & TEAR STRAP 5. CUT OUT DAMAGE, FABRICATED REPAIR DOUBLER AND INSTALLED IAW SRM 53-80-08, FIG 201, REPAIR 2.
DURING A ROUTINE SCHEDULED C2 CHECK INSPECTION, A DENT WAS DISCOVERED AT BS 1619, BETWEEN S-33R AND S-32R. FOUND DENT TO BE OUT OF LIMITS IAW SRM 53-00-01, FIG 101, DETAIL III. REPAIRED DENT IAW SRM 53-00-01, REPAIR 14, FIG 201.
DURING A ROUTINE SCHEDULED C2 INSPECTION, STA 1654 HAS 3 FUSELAGE SKIN CRACKS, ADJACENT TO S3 LENGTH 1.125, 2 BETWEEN S4 & S5 LENGTHS .175 AND .075. REPAIRED USING 0.032, 0.040, 0.063 7075 T6 REF SRM 53-80-01, FIG 201, REPAIR 4.
DURING A ROUTINE C2 INSPECTION, FOUND CRACKS EMINATING FROM FASTENERS AT BS 1654.5 BETWEEN STR 3 RT AND STR 7 RT. FOUR CRACKS, THE LONGEST MEASURING .5". REPAIRED USING 0.032, 0.040, 0.063 7075 T6 REF SRM 53-80-01, FIG 201, REPAIR 4.
DURING A ROUTINE SCHEDULED C2 INSPECTION, NR 1 FLAP SUPPORT FITTING OTBD STRAP UPPER COUNTERSUNK FASTENER, COUNTERSINK DAMAGED. THE OTBD SIDE HAS A THICKNESS OF 0.865. THE DAMAGE WAS REMOVED AND THE COUNTERSINK FASTENER HAD A MAXIMUM WIDTH OF 0.635 AND DEPTH OF 0.115. THE HOLE WAS REAMED TO THE NEXT HOLE SIZE (0.434-0.438 DIA) AND INSTALLED BACB30NW14K FASTENER WET WITH BMS 5-95 SEALANT. REWORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED IAW ENGINEERING DOCUEMENT 47023REA03 APPROVED.
DURING CRUISE FLIGHT, AT APPROX 3:22 AFTER TAKEOFF, OBSERVED NR2 ENGINE OIL QTY STARTED TO SHOW A POSSIBLE LOSS OF OIL AT A RATE OF 1 QT EVERY 3 MINUTES. WHEN QTY REACHED 3 QTS, ENGINE BROUGHT BACK TO IDLE & SHUTDOWN INITIATED. ACFT LANDED WITH A TOTAL FLIGHT TIME OF 6.1 HOURS. RT ENGINE COWLING OPENED AND EVIDENCE OF OIL LEAKAGE DISCOVERED. DURING MOTORING OF ENGINE, WITNESSED OIL LEAKING FROM BETWEEN ENGINE DRIVEN HYD PUMP & PUMP MOUNTING FLANGE ON GEARBOX. PUMP REMOVED & SPLINE SHAFT O-RING REPLACED. PUMP REINSTALLED IAW AMM 29-11-05. ENGINE MOTORED, NO LEAK DETECTED. ENGINE OPERATED FOR FURTHER INSP & NO LEAKS NOTED. NOTE: O-RING REPLACED 23.3 FLT HOURS EARLIER FOR EVIDENCE OF OIL LEAKING IN SAME AREA. ACFT OPERATED FOR 11.5 HOURS, SMALL AMOUNT OF OIL WITNESSED AT THE BOTTOM OF COWLING & ENGINE GEARBOX WAS AGAIN INSPECTED TO INSURE OIL WAS RESIDUAL FROM PREVIOUS OIL LOSS. THE QTY HAD DROPPED 1 QT IN 11.5 HOURS.
DURING THE PROCESS OF GAINING ACCESS TO THE FAIL-SAFE STRAP TRIM OUT AREA, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE INSTRUCTION IAW REV 1 OF THE SB WAS INSUFFICIENT TO REMOVE THE T-FITTINGS. MFG WAS CONTACTED VIA FIRST RESPONSE ON 6/9/09 AND THE SB ENGINEERING GROUP RESPONDED WITH THE INSTRUCTION REQUIRED VIA E-MAIL ON 6/10/09. THE SKIN STIFFENERS (T-FITTINGS) WERE REMOVED AND CORROSION WAS FOUND ON BOTH THE LT AND RT SKIN STIFFENERS (T-FITTINGS). IAW THE SENT INSTRUCTION, REV 2 OF THE SB, WHICH IS DUE OUT Q3 OF THIS YEAR, WILL INCLUDE THE DATA FOR T-FITTING REMOVAL AND INSTRUCTION TO CHANGE ANY CORRODED T-FITTINGS. CURRENTLY WE HAVE ORDERED AND RECEIVED BOTH OF THE T-FITTINGS FOR REPLACEMENT (PN 100T1440U3(LT) & 100T1440U4(RT). THE TRIM OUT PROCEDURE WAS COMPLIED WITH IAW THE SB 767-53A0100 FIGURE 15 ON 6/12/09. THE FINAL NDT TESTING WAS COMPLIED WITH ON 6/13/09 AND IT WAS VERIFIED THAT ALL CRACKS WERE REMOVED. CURRENTLY THE ACFT IS BEING RESTORED BACK TO THE USUAL CONDITION AND TERMINATING ACTION WILL BE COMPLETE IAW SB 767-53A0100. MFG DID INFORM AA767,LLC. THAT ALL TERMINATING ACTION IAW REV 1 OF THE SB WILL BE ACCEPTABLE AND THE UPCOMING REV 2 WILL HAVE NO FURTHER REQUIREMENTS.
DURING REMOVAL OF THE RT LWR AFT BODY FAIRING, ZONE 198, A CRACK WAS DISCOVERED IN THE FUSELAGE SKIN BETWEEN BS 1197 AND 1199, .5 INCH ABOVE STRINGER S-32R. THE CRACK IS APPROXIMATELY 1.625 INCHES IN LENGTH AND RUNS PARALLEL TO THE STRINGER. THE CRACK IS A RESULT OF LOCAL, LEVEL 2 CORROSION BEHIND THE AFT CARGO BIN SIDEWALL.
ON 5-13-09 AT 1600 HRS. NOTIFIED THAT WHILE COMPLYING WITH SB 767-53A0100 IAW AD 2004-19-06: ULTRASONIC TESTING OF THE LT AND RT STA 955 REAR BULKHEAD SIDE FITTING FAIL-SAFE STRAPS SHOWED POSSIBLE CRACKING OF BOTH FAIL-SAFE STRAPS AND RECEIVING THE NDT REPORT THE FOLLOWING DAY. UPON RECEIVING THE REPORT, THE INSTRUCTION OF THE SB WAS REVIEWED AND MFG WAS CONSULTED FOR VERIFICATION OF OUR NEXT COURSE OF ACTION. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN OPEN HOLE HFEC WAS NEEDED TO VERIFY THE THE EARLIER FINDINGS. ON 5-18-09 BOTH LT AND RT HOLES HAD HFEC TESTING DONE TO CONFIRM OUR FINDINGS. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE LT FAIL-SAFE STRAP LOWER BOLT HOLE HAD A CRACK INDICATION ON THE FWD EDGE OF THE HOLE. THE RT FAIL-SAFE STRAP INSP ALSO CONFIRMED A CRACK ON THE AFT EDGE OF THE HOLE WITH SIGNS OF CORROSION. WE RECEIVED THE FINAL NDT REPORT ON 5-19-09. WE ARE CURRENTLY PLANNING TO DO THE TERMINATING ACTION IAW SB 767-53A0100 (R1) STEP 3. B.
RT NR1 WINDSHIELD FAILURE.
UNCOMANDED DEPLOYMENT OF OFF WING EVACUATION SLIDE.
WHILE ACFT WAS ON GROUND, WITH JUST APU RUNNING, THE LT OVERWING SLIDE DEPLOYED. THE ESCAPE HATCH WAS NOT DISTURBED. THIS TOOK PLACE IN LFPB. THE ONLY THING DONE PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT WAS THAT THE LEAD F/A PUSHED THE EMERGENCY LIGHTING TEST SWITCH AT THE L1 CONTROL PANEL LOCATED ON THE F/A JUMP SEAT. THE TEST FUNCTIONED CORRECTLY, AND APPROX. 5 MIN. AFTER THE TEST, THE SLIDE DEPLOYED. THE SLIDE COMPONENTS REMOVED WERE SLIDE RAMP ASSY P/N 101630-305 S/NPG0261, INITIATOR ACTUATOR P/N 6023100-2,S/N 0263, LATCH ACTUATOR P/N 3125400-11,S/N 266, ACTUATOR P/N 526-2100, S/N 1171, BOTTLE P/N 130104-237, S/N IZ4603, EMERGENCY BATTERY CHARGER P/N 2012-1 AND BATTERY PACK P/N 2013-1A. THE BATTERY WAS FOUND TO HAVE A VOLTAGE OF 1.8 VOLTS. INSTALLED O/H SLIDE RAMP ASSY P/N 101630-305, S/N PG0192, O/H BOTTLE P/N 130104-237, S/N IZ5570, NEXT O/H DATE OF 01/11/2012, INITIATOR ACTUATOR P/N 6023100-2 S/N DL3, ACTUATOR P/N 5262100 S/N 2870, ACTUATOR P/N 3125400-11, S/N 2622, BATTERY CHARGER P/N 2012-1 S/N 2214 AND BATTERY PACK ASSY P/N 2013-1A, S/N 95660, AND ACTUATOR P/N 5262100, S/N 2872.THE SYSTEM FAILED DUE TO STC WIRING INSTALLED TO BATTERY PACK AFTER EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION AT A CERTIFIED REPAIR STATION IN THE US.
A SLIDE DEPLOYMENT OF THE RT AFT ENTRY DOOR OF THE ACFT WAS ATTEMPTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A DITCHING DEMONSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF OUR FAR PART 125 CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BY FSDO - 25. THE SLIDE DID NOT EXTRACT FROM THE DOOR BUSTLE AS THE DOOR WAS OPENED. UPON INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE GIRT BAR WAS NOT PROPERLY INSERTED INTO THE GIRT BAR CARRIER OF THE SLIDE AS CALLED OUT IN AMM 25-66-01, PAGE 405, STEP (15). THIS CONDITION WAS CORRECTED AND THE DOOR WAS CLOSED TO ATTEMPT SLIDE DEPLOYMENT AGAIN. ON THE SECOND ATTEMPT, THE SLIDE PACK DID RELEASE FROM THE DOOR AND DROPPED PROPERLY, HOWEVER IT DID NOT INFLATE. THE IN-CABIN FA OPERATING THE DOOR ATTEMPTED TO MANUALLY INFLATE THE SLIDE USING THE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE; HOWEVER THE SLIDE WOULD NOT INFLATE. AT THIS TIME, THE SLIDE WAS CHECK TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THIS SECOND OPERATIONAL FAILURE. IT WAS FOUND THAT THE SLIDE INFLATION BOTTLE SAFETY PIN HAD NOT BEEN REMOVED ON INSTALLATION OF THE SLIDE AS CALLED OUT IN THE AMM 25-66-01, PAGE 406, STEP (18). (K)