N933JX

ATA 7200

DURING CLIMB OUT EN ROUTE FROM HOU TO DAL, PASSING APPROXIMATELY FL200, THE CREW EXPERIENCED A SUDDEN AND MAJOR MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE #2 ENGINE. THIS WAS INDICATED BY AN EICAS MESSAGE, ACCOMPANIED BY A RAPID CASCADE OF SECONDARY MASTER CAUTIONS, INCLUDING A LOSS OF GENERATORS, ICING CONDITION ALERTS, AND AN UNCOMMANDED RISE IN CABIN PRESSURE. THE CREW IMMEDIATELY FOCUSED ON BASIC AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND STABILIZED THE AIRCRAFT. I CROSS-CHECKED THE EICAS INDICATIONS WITH PRIMARY ENGINE INSTRUMENTS. THE #2 ENGINE EXHIBITED ZERO ROTATION N2, AND SEVERE VIBRATION INDICATIONS PRIOR TO SPOOL-DOWN, CONFIRMING A CATASTROPHIC MECHANICAL FAILURE RATHER THAN A SIMPLE FLAMEOUT. DUE TO THE SECONDARY INDICATIONS (CABIN PRESSURE RISING AND ICING CONDITIONS), THE WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT WAS EXTREMELY HIGH. I INITIATED A CONTROLLED DESCENT TO 12,000 FEET TO ADDRESS THE PRESSURIZATION ISSUE, PROVIDE A WARMER/DENSER AIR MASS, AND CLEAR THE IMMEDIATE ICING THREAT WHILE THE FIRST OFFICER EXECUTED THE APPROPRIATE QRH CHECKLISTS (ENGINE OUT). IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ENGINE FAILURE AND EICAS CASCADE, I NOTIFIED ATC OF OUR OPERATIONAL STATUS (LOSS OF ENGINE #2 AND SECONDARY SYSTEMS ISSUES). ATC IMMEDIATELY PROVIDED PRIORITY HANDLING, CLEARING THE AIRSPACE AHEAD OF US AND GRANTING US DIRECT ROUTING. BECAUSE ATC HAD ALREADY SEAMLESSLY INTEGRATED US INTO A PRIORITY HANDLING FLOW TOWARD THE DALLAS AREA, AND BECAUSE THE AIRCRAFT WAS STABILIZED AT 12,000 FEET, DIVERTING ABRUPTLY INTO A CLOSER AIRPORT WOULD HAVE DISRUPTED THIS STABLE ATC FLOW, FORCED A RAPID DESCENT, AND INCREASED CREW WORKLOAD DURING CRITICAL CHECKLIST EXECUTION. AFTER STABILIZING THE AIRCRAFT AT 12,000 FEET AND SECURING THE #2 ENGINE, I EVALUATED THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. WHILE COLLEGE STATION (CLL) WAS GEOGRAPHICALLY CLOSER, I DETERMINED IT WAS NOT THE SAFEST SUITABLE AIRPORT. TIME AND COCKPIT WORKLOAD: RUSHING AN IMMEDIATE APPROACH INTO CLL WOULD HAVE FORCED THE CREW TO CONDUCT CRITICAL EMERGENCY CHECKLISTS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY MANEUVERING FOR A SHORT-RANGE ARRIVAL. THIS WOULD HAVE SEVERELY DEGRADED OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INCREASED THE RISK OF A RUSHED, UNSTABILIZED APPROACH. AIRPORT CAPABILITY & WEATHER: DALLAS LOVE FIELD (DAL) OFFERED SUPERIOR RUNWAY LENGTHS, FAVORABLE WEATHER, MAXIMUM ARFF (EMERGENCY SERVICES) CAPABILITY, AND A FAMILIAR ATC ENVIRONMENT. SINGLE-ENGINE PERFORMANCE IN ICING: GIVEN THAT WE HAD ENCOUNTERED ICING CONDITIONS, MAXIMIZING OUR OPERATIONAL SAFETY MARGIN BY TRANSITIONING TO A HIGH-CAPABILITY ENVIRONMENT (DAL) WAS DEEMED SAFER THAN ATTEMPTING AN IMMEDIATE PENETRATION OF WEATHER INTO A LOWER-CAPABILITY FIELD WITH SINGLE-ENGINE ANTI-ICE LOADS. . APPROACH AND LANDING. BY ELECTING TO CONTINUE TO DAL, THE CREW HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO METHODICALLY SECURE THE FAILED ENGINE, STABILIZE THE CABIN PRESSURE, CONFIGURE THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM, AND BRIEF THE PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS. WE WERE CLEARED FOR AND EXECUTED THE ILS RUNWAY 13L APPROACH INTO DAL. UTILIZING A PRECISION ILS APPROACH ALLOWED US TO MAINTAIN A LOW-WORKLOAD, HIGHLY STABILIZED ENVIRONMENT UTILIZING THE AUTOPILOT. ATC WAS FULLY COORDINATED, EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT WAS STAGED, AND A STABLE, SINGLE-ENGINE PRECISION LANDING WAS EXECUTED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE DECISION TO CONTINUE TO DAL WAS MADE ENTIRELY IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY, PRIORITIZING WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT, ASSET AVAILABILITY, AND A STABILIZED APPROACH OVER A RUSHED, HIGH-RISK DIVERSION. MX ACTION-R&R #2 ENGINE DUE TO INTERNAL FAILURE.

ATA 3418

CREW REPORTED SPS ADV EICAS MESSAGE ELECTED TO RETURN TO DAL. CORR ACTION- MX REPLACED STALL PROTECTION COMPUTER ALL OPS CHECKS C/W GOOD.