Altius Aviation, LLC

Sanction: $40,000 · case closed 2025-03-31

Part: SEAT TRACK — REVERSED (ZONE 100) · airframe 3,090 hrs · 2,193 cycles

NEW CO-PILOT WHO IS SHORT IN STATURE COMPLAINED THAT DURING ROTATION HER SEAT WILL COME UNLOCKED AND SLIDE BACK. PREVIOUS FLIGHT CREWS HAVE NEVER OPERATED OUT OF THE FORWARD MOST SET OF SEAT TRACK HOLES. FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE FORWARD SEAT STOP BRACKET HOLES ARE NOT DRILLED IN THE CENTER OF THE BRACKET, BUT OFFSET APPROX 3/16", LIMITING FORWARD TRAVEL OF THE SEAT BY ABOUT 3/32". SEAT PIN WOULD CATCH, BUT NOT COMPLETELY ENGAGE THE SEAT TRACK HOLE, APPEARING TO BE LOCKED IN, UNTIL ROTATION, AND SEAT WOULD SLIDE BACK. ASSURING THAT BOTH IB SIDE AND OB SIDE SEAT STOP BRACKETS ARE ORIENTED WITH THE HOLE OFF-SET TO THE AFT ASSURES THAT THE SEAT CAN SLIDE FORWARD ALL THE WAY TO ENGAGE THE SEAT TRACK HOLE. THE LEAR 60 AMM 25-10-01, REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION OF THE CREW SEATS DOES NOT MENTION ANY SPECIFIC ORIENTATION OF THE SEAT RAIL STOPS. WE WILL BE USING A METAL STAMP TO MARK CORRECT ORIENTATION TO ASSURE FUTURE INSTALLATION IS CORRECT.

Part: STEERING SYS — FAILED (NLG) · airframe 6,154 hrs · 4,523 cycles

NOSE WHEEL STEERING FAIL AFTER TAKEOFF.

Part: ROD END — BROKEN (NLG STEERING) · airframe 5,994 hrs · 4,419 cycles

NOSE WHEEL STEERING FAIL CAS MESSAGE AFTER ROTATION ON TAKEOFF FROM KHYA. AIRCRAFT DIVERTED TO KPVD. ULTIMATELY FOUND THAT THE SAFETY-WIRE FOR THE JAM-NUT FOR THE ROD END FOR THE WEIGHT ON WHEELS WAS BROKEN, ALLOWING THE WEIGHT ON WHEELS SENSOR TO BECOME OUT OF RIG, INHIBITING THE NOSE WHEEL STEERING SYSTEM.

Part: VALVE — MALFUNCTIONED (CABIN PRESSURE) · airframe 4,247 hrs · 2,921 cycles

AIRCRAFT DEPARTED KJAN. CLIMBING THROUGH 21,000 FT, PASSENGERS CAME FORWARD AND ALERTED CREW OF HIGHER THAN NORMAL CABIN TEMP AND THE APPEARANCE OF A "HAZE" IN THE CABIN. AS CREW BEGAN TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE, THE AMBER "PRESS SYSTEM" ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED ALONG WITH A "FAULT" LIGHT ON THE CABIN PRESS CONTROL PANEL. THE CREW THEN OBSERVED THE CABIN RATE INDICATOR SWINGING WILDLY FROM MAX CLIMB TO MAX DESCEND AND BACK. CREW SWITCHED TO MANUAL MODE FOR BOTH CABIN TEMP AND CABIN PRESS CONTROL WITH NO CHANGE. CREW INITIATED THE APPROPRIATE EMERGENCY CHECKLIST FOR THE OBSERVED ANNUNCIATION, "PRESS SYSTEM". ACTIONS OF THE CHECKLIST HAD NO EFFECT ON ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM BEHAVIOR. THE CREW THEN DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AND RETURNED TO KJAN, AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LANDING. TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED THAT THE RIGHT EMERGENCY PRESSURIZATION VALVE MALFUNCTIONED, OPENING UNCOMMANDED, ALLOWING UNCONDITIONED AIR INTO THE CABIN, WITHOUT AN "EMERGENCY PRESS" ANNUNCIATOR. THIS HOT AIR CONTINUALLY THROUGH THE UNDERFLOOR VENTILATION SYSTEM, CAUSED AN APPROXIMATELY 3 INCH SECTION OF THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION VACUUM SOURCE CONTROL LINE TO BECOME PLIABLE ENOUGH TO COLLAPSE AND RESTRICT THE VACUUM INPUT TO THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION CONTROLLER, RESULTING IN THE OUTFLOW VALVES CLOSING, WITH NO VACUUM AVAILABLE TO OPEN THEM IN AUTO OR MANUAL MODE.

Part: RETAINING CLIP — FAILED (NACELLE) · airframe 5,690 hrs · 4,137 cycles

DURING CLIMBOUT, LT ENGINE FIRE WARNING WENT OFF. CREW FOLLOWED CHECKLIST PROCEDURES AND PULLED BACK THROTTLE AND LIGHT WAS STILL ILLUMINATED FOR 15 SECONDS AND THEN CREW PULLED, T-HANDLE IAW CHECKLIST REQUIREMENTS AND LIGHT DID NOT EXTINGUISH. CREW THEN SELECTED ONE SHOT OF FIRE BOTTLE AND LIGHT EXTINGUISHED. ACFT LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL DISCOVERED SMALL, BUTTERFLY CLIP SUPPORT ON FIRE LOOP FAILED ALLOWING FIRE LOOP TO REST UPON BLEED AIR VALVE. CLIP WAS REPLACED AND MM PROCEDURES WERE ACCOMPLISHED AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.