Sawyer Aviation LLC

Operated by Sawyer Aviation (per NTSB report)

The failure of the student pilot to maintain pitch control while landing, which resulted in a hard landing, loss of directional control, and runway excursion.

Operated by Sawyer Aviation LLC (per NTSB report)

overload of the nose landing gear actuator attach bracket resulting in collapse of the nose gear while taxiing. It is undetermined when and under what circumstances the overload occurred.

Operated by SAWYER AVIATION (per NTSB report)

the pilot's misjudging the flare altitude and failing to maintain adequate airspeed resulting in an inadvertent stall and hard landing. The pilot's lack of total time in the airplane is a factor in this accident.

Operated by SAWYER AVIATION (per NTSB report)

THE STUDENT PILOT'S IMPROPER FLARE AND RECOVERY FROM THE ENSUING BOUNCED LANDING.

Operated by SAWYER AVIATION (per NTSB report)

THE CFI'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISION AND HIS DELAYED REMEDIAL ACTION. A FACTOR WAS CARBURETOR ICING CONDITIONS.

Operated by SAWYER AVIATION (per NTSB report)

THE FAILURE OF THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR TO ENSURE THAT AN ADEQUATE AIRSPEED WAS MAINTAINED DURING THE FINAL APPROACH FOR THE EXISTING WIND CONDITIONS; TO ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF THE FLIGHT; AND TO ARREST THE RATE OF DESCENT PRIOR TO TOUCH DOWN.

Sanction not stated · case closed 2025-04-15

Sanction not stated · case closed 2024-05-16

Sanction: $7,500 · case closed 2024-01-30

Part: NONE — LOOSE (ZONE 500) · airframe 5,229 hrs · 4,599 cycles

UPON CLIMB OUT FROM KSDL THE PILOT SAW A LH GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT. HE THEN CYCLED THE LANDING GEAR AND APPROX. 4 MINUTES LATER HE SAW THE RED GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT AGAIN. HE CYCLED THE LANDING GEAR ONCE MORE AND THE CREW RETURNED TO BASE. - MAINTENANCE TROUBLESHOT THE DISCREPANCY AND FOUND THAT THE LH MLG UP-LOCK SUPPORT BRACKET WHICH HOUSES THE UP-LOCK SWITCH TO BE LOOSE CAUSING MOTION SUFFICIENT TO UN-ACTUATE THE UP-LOCK SWITCH. MAINTENANCE CORRECTED THE ISSUE, AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RELEASED.

Part: LINK — CRACKED (RT DOOR FLAP) · airframe 4,107 hrs · 4,114 cycles

DURING A SCHEDULED INSPECTION THE RH FLAP LINK ASSEMBLY CONNECTING THE INBOARD FLAP TO THE FUSELAGE FAIRING WAS DISCONNECTED AND CRACKED. SEE THE ATTACHED PICTURE. NO DAMAGE TO THE FAIRING WAS FOUND.

Part: CONNECTOR — CORRODED (FIRE DETECTOR) · airframe 3,999 hrs · 3,975 cycles

THIS IS THE 2ND EVENT OF A FALSE FIRE WARNING MESSAGE, 9.5 HOURS & 16 CYCLES SINCE PRIOR EVENT. DURING CRUISE FLIGHT AT 41,000 FT. RH ENGINE FIRE WARNING. CREW DIVERTED TO KBUR AND LANDED. ENGINE WAS SHUTDOWN PRIOR TO LANDING AND THE SINGLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER DISCHARGED. CREW LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND LANDING NO FIRE WAS EVIDENT. FIRE WARNING REMAINED ON EVEN AFTER THE AIRCRAFT LANDED AND SHUTDOWN. MAINTENANCE DISPATCHED, ARRIVED ABOUT 3 HOURS AFTER LANDING. AFTER EXAMINING THE ENGINE THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF FIRE. WHEN MAINTENANCE PERFORMED THE FIRE WARNING OPERATIONAL CHECK (390 MM 26-10-00, PARA. 3) PERFORMED AND PASSED. ENGINE FIRE SENSOR CONNECTIONS CHECKED AND INSPECTED FOR FIRE LOOP DAMAGE, NO DEFECTS NOTED. THE FIRE DETECTION CONTROLLER WAS EXAMINED BY REMOVING THE UNIT AND DISCONNECTING THE 2 CONNECTORS. THE RH SYSTEM CONNECTOR 26A1P2 WAS FOUND WITH CORROSION IN THE CONNECTOR. USING CONTACT CLEARER THE CONNECTOR AND SOCKET WERE CLEANED. FIRE DETECTION CONTROLLER INPUTS WERE SWAPPED FOR TROUBLESHOOTING PURPOSES. ENGINE FIRE EXTINGUISHER REPLACED AND FUNCTIONAL CHECKS COMPLETED. ENGINE RUNS PERFORMED AT 80% POWER FOR 5 MINUTES, NO DEFECTS NOTED. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE AND FLOWN TO KDVT. NO OTHER FIRE WARNING ANNUNCIATIONS.

Part: SEAL — LEAKING (BLEED AIR) · airframe 3,989 hrs · 3,959 cycles

RIGHT FIRE LIGHT ON MFD AND RIGHT FIRE PUSH ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED IN FLIGHT AND DID NOT EXTINGUISH. THE DESCENT 100 MILES OUT FROM APA WAS WITH RIGHT ENGINE AT IDLE, WHICH HAD NO EFFECT. ALL ENGINE INDICATORS SUCH AS OIL READINGS REMAINED NORMAL, SHOWING AN ABSENCE OF FIRE. AFTER SHUTDOWN THE LIGHTS REMAINED ILLUMINATED. (PILOTS WRITE UP.) WHEN MAINTENANCE ARRIVED AT THE AIRCRAFT THE NEXT DAY. ENGINE FIRE INDICATION SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK PERFORMED AND PASSED. WHEN CREW ARRIVED TO RUN THE ENGINES TECHNICIAN PERFORMED LEAK CHECK OF THE RH ENGINE BLEED AIR ENGINE SYSTEM. FOUND EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE COMING FROM THE 'WIGGINS" CLAMP CONNECTING THE "Y" PIPES TOGETHER. THE SEALS THAT WERE REPLACED TO REPAIR THE LEAK ARE PN W932-24E, REF 390 IPC, CHAP 75-10-00-01 ITEMS 95. AFTER THE SEALS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW PERFORMED ANOTHER ENGINE RUN TO 80-% WITH NO LEAKS DETECTED. RECOMMEND ADDING INSPECTION AT ENGINE CHECK 1 INSPECTION TO RUN ENGINES TO 80% AND PERFORM ENGINE BLEED AIR SYSTEM LEAK CHECK.

Part: HOSE — RUPTURED (HYD SYSTEM) · airframe 6,904 hrs · 6,015 cycles

DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION BY PILOT LARGE AMOUNT OF HYDRAULIC FLUID VISIBLE ON BOTTOM OF FUSELAGE AND LEFT PYLON. PILOT ALSO REPORTED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM RESERVOIR BELOW ADD LINE. UPON INVESTIGATION BY MAINTENANCE THE LH THRUST ATTENUATOR ACTUATOR EXTEND HOSE LEAKING HYDRAULIC FLUID. HOSE PN AE6203B0185-180, CURE DATE 07-01. HOSE RUPTURED 1/4 INCH FROM ACTUATOR END FITTING. NO ABRASION SLEEVE COVERS THIS AREA OF HOSE. MINOR ABRASION DAMAGE EVIDENT ON SLEEVE APPROX. 5 INCHES FROM ACTUATOR WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN COVERED BY SPIRAL WRAP ABRASION PROTECTION. ALL 4 THRUST ATTENUATOR HOSES REPLACED WITH NEW.

Part: TIRE — BLOWN (RT MLG) · airframe 3,377 hrs · 3,498 cycles

WE TOOK OFF FROM 30C AT KIWA TO KSTS, WHERE OUR RT MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRE BLEW AFTER PASSING V1 AND CROSSED FROM THE CONCRETE PORTION OF THE RUNWAY TO THE ASPHALT. OUR TAKEOFF WEIGHT WAS 12,500LBS, THE WEATHER WAS VFR AND WE HAD FOUR PASSENGERS ON BOARD. ON TAKEOFF, WE FELT A THUMP IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY VIBRATION AND THE PLANE YAWING TO THE RIGHT. WE BECAME AIRBORNE AS WE WERE ALREADY COMMITTED TO THE TAKEOFF THEN ADVISED THE TOWER WE HAD AN ISSUE AND NEEDED TO RETURN FOR A LOW APPROACH TO HAVE THEM VISUALLY CONFIRM OUR TIRE WAS BLOWN. WE REQUESTED A LOW APPROACH WITH THE GEAR EXTENDED, TOWER CONFIRMED OUR RT TIRE WAS GONE SO WE REQUESTED VECTORS TO BURN OFF FUEL AND WOULD ADVISE WHEN WE WERE READY TO COME BACK IN AND LAND. ONCE ESTABLISHED IN DELAY VECTORS WE ADVISED COMPANY WE HAD AN ISSUE AND SOUGHT ADDITIONAL INPUT FROM ANOTHER COMPANY PILOT AS TO ANY ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS FOR LANDING. I DECIDED I WANTED TO BE AS LIGHT AS POSSIBLE AND SHUT DOWN ALL ENGINES AND SYSTEMS JUST AFTER LANDING. THE 9,500 RUNWAY OF 30R (OUR INTENDED RUNWAY) WAS MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR A NORMAL LANDING. APPROACH VECTORED US FOR A STRAIGHT IN ON 30R WHERE EMERGENCY VEHICLES WERE STANDING BY. WE TOUCHED DOWN AS LIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE SLIGHTLY LEFT OF CENTERLINE TO MAXIMIZE THE AVAILABLE 150’ WIDTH OF THE RUNWAY IN CASE OF DIRECTIONAL ISSUES, ACTIVATED THE LIFT DUMP, AND APPLIED LIGHT BRAKING. NOSE WHEEL STEERING WAS EFFECTIVE FOR AIRCRAFT CONTROL.