N4035W
Registered owner: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DC (owner ≠ operator)
Operators of this aircraft
Who operated this tail, and how firmly we know it.
| Operator | Role | Period | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY | Operator | on 2016-06-17 | Operator named in NTSB report |
Accident & incident history
Maintenance disclosures
Service Difficulty Reports filed with the FAA for this airframe. Filing is largely voluntary — the number of reports is not a measure of reliability. To verify a report, search its control number at the FAA SDRS site.
12 reports on file, 1996-10-29 – 2015-07-27.
Part: BOLT — MISMANUFACTURED (LANDING SKID) · airframe 10,088 hrs · 13,519 cycles
LANDING GEAR SKID BOLTS, WERE IMPROPERLY COATED. NEW PARTS REJECTED BY QUALITY CONTROL. BOLTS APPEAR TO HAVE CORROSION BUT UPON FURTHER INSPECTION, IT IS THE PROTECTIVE COATING THAT HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY APPLIED.
Part: LEVER — SEIZED (T/R SERVO CNTL)
DURING A SCHEDULED PHASE INSPECTION, WE ARE TO BE LOOKING FOR A HOLE THAT IS WORN OUT OF ROUND ON THE YAW CONTROL COMPENSATOR LEVER. WHEN THE CONTROL WAS REMOVED IT WAS FOUND THAT THE BEARING HAD FROZEN. THE BEARIING STILL HAD MOVEMENT IN THE SMALL RANGE IT USES TO ACTUATE 30 DEGREES. BUT THE REST WAS IMMOBILE. THERE IS NO PROCEDURE FOR REMOVING AND REPLACING OF THIS BEARING, SO THE COMPLETE UNIT HAS TO BE REPLACED.
Part: SEAL — MISSING (T/R DRIVE SHAFT)
AT A SCHEDULED INSPECTION THE SELF ADHESIVE SEAL PN 350A-1063-20 WAS FOUND NOT TO BE INSTALLED. THIS IS A SEAL THAT IS INSTALLED FOR DISSIMILAR METAL CORROSION ON THE TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT HANGAR SUPPORT AND THE HANGAR BEARINGS.
Part: BEARING — ROTATED (T/R DRIVE SHAFT)
AT A SCHEDULED INSPECTION THE BEARING PN 83A851BC3 HAD ROTATED IN THE RUBBER BUSHING PN FA3819 APPROX .3750. WE HAVE BEEN COMPLYING WITH SB REGARDING THE GREASING AND INSPECTION OF THESE BEARINGS AND STILL HAD A BEARING TURN. THIS IS AN AREA THAT CALLS FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION DURING INSPECTIONS AND DAILY PRE FLIGHTS. AT THIS TIME WE ARE INSTALLING THE NEWER TYPE BEARINGS THAT THIS SB DOES NOT APPLY TO.
Part: BRACKET — WORN (BATTERY BOX)
DURING A 100-HOUR INSPECTION, FOUND THE FORWARD BATTERY HOLD-DOWN BRACKET PN G10110 AND THE AFT BATTERY HOLD-DOWN BRACKET PN G10115 WERE BADLY WORN AT THE SLOTS THAT HOLD THE BATTERY IN PLACE. THERE ARE 3 AIRCRAFT WITH THE SAME STC INSTALLING THE BATTERY IN THE TAIL BOOM AND ALL SHOW THE SAME PROBLEM WITH THE BRACKET WEAR. WHEN ORDERING REPLACEMENT BRACKETS, THE HOLES DO NOT MATCH THE ATTACH POINTS IN THE AIRCRAFT. EVEN THROUGH ALL AIRCRAFT HAVE THE SAME STC, AEC SAYS THERE ARE AT LEAST 2 CHANGES TO THE DRAWINGS AND THAT THEY ARE WORKING ON THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO FIGURE OUT WHAT PART GOES TO WHAT CHANGE IN AIRCRAFT. TT: 2,571.3 HOURS. (X)
Part: CASE — CRACKED (BATTERY)
DURING 100-HOUR INSPECTION, LEAD ACID BATTERY WAS FOUND WITH A CASE CRACK IN ALL THE LOWER BOX CORNERS. ALL OF THE CRACKS ARE 1 INCH TO 2 INCHES LONG. BATTERY IS INSTALLED IN THE TAIL BOOM UNDER AN AEC STC. AT APPROX 119.48 STA, THE LEAD ACID BATTERY IS 4 POUNDS AND THE NICAD, IS 38 POUNDS. TIME ON BATTERY 395 HOURS. WITH THE INCREASED WEIGHT OF BATTERY AND LOCATION, POSSIBLY THE CASE OF THE BATTERY CANNOT STAND UP TO THE VIBRATIONS. ATTACH BRACKET WHERE THE BATTERY CLAMPS DOWN IS SQUARE CUT NOT ROUNDED. SUBMITTER STATED SECOND ACFT IN FLEET AT THIS SITE WITH THIS CONDITION. TO-DATE, SUBMITTER HAS HAD 6 CASES OF BATTERY BOX CASE CRACKING. (X)
Part: ADAPTER — DETACHED (STROBE LIGHT)
AFTER A FLIGHT AND ON THE POST-FLIGHT INSPECTION, THE TAIL STROBE BEACON WAS FOUND HANGING ON THE SIDE OF THE VERTICAL FIN. THE CLAMP WAS STILL IN PLACE BUT LOOSE ALLOWING THE STROBE LENS TO WEAR AWAY THE HOLDING ADAPTER FOR THE STROBE. WHEN ENOUGH MATERIAL WAS LOST, THE STROBE BROKE OFF. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN A LOT WORSE IF THE WIRES HAD BROKEN AND ALLOWED THE STROBE TO CONTACT THE TAIL ROTOR. THIS IS THE SECOND TIME ON TWO AIRCRAFT IN FLEET. BOTH AIRCRAFT HAD ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT OF TIME. (X)
Part: DETECTOR — FAILED (ENGINE FIRE)
DURING 500-HOUR T INSP' INSPECTION OF 3 OF THE 6 ENGINE FIRE DETECTORS WERE FOUND DEFECTED PER TURBOMECA MM CHAP 26-11-00 PARA 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES. TWO WERE OVERHEATED AND ON ONE THE OHMS WERE TOO LOW. SUBMITTER STATED THE OPERATOR BELIEVES THEY SHOULD HAVE HAD LONGER COMPONENT LIFE SINCE THIS IS THE ONLY FORM OF FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE AIRCRAFT.
Part: DETECTOR — FAILED (ENGINE FIRE)
DURING 500-HOUR T INSP' INSPECTION OF 3 OF THE 6 ENGINE FIRE DETECTORS WERE FOUND DEFECTED PER TURBOMECA MM CHAP 26-11-00 PARA 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES. TWO WERE OVERHEATED AND ON ONE THE OHMS WERE TOO LOW. SUBMITTER STATED THE OPERATOR BELIEVES THEY SHOULD HAVE HAD LONGER COMPONENT LIFE SINCE THIS IS THE ONLY FORM OF FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE AIRCRAFT.
Part: SCREW — DEFECTIVE (T/R DRIVE SHAFT)
DURING C/W SB 05.08 PARA 1C(2A) WHEN REINSTALLING SCREW INTO BEARING SUPPORT MOUNT BRACKET, MECHANIC STATED THAT TORQUE DID NOT FEEL STABLE. REMOVED AND INSPECTED, FOUND NO OBVIOUS DEFECTS. REINSTALLED TORQUED NUT AND, AGAIN, DID NOT FEEL LIKE TORQUE STABILIZED. ATTEMPTED TO TORQUE TO MAXIMUM, TORQUE BOLT FAILED. EUROCOPTER AS350B2 PARTS MANUAL, SCREW, PN 22208BC060012C, ITEM 230, FIGURE 65.10.10, PG 3.
Part: FREEWHEEL SHAFT — EXTRA O RING (ENG POWER SHAFT)
DURING REPLACEMENT OF MODULE I MAG ASSEMBLY, DISCOVERED AN O-RING ON POWER SHAFT BETWEEN FREEWHEEL UNIT AND MAG SEALING RING HOLDER. THIS PARTICULAR MODEL ENGINE DOES NOT USE AN O-RING IN THIS LOCATION. THE PRESENCE OF THIS O-RING COULD RESTRICT SOME FLOW OF OIL TO THE FREEWHEEL UNIT. THIS COMPONENT WAS NEVER WORKED ON BEFORE THIS SEAL REPLACEMENT. DEFECT WAS PROBABLY DONE DURING ASSEMBLY BY MANUFACTURER.
Part: CONTROL HEAD — MISWIRED (DME)
DME WOULD NOT WORK ON SEVERAL CHANNELS. THE AIRCRAFT WAS RECENTLY DELIVERED FROM MANUFACTURING AND WAS MISSING JUMPER IN CONTROL HEAD K1572 BETWEEN PINS 30 AND 47. THIS APPEARS TO BE A REVISION THAT WAS NOT INCORPORATED BY THE INSTALLER. THE OLD INSTALL MANUAL DOES NOT INDICATE THIS JUMPER.