HELIQWEST INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Operated by Heliqwest International, Inc. (per NTSB report)

ENROUTE TO A DIP SITE FOR ANOTHER BUCKET OF WATER THE PILOT SMELLED ELECTRICAL SMOKE IN THE CABIN OF THE AIRCRAFT. ODOR WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY SMOKE COMING FROM UNDER THE CENTER CONSOLE WHICH FILLED THE HELICOPTER CABIN. THE PILOT CALLED IN A MAYDAY OVER THE RADIO AND BEGAN FLYING TO AN OPEN FIELD NORTHWEST OF BUCKWITH RESERVOIR TO MAKE AN EMERGENCY LANDING. AIR ATTACK HALTED AIR OPERATIONS AND FOLLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO THE EMERGENCY LANDING SITE. ANOTHER HELICOPTER AND LARGE AIR TANKER ON THE INCIDENT ALSO FOLLOWED TO ENSURE THEY COULD PROVIDE HELP IF NEEDED. THE PILOT SHUT OFF THE THREE BATTERY SWITCHES ENROUTE TO THE LANDING SITE WHICH IMMEDIATELY CAUSED THE SMOKE TO SUBSIDE. WHILE THIS WAS OCCURRING AIR ATTACK INFORMED THE GROUND RESOURCES AND THE MANAGER OF THE HELICOPTER OVER THE VHF AIR TO GROUND INCIDENT FREQUENCY. THE CREW CAPTAIN THAT WAS MANAGING ONE OF THE DIP SITES MADE HIS WAY TO THE EMERGENCY LANDING SITE. NOTIFICATIONS WERE MADE FOLLOWING THE MISHAP RESPONSE PLAN AND ALL NECESSARY PERSONNEL WERE INFORMED OF THE UNFOLDING SITUATION. THE PILOT WAS ABLE TO SAFELY PUT THE AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND WITH NO INJURY OR FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT. THE DISTRICT CHIEF FOR THE AREA ARRIVED AT THE EMERGENCY LANDING SITE FIRST AND CONFIRMED THE LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE AS WELL AS CONFIRMED THAT THE PILOT WAS OKAY. NO FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT WAS CAUSED WHILE LANDING. THE MANAGER WAS ALSO ABLE TO REACH THE PILOT VIA CELL PHONE AND CONFIRMED THAT THE PILOT WAS OKAY. THE CREW CAPTAIN ARRIVED AT THE EMERGENCY LANDING SITE SHORTLY AFTER AND ENSURED THAT THE MECHANIC WAS ENROUTE. THE MANAGER INFORMED THE REGION AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE INSPECTOR ABOUT THE INCIDENT WITH THE PLAN TO FOLLOW UP ONCE A RESOLUTION WAS REACHED. THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT THE HELICOPTER OPERATIONS SPECIALIST WAS INFORMED WITH UPDATES AND DETAILS. THE MECHANIC ARRIVED AT THE LANDING SITE AND BEGAN DIAGNOSING THE HELICOPTER WITH THE PILOT. IT WAS FOUND THAT A BATTERY RELAY HAD FAILED AND BURNED THROUGH THE RELAY. UPON FINDING THE FAILED RELAY THE MECHANIC LOOKED THROUGH THE WIRING HARNESS TO ENSURE DAMAGE HADN’T SPREAD THROUGH THE ADJOINING WIRE HARNESS. ONCE THE ISSUE WAS DISCOVERED, A REPLACEMENT RELAY WAS ON HAND IN THE MECHANIC TRAILER. THE MECHANIC INSTALLED THE NEW RELAY AND COMPLETED THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION FOR THE REPAIR. THE HELICOPTER WAS TESTED WITH THE NEW PART, ENSURING THAT THE CIRCUITS ATTACHED TO THE RELAY BUSS WERE WORKING APPROPRIATELY AND NO CASCADING FAILURES HAD OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE FAILED RELAY.

REAR AFT CROSSTUBE FAILED WHILE AIRCRAFT WAS NOT RUNNING. CREW WANTED TO FILL BELLY TANK WITH WATER AND MARK NUMBER OF GALLONS, DURING FILLING OPERATIONS FROM WATER TENDER, REAR CROSSTUBE FAILED, BREAKING IN HALF, CAUSING HELICOPTER TO SETTLE ON ISOLAIR BELLY TANK USED FOR DROPPING WATER ON FIRES. EXTENSIVE DAMAGE CAUSED TO AFT CROSSTUBE TUNNEL AS WELL AS AIRCRAFT JACK POINTS.

WASTE AND WATER ACCESS DOOR INTERNAL SIDE HAS CORROSION NEAR ATTACHMENT AREA, REMOVED AND REPLACED HINGE AND BONDING STRAP REF SRM 51-41-02, AND 51-43-04, AND AMM 20-10-01.

DURING FLIGHT THE PILOT REPORTED THAT HIS RT TAIL ROTOR PEDAL WOULD PRESS FWD BUT HIS LT PEDAL COULD ONLY TRAVEL TO NEUTRAL POSITION. TOWER WAS CONTACTED & A REQUEST TO PERFORM A STUCK PEDAL LANDING WAS MADE. THE ACFT LANDED SAFELY & THE ENSUING MX INVESTIGATION LED TO A DISCOVERY OF A STUCK INPUT PILOT VLV IN THE TAIL ROTOR SERVO, PN SC5072 & SN 1662. THE SERVO WAS REMOVED & A REPLACEMENT ORDERED.

DURING SCHEDULED MX IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A BEARING WOULD NOT FIT BETWEEN THE MOUNTING LUGS OF THE SWASHPLATE SUPPORT, PN 204-011-404-125, SN RE18039. THE SWASHPLATE SUPPORT LUGS WERE DIMENSIONALLY CHECKED & ENGINEERING CONTACTED. THE DIMENSIONAL CHECK REVEALED THE FOLLOWING RESULTS, LUG 1 BELOW BUSSING - 0.777", ABOVE BUSHING - 0.777", BETWEEN BUSHINGS - 0.558". LUG 2 BELOW BUSHING - 0.772", ABOVE BUSHING - 0.763", BETWEEN BUSHINGS - 0.546". PRODUCT SUPPORT REPORTED THAT THE MINIMUM DIMENSION BETWEEN THE LUGS SHOULD BE 0.777 INCHES & THE DIMENSION BETWEEN THE BUSHING FLANGES SHOULD BE BETWEEN 0.558 & 0.560 INCHES. BASED ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED, LUG 2 DOES NOT MEET THE APPROVED ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT ALLOW REMOVAL OF MATERIAL FROM THE BUSHING FLANGES AS A REPAIR. FURTHERMORE, MFG COMMUNICATED THAT ANY BENDING OF THE LUGS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE & THE SWASHPLATE SUPPORT SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THE SWASHPLATE SUPPORT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THIS APPEARS TO BE A MFG DEFECT AS WE ARE AWARE OF ANOTHER OPERATOR RECENTLY DISCOVERING THE SAME ISSUE WITH THE SAME PN SWASHPLATE SUPPORT.

COMBUSTION CHAMBER HOUSING FOUND CRACKED 8 INCHES LONG FROM (LOOKING FORWARD) 12:30-2:30 POSITION. CRACK WAS FOUND AFTER SHUTDOWN DURING DAILY INSPECTION BY MECHANIC. NO IRREGULAR INDICATIONS OR PERFORMANCE DURING FLIGHT WAS NOTICED OR EMERGENCY ACTIONS WERE TAKEN, AS IT WAS VISUALLY FOUND POST FLIGHT.