VERIJET INC

Part 135 operator · designator VSNA

Data confidence: Records are linked by certificate number, aircraft registration, or a name match that a reviewer has confirmed. Each record below shows how it was linked.

Also recorded as: VERIJET INC, Verijet

Accident & enforcement record

Events that happened, regardless of the operator's own reporting. Each links to its public source.

NTSB accidents & incidents

Acc · 2022-11-25 Operator named in NTSB report
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF50 (N15VJ) None injury Part 91

Operated by Verijet (per NTSB report)

Source: NTSB case CEN23FA045

FAA enforcement actions

FAA enforcement records haven't been loaded into GroundCheck yet, so none can be shown — a gap in our data, not evidence of a clean enforcement history.

Maintenance disclosure history

Service Difficulty Reports are self-reported maintenance findings. The NUMBER of reports is not a measure of reliability — diligent operators file more, not fewer. These are shown for transparency, not as a negative signal.

9 reports on file.

O · 2023-11-14 Matched by certificate designator
N19VJ · ATA 7230

FJ33-5A ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER 361138, FROM AIRCRAFT SF50-0236 (N19VJ), WAS RETURNED TO THE REPAIR STATION FOR SCHEDULED CHECK 3 HOT-SECTION MAINTENANCE. TYPICALLY, CHECK 3 MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED “ON-FUSELAGE”; HOWEVER, ENGINE 361138 WAS SELECTED FOR WILLIAMS INTERNATIONAL’S OPERATION MONITORING PLAN (OMP). OMP REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE “AS-RECEIVED” ENGINE TESTING AND SUBSEQUENT ENGINE DISASSEMBLY BEYOND THE SCOPE OF CHECK 3 REQUIREMENTS. AS-RECEIVED ENGINE TESTING RESULTS REVEALED NOMINAL ENGINE PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS WITH INTER-TURBINE TEMPERATURE (ITT) BEING 6° RANKINE ABOVE THE NEW-ENGINE PRODUCTION ITT LIMIT FOR THE FJ33-5A ENGINE MODEL. DISASSEMBLY OF THE ENGINE’S COMPRESSOR SECTION REVEALED ONE LIBERATED 3RD-STAGE INTERMEDIATE PRESSURE COMPRESSOR (IPC) BLADE. NOTE: THE IPC ROTOR IS A THREE-STAGE AXIAL COMPRESSOR. FURTHER DISASSEMBLY OF THE ENGINE REVEALED DOWNSTREAM SECONDARY DAMAGE TO OTHER ENGINE COMPONENTS.

Source: SDR WI5R2023111700001 · FAA SDRS
B J · 2023-07-13 Matched by certificate designator
N19VJ · ATA 3600

DURING CLIMBOUT ECS BLEED OVERHEAT OBSERVED AND SMELL OF BURNING IN CABIN

Source: SDR 2023FA0000367 · FAA SDRS
J · 2023-03-29 Matched by certificate designator
N14VJ · ATA 7900

OIL PRESSURE WARNING IN FLIGHT AND LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS ON EIS DISPLAY

Source: SDR 2023F00101 · FAA SDRS
J · 2023-02-07 Matched by certificate designator
N14VJ · ATA 2820

BOTH FUEL VALVES FAILED.

Source: SDR 2023F00047 · FAA SDRS
F · 2022-11-25 Matched by certificate designator
N15VJ · ATA 2230

PILOT STATED DURING CLIMB OUT, AUTO THROTTLE ENGAGED, PULLING POWER BACK TO IDLE AND PITCHED AIRCRAFT NOSE UP AND WAS UNABLE TO DISENGAGE. TRIED TO COMMAND AIRCRAFT, ONCE DETERMINED UNABLE, DEPLOYED CAPS (CIRRUS AIRFRAME PARACHUTE SYSTEM) - AIRCRAFT BEING INVESTIGATED BY NTSB AND CIRRUS AIRCRAFT

Source: SDR 2022FA0000732 · FAA SDRS
J · 2022-09-08 Matched by certificate designator
N102JL · ATA 7300

FADEC CTRL DEGRADED 58 (FUEL METERING VALVE) ENGINE POWER FLUCTUATES AT MCT ON LANDING, THRUST LEVER IDLE POWER REMAINED AT 26%

Source: SDR 2022F00330 · FAA SDRS
B J · 2021-11-01 Matched by certificate designator
N803LU · ATA 2120

ON DEPARTURE, RECEIVED ECS CONTROL OVERHEAT, ECS CONTROL FAIL, TCV FAIL, AND A BURNING ODOR. TROUBLESHOT THE BLEED AIR SYSTEM TO SEE THE CAUSE OF THE CAS MESSAGES. FOUND THE AIRE DUCT LOOSE ON THE RAM AIR PLENUM TO BASS HEAT EXCHANGER PLENUM IN THE TAIL CONE. SECURED THE AIR DUCT AND SYSTEM FUNCTIONED OK.

Source: SDR VSNA20211120001 · FAA SDRS
J · 2021-03-07 Matched by certificate designator
N21VJ · ATA 7320

DURING CRUISE FLIGHT WITH ENGINE IPS HEAT ON FOR APPROX. 30 MIN. IN IMC FLIGHT CONDITIONS THE CAS WARNING RED "FADEC NO DISPATCH" AND AMBER FADEC DEGRADE ILLUMINATED AND COULD NOT BE RESET AS INSTRUCTED IN THE PILOTS CHECK LIST. PILOT HAD FULL CONTROL AT ALL TIMES OF THE ENGINE FADEC AND OPERATIONS WAS NORMAL. CHECKLIST INSTRUCTED PILOT TO "LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" AND PILOT INSTRUCTED ATC THAT HE WANTED TO DIVIATE TO ANOTHER AIRPORT AND DURING THE APPROACH AROUND 5000' THE FADEC RESET AND ALL LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED WITH NO FURTHER ISSUES WITH THE FADEC CAS FAULTS. DOWNLOAD ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT WHAT THE P2 ENGINE PRESSURE AND WHAT THE AVIONICS PITOT PRESSURE, I AM ASSUMING FROM THE ADC THAT REPORTS THIS DATA TO THE FADEC HAD GONE OUT OF LIMITS FROM EACH OTHER. AT 5000' THE SYSTEM RETURNED TO NORMAL LIMITS AND THE FADEC LIGHT WENT OUT. WILLIAMS IS INVESTIGATING THIS EVEN AND TO WHY THE AVIONICS IS REPORTING PRESSURE DATA TO THE ENGINE. I SUSPECT IT MIGHT BE BECAUSE OF THE SAFE RETURN GARMING FEATURE. IF THIS IS THE CASE THEN POSSIBLY A DIFFERENT CAS MESSAGE TO INDICATE A MISCOMPARE TO THE SAFE RETURN SYSTEM AND NOT TO THE FADEC ENGINE SYSTEM. THIS MIGHT CHANGE THE ACTION REQUIRED BY THE PILOT.

Source: SDR 2021F00046 · FAA SDRS
K S · 2021-02-08 Matched by certificate designator
N15VJ · ATA 2910

AIRCRAFT AFTER TAKEOFF AND AFTER THE LANDING GEAR WAS RETRACTED THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR REMAINED DOWN AND LOCKED, THE LEFT MAIN AND NOSE GEAR RETRACTED NORMALLY. PILOT SELECTED THE LANDING GEAR DOWN AND THE TWO EXTENDED AND ALL THREE INDICATED DOWN AND LOCKED. PILOT STATED PER CHECK THE GEAR WAS SELECTED UP AND THIS TIME THE LEFT MAIN GEAR REMAINED DOWN AND LOCKED AND THE RIGHT MAIN GEAR AND NOSE RETRACTED NORMALLY. PILOT PLACE THE GEAR HANDLE BACK DOWN AND THE TWO GEAR THAT RETRACTED CAME DOWN AND ALL THREE INDICATED DOWN AND LOCKED. PILOT CYCLED A THIRD TIME AND THE RESULTS WERE THE SAME AS THE SECOND. SEE ATTACHED DOCUMENT FOR FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE PILOT. ON INVESTIGATION THE CIRRUS MAINTENANCE SHOP FOUND A STAINLESS STEEL 11/16" B NUT NEAR THE HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR INSTALLED IN THE SUCTION RESERVOIR RETURN LINE LOOSE. THERE IS ALSO A 9/16' B NUT INSTALLED IN THE PRESSURE LINE NEAR THE SUCTION B NUT AND IT WAS FOUND TIGHT. THE LANDING GEAR HYDRAULIC POWER PACK HAD GOTTEN LOW ON FLUID DUE TO THE LEAK TO A LEVEL THAT COULD NOT RETRACT ALL THREE LANDING GEAR. ON INVESTIGATION IT WAS FOUND THE B NUT THAT WAS FOUND LOOSE IS THE CHOICE OF THE POINT FOR COLLECTION OF THE 100 HOUR/ANNUAL HYDRAULIC FLUID SOAP SAMPLE LOCATION. MRO WAS CONTACTED ABOUT THE EVENT ISSUE FOUND AS WAS CIRRUS AIRCRAFT. A REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE TO CIRRUS TO POSSIBLE INSTALL A SPRING LOADED PUSH OPEN DOOR OR A CLEAR WINDOW SO THAT THE PILOT AND OR THE MECHANIC CAN VIEW THE LEVEL OF THE RESERVOIR BEFORE EACH FLIGHT. PART 91 OPERATIONS COULD POSSIBLE FLY MANY HOURS BEFORE AN ANNUAL INSPECTION WOULD COME DUE AND THIS SHOULD BE ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT HAVING TO REMOVE THE SCREWED DOWN ACCESS PANEL. RESERVOIR WAS SERVICED AND THE GEAR HYDRAULIC SYSTEM BLED AND GEAR SWINGS WERE GOOD AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RELEASED.

Source: SDR VSNA202102230001 · FAA SDRS

Linked aircraft

N-numberMake / modelYearStatusLink basis
N102JLCIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF502020Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N14VJCIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF502020Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N15VJOperator named in NTSB report
N15VJMatched by certificate designator
N16VJCIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF502020Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N19VJCIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF502020Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N21VJCIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF502020Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N379SFCIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF502020Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N803LUMatched by certificate designator