Maritime Helicopters, Inc

Operated by Maritime Helicopters (per NTSB report)

The failure of both pilots to see and avoid while en route, which resulted in a midair collision.

Operated by MARITIME HELICOPTERS INC (per NTSB report)

The pilot's decision to fly at a low altitude over a large body of water toward featureless terrain, which resulted in a loss of visual clues and controlled flight into terrain.

Operated by MARITIME HELICOPTERS INC (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from power lines during an external load lift. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's lack of situational awareness.

Operated by MARITIME HELICOPTERS (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT'S LACK OF COMPENSATION FOR WIND CONDITIONS AND CONTINUED OPERATION WITH THE WIND IN THE 'CRITICAL WIND AZIMUTH' AREA WHICH LED TO LIMITED TAIL ROTOR AUTHORITY. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE VARIABLE AND GUSTY WIND CONDITIONS.

Operated by MARITIME HELICOPTERS INC. (per NTSB report)

Part: CIRCUIT CARD — SHORTED (NETWRK INTERFACE) · airframe 433 hrs · 1,583 cycles

ON JULY 22, 2021 AT APPROXIMATELY 0920, INFLIGHT AND IN IMC WHILE PERFORMING THE RNAV RWY 5 APPROACH INTO PAAD THE CREW EXPERIENCED A TEMPORARY LOSS OF VERTICAL AND LATERAL COURSE GUIDANCE AND A CASCADING PRESENTATION OF CAS MESSAGES INCLUDING AMBER: AGM 2 FAIL, APM FAIL, MAU B FAIL, CHECK COPILOT PFD, ASCB FAIL, UNABLE FMS-GPS MON AND CYAN: CMS 2 FAIL, AP 1 FAIL, FD 1 FAIL, YD 1 FAIL, TCAS FAIL, MONITOR FAULT, CAS B FAIL, AURAL WARNING FAULT, AIOP B FAIL AND GIO B FAIL. THE CAS MESSAGES WERE PRESENTING A CONTINUOUS AND REPEATING DISPLAY CYCLING ON AND OFF. ALSO INTERMITTENTLY REMOVED OR INOPERATIVE WERE THE FMS WAYPOINTS, THE PILOT AND COPILOT PFDS, COPILOT ALTIMETER, BOTH PILOT'S SYNTHETIC VISION AND THE INAV DISPLAY, WHICH LOST COURSE GUIDANCE AND WAYPOINT DISPLAY. SHORTLY AFTER THE FAILURE BEGAN THE SYSTEM SLOWLY RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE APPROACH CONTINUED TO A NORMAL LANDING. AFTER LANDING IN PAAD, ON ROLL OUT ANOTHER FAILURE TOOK PLACE IDENTICAL TO DESCRIBED ABOVE AND CONTINUED UNTIL SHUT DOWN ON THE RAMP. AFTER CONFERRING WITH MAINTENANCE A NORMAL AIRCRAFT POWER UP WAS DONE AND 3-4 MINUTES INTO THE POWER UP THE SYSTEM FAILED AS PREVIOUSLY LISTED ABOVE. AFTER CONSULTING WITH OEM (VIKING) TECHNICAL SUPPORT, COMPANY MAINTENANCE FOUND A POOR SOLDER SPLICE BETWEEN THE #2 NETWORK INTERFACE CARD AND THE AIRCRAFT STANDARD COMMUNICATION BUS. MAINTENANCE TESTED ALL THE WIRING AND PIN CONNECTIONS FOR THE MAU MODULES AND FOUND NO FURTHER BAD SPLICES OR CONNECTIONS.

Part: BLADE — DENTED (TAIL ROTOR) · airframe 12,099 hrs · 82,984 cycles

DAILY AIRCRAFT CHECK NOTED DENTS ON TAIL ROTOR BLADES OUTER SURFACE. NON-SHARP DENTS ON OTBD FACE OF BOTH BLADES. NO INDICATION OF STRIKE TO BLADE L/E.

Part: OIL COOLER — LEAKING (ZONE 200) · airframe 5,560 hrs

OIL COOLER CRACKED INTERNAL OF COOLER FINS CAUSING OIL LEAK.

Part: COUPLING — CHIPPED (M/R DRIVE)

DURING NORMAL 600-HOUR/12-MONTH INSPECTION AND REPACK OF MAIN ROTOR DRIVESHAFT, DISCOVERED A GEAR TOOTH (ON THE END) OF THE OUTER COUPLING WAS CHIPPED. SUBMITTER SIFTED THROUGH THE GREASE, BUT COULD NOT FIND ANY EVIDENCE OF THIRD CHIP. PART WAS RED-TAGGED AND DESTROYED. A NEW OUTER COUPLING OF SAME PART NUMBER INSTALLED AND AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. (X)