SKYTECH TRAVEL LLC
Also recorded as: SKYTECH TRAVEL LLC
Accident & enforcement record
Events that happened, regardless of the operator's own reporting. Each links to its public source.
NTSB accidents & incidents
No NTSB accidents or incidents linked to this operator.
FAA enforcement actions
FAA enforcement records haven't been loaded into GroundCheck yet, so none can be shown — a gap in our data, not evidence of a clean enforcement history.
Maintenance disclosure history
Service Difficulty Reports are self-reported maintenance findings. The NUMBER of reports is not a measure of reliability — diligent operators file more, not fewer. These are shown for transparency, not as a negative signal.
5 reports on file.
DURING COMPLIANCE WITH PIPER SL 1286D, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NOSE STEERING ARM LOCKING ADJUSTER WAS DEFORMED. THIS ALLOWED THE NOSE STEERING ARM CLEARANCE TO BECOME OUT OF LIMITS AND COULD HAVE POTENTIALLY CAUSED A CONTROL ISSUE UPON LANDING. REVIEW OF SL 1269D NOTES THE TORQUE SEQUENCE FOR THE PA-46-600TP STEERING ARM BOLT IS QUESTIONABLE. IT STATES TO TORQUE THE NUT TO 100 IN LBS AND THEN BACK OF TO NEXT CASTELLATION FOR COTTER PIN. THE HARDWARE FOR A PA-46-500TP USES A LOCKNUT AND THE TORQUE SPEC IS HIGHER. WE SUSPECT THAT THE TORQUE SPEC FOR THE PA-46-600TP IS NOT SUFFICIENT AND ALLOWS THE STEERING ARM TO BECOME LOOSE. THIS THEN APPLIES ALL THE FORCES TO THE LOCKING ADJUSTER WHICH IT IS NOT DESIGNED TO HANDLE. THE NOSE STEERING ARM LOCKING ADJUSTER WAS REPLACED IAW PIPER SL 1286D.
PILOT REPORTED THE PROPELLER HEAT CB OPENED AND A PROP HEAT FAIL MESSAGE ILLUMINATED ON THE MFD. ATTEMPTED ONE RESET OF CB WITHOUT SUCCESS. REMOVED SPINNER FOR VISUAL INSPECTION AND FOUND 4 OUT OF 5 PROPELLER HEAT HARNESSES HAD CHAFED THROUGH THE INSULATION CAUSING CONTACT WITH PROP SPINNER. REPLACED THE PROPELLER HEAT HARNESSES WITH NEW UNITS P/N 105555 IAW HARTZELL SB HC-SB-30-375. NOTE: THE REMOVED HARNESSES WERE THE SAME PART NUMBER BUT THE INSTALLATION HAD ALLOWED THE MOVEMENT OF THE HARNESS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ISSUE.
DURING A MAINTENANCE PRE-FLIGHT WALKAROUND, NOTED THE LH NOSE GEAR DOOR ROD ASSEMBLY CRACKED AT LOWER ROD END ATTACHMENT. INSTALLED PART APPEARS TO BE ORIGINAL TO AIRCRAFT. ROD END WAS NOT LOOSE IN ROD, BUT COULD BE COMPROMISED IF LEFT UNNOTICED. MAKE SURE TO PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO ALL LINKAGES WHEN PERFORMING INSPECTIONS. REPLACED THE ROD P/N 532.21.12.082.
THE FLAPS FAIL CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED UPON RETRACTION FROM THE 15 DEGREE SETTING ON CLIMBOUT. THE FAILURE OCCURRED WITHIN 2 â 3 SECONDS OF THE FLAP SELECTION. A RESULTANT PUSHER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED APPROXIMATELY 3 â 5 SECONDS LATER. THE CLIMB WAS CONTINUED MAINTAINING A SAFE AIRSPEED OF 150 KNOTS, WHICH IS WITHIN THE SPEED RANGE FOR FLAPS EXTENDED. THE FLAPS FAILURE IN FLIGHT PROCEDURE IN THE AIRCRAFT QRH WAS COMPLETED WITH VERIFICATION THAT NO CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE OPEN. THE QRH WAS AGAIN CONSULTED FOR THE PUSHER SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONâ PROCEDURE. ASSUMING THE AIRCRAFT WAS NO LONGER PROTECTED FROM STALLS, THE SAFE OPERATING AIRSPEEDS WERE BRIEFED FOR THE ESTIMATE FLAP POSITION. AN AIRBORNE PUSHER SYSTEM CHECK WAS COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY, WITH THE PUSHER LIGHT REMAINING ILLUMINATED. THERE WERE NO ADVERSE CONTROL FORCES THAT WOULD INDICATE AN ASYMMETRIC FLAP CONDITION. NO EXCESS AILERON TRIM WAS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN LEVEL FLIGHT. WITH THE PUSHER OPERATING IN THE PUSHER SAFE MODE, FLIGHT WAS CONTINUED TO ITS DESTINATION. UPON LANDING, A FLAP RESET PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED AND THE FLAP FAIL CAUTION LIGHT EXTINGUISHED. UPON EXTENSION OF FLAPS FROM ZERO TO FIFTEEN DEGREES, THE FLAPS FAIL LIGHT ILLUMINATED AGAIN. THE SUSPECTED CAUSE IS A FLAP CONTROL WARNING UNIT BUT HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED PRIOR TO SUBMISSION OF THIS REPORT. WORK IS IN PROGRESS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE AND AN ADDENDUM TO THIS REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION: INSPECTED AIRCRAFT FLAPS SYSTEM. FOUND TWO DISCREPANCIES CAUSING THE FLAP FAILURE. THE LT FLAP ROTATION TRANSMITTER ADAPTER BECAME DISCONNECTED INTERNALLY. THE SCREW HOLDING THE ROTATION "TARGET" TO THE DRIVE SHAFT HAD BACKED OUT. THIS PREVENTED ROTATION INFORMATION TO BE TRANSMITTED TO THE FLAP COMPUTER WHICH CAUSED A SHUTDOWN. IN THE COURSE OF TROUBLESHOOTING THE SYSTEM, THE RT FLAP PROXIMITY SENSOR FAILED ELECTRICALLY. IT WOULD NOT CONSISTENTLY TRANSMIT SIGNAL TO FLAP COMPUTER. THE LT FLAP ROTATION TRANSMITTER ADAPTER WAS ORIGINAL TO THE AIRCRAFT ANF HAD 8386.0 HOURS IN SERVICE. IT IS ALSO ASSUMED THAT THE PROXIMITY SWITCH IS ORIGINAL.
NR 2 BATTERY WOULD NOT CHARGE WHEN THE NR 2 GENERATOR SELECTED TO ON. THE GENERATOR VOLTMETER INDICATED PROPER OUTPUT AND THERE WAS NO ASSOCIATED FAILURE INDICATION. CYCLING THE NR 2 GENERATOR WOULD RESOLVE PROBLEM. DETERMINED HIGH RESISTANCE PRESENT ON MAIN CONTACTS OF NR 2 GENERATOR CONTACTOR WHEN ENERGIZED CLOSED. REPLACED CONTACTOR.
Linked aircraft
| N-number | Make / model | Year | Status | Link basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N107PJ | PILATUS AIRCRAFT LTD PC-24 | 2018 | Valid Registration | Matched by certificate designator |
| N125LE | — | — | Matched by certificate designator | |
| N331NG | PILATUS AIRCRAFT LTD PC-12/47E | 2012 | Valid Registration | Matched by certificate designator |
| N479ST | PILATUS PC-12/45 | 2000 | Valid Registration | Matched by certificate designator |
| N60HL | PIPER AIRCRAFT INC PA-46-600TP | 2019 | Valid Registration | Matched by certificate designator |
| N992ST | PIPER PA-46-600TP | 2019 | Valid Registration | Matched by certificate designator |