Neptune Aviation Services Inc

Operated by NEPTUNE AVIATION SERVICES INC (per NTSB report)

The use of a new long term fire retardant with a chemical composition incompatible with the retardant previously in use for the integration-operational field evaluation without adequate testing and qualification.

Operated by NEPTUNE AVIATION SERVICES INC (per NTSB report)

Maintenance personnel's failure to secure hardware, which resulted in an uncommanded upward deflection of the left elevator and aft movement of the control yoke and inhibited the flight crew from adjusting the airplane's pitch attitude in flight. Contributing to the accident was the lack of maintenance oversight, which should have identified the unsecured hardware before flight.

Operated by NEPTUNE AVIATION SERVICES INC (per NTSB report)

The flight crew's misjudgment of terrain clearance while maneuvering for an aerial application run, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to follow the lead airplane's track and to effectively compensate for the tailwind condition while maneuvering.

Operated by NEPTUNE AVIATION SERVICES INC (per NTSB report)

The flight crew's failure to maintain terrain clearance during low altitude flight in low ceiling and visibility conditions. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to adequately monitor their location with respect to the rising terrain environment ahead, and, their lack of crew resource management communication as a crew.

Operated by Neptune Aviation Services Inc. (per NTSB report)

The failure of the flight crew to maintain airspeed above in-flight minimum control speed (Vmca) after losing power in the left jet engine during initial climb after takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the crew's inadequate cockpit resource management procedures, the failure of the captain to assume command of the airplane during the emergency, the flight crew's failure to carry out the jet engine fire emergency procedure, and the failure of the crew to jettison the retardant load.

Part: REGULATOR VALVE — STUCK (RT ENGINE) · airframe 13,872 hrs · 9,391 cycles

DURING FLT, SMOKE IN CABIN, DURING SLOW CRUISE FLT OVER FIRE TRAFFIC AREA, PERFORMED QRH ITEMS, REMOVED SMOKE FROM CABIN. DEPARTED THE FTA TO KCDC LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER PROBLEMS. MX TROUBLESHOT SMOKE IN CABIN TO BE COMING FROM RT ENG. AFTER EXTENSIVE TROUBLESHOOTING OF R/H ENGINE AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM AND COMPONENTS. FOUND REGULATING VALVE NEXT TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT (ECU) STUCK IN OPEN POSITION. THIS CONDITION ALLOWED FOR UNRESTRICTED P3 AIR TO OVERHEAT ECU AND BURN OFF OIL CAUSING SMOKE AND HIGH DUCT TEMPS.

Part: SEAL — LEAKING (ZONE 400) · airframe 39,820 hrs · 55,454 cycles

ENROUTE TO THE BEULAH INCIDENT, APPROXIMATELY 30 MILES EAST OF HIF, THE PYLON 3 OVHT LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE MWP. THE ENGINES WERE SET TO CLIMB THRUST OF 800 TGT WHEN THE LIGHT CAME ON. WE COMPLETED THE QRH PROCEDURE FOR PYLON OVERHEAT AND TURNED TOWARD THE NEAREST JETTISON AREA. THE QRH PROCEDURE DIRECTED THAT WE COULD CONTINUE ENGINE OPERATION AT A RESTRICTED THRUST SETTING TO KEEP THE CAPTION OUT. WE LEFT THE ENGINE AT FLIGHT IDLE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT. WE NOTIFIED DISPATCH AND HILL TANKER BASE. WE DECLARED AN EMERGENCY WITH HIF TOWER AND SALT LAKE APPROACH. JETTISON AND LANDING WERE NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. LOCATED AIR LEAKAGE FROM AN UNSEATED DUCT AND LOOSE V-BAND CLAMPS BOTH UPSTREAM & DOWNSTREAM OF THE BLEED AIR COOLER ON PYLON#3. REPLACED V-BAND (P/N: B38C37) ON FWD END OF VENTURI DUCT CONNECTOR AND REPLACE BOTH CRUSH SEALS & UPSTREAM PERI SEALS (P/N 706-3-250) AT BLEED AIR COOLER ATTACHMENT COUPLING DURING REASSEMBLY OF DISTURBED DUCTING. OPS CHECK GOOD. NO LEAKS NOTED.

Part: ENGINE — FLAMED OUT (RT ENGINE) · airframe 7,663 hrs · 8,406 cycles

PILOT REPORT: WE WERE ORBITING THE FIRE AT 10,500' IN A RIGHT TURN, WITH BOTH ENGINES STABILIZED AT 200 HORSEPOWER EACH AND FUEL FLOWS AT 200 LBS./HR. EACH WHEN I FELT A YAWING MOTION THAT I INITIALLY THOUGHT WAS WAKE TURBULENCE. LOOKING AT THE ENGINE INSTRUMENTS I QUICKLY NOTICED THAT THE RIGHT ENGINE HORSEPOWER WAS READING ZERO, THE RIGHT ENGINE ITT WAS DECREASING THROUGH 300 DEGREES CENTIGRADE, AND THE RIGHT ENGINE RPM WAS DECREASING THROUGH 30%. I INFORMED THE ATGS AND THE ATGS TRAINEE THAT WE HAD LOST THE RIGHT ENGINE, AND WOULD BE STARTING A TURN TOWARDS ELKO, NEVADA, OUR NEAREST RECOVERY AIRPORT. AFTER STABILIZING THE AIRCRAFT I ENGAGED THE AUTOPILOT AND RAN THE QRH ITEMS FOR ENGINE FAILURE IN FLIGHT. WITH THE ENGINE SECURED, AND NOT NOTICING ANY ERRATIC OR UNUSUAL ENGINE INDICATIONS BEFORE OR DURING THE FAILURE I DECIDED TO ATTEMPT A RELIGHT. I ACCOMPLISHED THE ENGINE RELIGHT PROCEDURE IN THE QRH AND THE ENGINE RESTARTED UNEVENTFULLY. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY 20 MINUTES LATER IN ELKO WITH BOTH ENGINES OPERATING NORMALLY. NO EMERGENCY DECLARED.

Part: FRAME — CRACKED (ZONE 200) · airframe 6,834 hrs

WHILE PERFORMING ZONE 4 INSPECTION OF SB 244, FOUND CRACKS IN UPPER FRAME AT FS 386 IN BOTH PASS THROUGH HOLES.

Part: FRAME — CRACKED (ZONE 200) · airframe 7,524 hrs

WHILE PERFORMING ZONE 4 INSPECTION OF SB 244, FOUND CRACKS IN UPPER FRAME AT FS 386 IN BOTH PASS THROUGH HOLES.

Part: PULLEY BRACKET — MISREPAIRED (ZONE 100) · airframe 6,868 hrs · 7,999 cycles

DURING 150 HOUR INSPECTION MECHANIC FOUND SIGNIFICANTLY FRAYED RUDDER INTERCONNECT CABLE. UPON INSTALLATION OF NEW CABLE AND NEW PULLEY IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A PREVIOUS REPAIR ON A PULLEY BRACKET HID THE ORIGINAL CABLE GUARD PIN HOLE. PRIOR MAINTENANCE INSTALLED THE CABLE GUARD PIN IN A DIFFERENT HOLE IN THE BRACKET CAUSING THE CABLE TO WEAR ON THE PIN. CORRECTIVE ACTION-DRILLED ORIGINAL HOLE IN REPAIR BRACKET AND INSTALLED PIN IN CORRECT LOCATION. EDGE DISTANCE MAINTAINED ON ALL FASTENERS. OPS CHECK GOOD. NO DEFECTS NOTED.