K & S HELICOPTERS, INC.

Part 135 operator · designator K2DA

Data confidence: Records are linked by certificate number, aircraft registration, or a name match that a reviewer has confirmed. Each record below shows how it was linked.

Also recorded as: K & S HELICOPTERS, INC., K & S Helicopters Inc, K & S Helicopters, Inc., PARADISE HELICOPTERS, TROPICAL HELICOPTERS, VERTICAL WORX

Accident & enforcement record

Events that happened, regardless of the operator's own reporting. Each links to its public source.

NTSB accidents & incidents

Acc · 2024-01-25 Operator named in NTSB report
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER 369E (N545PH) None injury Part 135

Operated by K & S HELICOPTERS INC (per NTSB report)

Source: NTSB case ANC24LA012
Acc · 2022-06-08 Operator named in NTSB report
BELL 407 (N402SH) Serious injury Part 135

Operated by K&S HELICOPTERS INC (per NTSB report)

Source: NTSB case ANC22FA041
Acc · 2019-04-16 Operator named in NTSB report
MD HELICOPTER 369 (N593C) None injury Part 135

Operated by K & S Helicopters Inc — Rotorcraft external load (133), On-demand air taxi (135), Commercial air tour (136), Agricultural aircraft (137) Operator Does Business As: (per NTSB report)

Source: NTSB case WPR19LA111
Acc · 2018-10-27 Operator named in NTSB report
Bell 430 (N430ST) None injury Part 135

Operated by K & S HELICOPTERS INC (per NTSB report)

Source: NTSB case WPR19LA028
Acc · 2009-11-20 Operator named in NTSB report
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELI CO 369E (N551CR) None injury Part 135

Operated by K & S HELICOPTERS INC (per NTSB report)

Source: NTSB case WPR10LA060
Accident · 2002-12-24 Matched by aircraft (N-number)
Hughes 369D (N8366F) None injury
Source: NTSB case SEA03LA021

FAA enforcement actions

FAA enforcement records haven't been loaded into GroundCheck yet, so none can be shown — a gap in our data, not evidence of a clean enforcement history.

Maintenance disclosure history

Service Difficulty Reports are self-reported maintenance findings. The NUMBER of reports is not a measure of reliability — diligent operators file more, not fewer. These are shown for transparency, not as a negative signal.

52 reports on file — showing most recent 50.

O · 2024-04-12 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 5313

CRACK IN ENGINE PAN LONGERON AND STRAP AT STA 192 AND CRACK IN AFT BULKHEAD.

Source: SDR 2024FA0000308 · FAA SDRS
O · 2024-04-10 Matched by certificate designator
N808PH · ATA 5330

SKIN PUNCTURED BEYOND LIMITS FROM FLYING DEBRIS WHILE PARKED ON RAMP.

Source: SDR 2024FA0000310 · FAA SDRS
O · 2024-04-08 Matched by certificate designator
N8366F · ATA 5343

FOUND CENTER BEAM LANDING GEAR FITTING RETAINER BORE WORN OUT OF LIMITS

Source: SDR 2024FA0000309 · FAA SDRS
O · 2021-11-11 Matched by certificate designator
N402SH · ATA 7930

ON 11 NOV 2021 AT 1354 HST, AIRCRAFT N402SH PERFORMED A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING DUE TO A ENGINE OIL PRESSURE GAUGE INDICATION OF ZERO WHILE CONDUCTING AN AIR TOUR ON THE ISLAND OF HAWAI’I. THERE WERE NO SECONDARY INDICATIONS AND THE AIRCRAFT LANDED SAFELY AT 18º59’04.1”N 155º40’43.1”W. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WERE DISPATCHED TO THE AIRCRAFT AND THE ENGINE OIL TRANSDUCER WAS REPLACED. AFTER A PENALTY RUN AND SIGN OFFS, THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO KONA AIRPORT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ENGINE OIL PRESSURE TRANSDUCER, P/N 222-375-077-113 IS AN "ON CONDITION" PART.

Source: SDR K2DA202111120001 · FAA SDRS
B · 2021-11-03 Matched by certificate designator
N508PH · ATA 7200

AIRCRAFT N508PH, A MD500E, WAS CONDUCTING A UTILITY FLIGHTS UNDER AN OAS CONTRACT AND PERFORMED A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING AT 21°35’ 10.9” N, 158° 00’ 44.7” W DUE TO SMOKE EMANATING FROM THE ENGINE. THE PILOT WAS THE ONLY OCCUPANT OF THE AIRCRAFT. AFTER LANDING IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD SUBSTANTIAL OIL LEAKING FROM THE COMPRESSOR. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AN ENGINE OVERHAUL FACILITY IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE #1 CARBON SEAL INTERNAL TO THE COMPRESSOR SECTION HAD FAILED.

Source: SDR K2DA0182E · FAA SDRS
J · 2020-03-11 Matched by certificate designator
N808PH · ATA 6320

SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE AIRCRAFT TURNED AROUND AND LANDED BACK AT THE AIRPORT & MX WAS DISPATCHED TO THE AIRCRAFT. UPON INSPECTION OF THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION CHIP DETECTORS, MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL FOUND LARGE CHUNKS OF METAL THAT WERE OUT OF LIMITS. THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION ONLY HAD 1185.1 HOURS TSO. BELL HAS RATED THESE TRANSMISSIONS TO A 5000 HOUR TBO. THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION WAS REPLACED WITH A SERVICEABLE UNIT AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE WITH NO OTHER DISCREPANCIES NOTED AND NO OTHER ISSUES.

Source: SDR K2DA53101 · FAA SDRS
O · 2019-07-24 Matched by certificate designator
N430ST · ATA 6410

UPON A DAILY / POST FLIGHT INSPECTION THE A&P MECHANICS DISCOVERED THE TAIL ROTOR BLADE DEBONDED AT THE BLADE ROOT. THE TAIL ROTOR BLADE HAD 22.7 HOURS TIME SINCE NEW.

Source: SDR K2DA2019090600000 · FAA SDRS
O · 2019-04-17 Matched by certificate designator
N58243 · ATA 7532

PILOT PERFORMED ENGINE POWER ASSURANCE CHECK AT 80% TQ AND 2,000 FT AGL AND REPORTED A +1* ON THE POWER CHECK WHICH WAS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE POWER CHECK TAKEN THE DAY PRIOR (+30). UPON LANDING, MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WERE CALLED AND IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE BLEED VALVE WAS STUCK CAUSING THE ENGINE TO RUN HOT AND ALSO THE DIAPHRAGM WAS TORN. BLEED VALVE HAD 768.0 TSO.

Source: SDR K2DA2019052800001 · FAA SDRS
O · 2019-03-19 Matched by certificate designator
N545PH · ATA 7532

DURING AN ROUTINE INSPECTION IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE ENGINE BLEED VALVE WAS STICKING. BLEED VALVE HAD 317.2 TSO.

Source: SDR K2DA2019052800003 · FAA SDRS
R · 2019-02-17 Matched by certificate designator
N545PH · ATA 7532

PILOT WAS RUNNING ENGINE ON THE GROUND AND THE COMPRESSOR STARTED STALLING. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL DISCOVERED THE ENGINE BLEED VALVE WAS STUCK IN THE CLOSED POSITION. BLEED VALVE HAD 103.4 TSO. BLEED VALVE WAS CHANGED OUT AND THE ISSUE WENT AWAY.

Source: SDR K2DA2019052800002 · FAA SDRS
E · 2018-11-03 Matched by certificate designator
N430ST · ATA 6410

WITH AUTOPILOT ENGAGED AND A COMMANDED CLIMB TO 1500 FT MSL IN PROGRESS, THE PIC EXPERIENCED A LOUD THUMP, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A MEDIUM-TO-HIGH FREQUENCY VIBRATION OF SIGNIFICANT AMPLITUDE. THE PIC WAS ON THE CONTROLS, AND FELT THE VIBRATION MORE THROUGH THE AIRFRAME THAN THROUGH THE FLIGHT CONTROLS. ELECTED TO CONDUCT A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING, LANDED SAFELY. W HEN THE THROTTLES WERE REDUCED TO IDLE AS PART OF THE SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST, THE VIBRATIONS INCREASED IN AMPLITUDE. A NORMAL SHUTDOWN WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT FURTHER ISSUE. A POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION REVEALED A BACKPLATE (ALONG WITH ASSOCIATED WEIGHTS AND ATTACHMENT BOLTS) HAD COMPLETELY SEPARATED FROM ONE TAIL ROTOR BLADE, AND A DENT APPROXIMATELY 6 INCHES IN LENGTH AND .250 INCH DEEP WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE OTHER T/R BLADE, LOCATED ROUGHLY MID SPAN. WHAT APPEARED TO BE WHITE PAINT TRANSFER COULD BE SEEN AROUND THIS DENT. MAINTENANCE VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE TRAILING EDGE ROOT CLOSURE CAP WAS MISSING ENTIRELY, ALONG WITH THE STUD INSERTS THAT THE BOLTS SCREW INTO THAT ATTACH THE END CLOSURE CAP. IT APPEARS AS THOUGH THE BONDING PROCESS BETWEEN THIS TRAILING EDGE ROOT CLOSURE CAP AND THE TAIL ROTOR ITSELF WAS DONE INCORRECTLY. EITHER THE ADHESIVE WASN'T MIXED PROPERLY, OR CURED PROPERLY, OR THE ADHESIVE WASN'T APPLIED PROPERLY TO THE BLADE AND THE END CAP, CAUSING THE END CAP TO BECOME DEBONDED DURING FLIGHT AND THE OTHER TAIL ROTOR BLADE WAS HIT WITH THE END CAP IN THE PROCESS.

Source: SDR K2DA201811030001 · FAA SDRS
O · 2018-10-03 Matched by certificate designator
N430ST · ATA 6410

AT 1104 HST, WAS AT APPROXIMATELY N19.54`02" W156.06`58" TRANSITIONING THROUGH PHKO CLASS D AIRSPACE AT 1350`MSL AND 125 KIAS ON A HEADING OF 165 DEGREES, EN ROUTE TO FLY COUNTER-CLOCKWISE AROUND THE BIG ISLAND. WITH AUTOPILOT ENGAGED AND A COMMANDED CLIMB TO 1500` MSL IN PROGRESS, THE PIC EXPERIENCED A LOUD THUMP, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A MEDIUM-TO-HIGH, FREQUENCY VIBRATION OF SIGNIFICANT AMPLITUDE. THE PIC WAS ON THE CONTROLS, AND FELT THE VIBRATION MORE THROUGH THE AIRFRAME THAN THROUGH THE FLIGHT CONTROLS. THE PIC ELECTED TO CONDUCT A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING. LANDING SAFELY . WHEN THE THROTTLES WERE REDUCED TO IDLE AS PART OF THE SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST, THE VIBRATIONS INCREASED IN AMPLITUDE. A NORMAL SHUTDOWN WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT FURTHER ISSUE. A POST FLIGHT INSPECTION REVEALED A BACK PLATE (ALONG WITH ASSOCIATED WEIGHTS AND ATTACHMENT BOLTS) HAD COMPLETELY SEPARATED FROM ONE TAIL ROTOR BLADE, AND A DENT APPROX 6 INCHES IN LENGTH AND 1/4 INCH DEEP WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE TAIL ROTOR BLADE, LOCATED ROUGHLY MID SPAN. WHAT APPEARED TO BE WHITE PAINT TRANSFER COULD BE SEEN AROUND THIS DENT. MAINTENANCE WAS CALLED AND VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE TRAILING EDGE ROOT CLOSURE CAP WAS MISSING ENTIRELY, ALONG WITH THE STUD INSERTS THAT THE BOLTS SCREW INTO THAT ATTACH THE END CLOSURE CAP. IT APPEARS AS THOUGH THE BONDING PROCESS BETWEEN THIS TRAILING EDGE ROOT CLOSURE CAP AND THE TAIL ROTOR ITSELF WAS DONE INCORRECTLY. EITHER THE ADHESIVE WASN`T MIXED PROPERLY, AND/OR CURED PROPERLY, AND /OR THE ADHESIVE WASN`T APPLIED PROPERLY TO THE BLADE AND THE END CAP, CAUSING THE END CAP TO BECOME DE-BONDED DURING FLIGHT AND THE OTHER TAIL ROTOR BLADE WAS HIT WITH THE END CAP IN THE PROCESS.

Source: SDR K2DA2020012220 · FAA SDRS
E B · 2018-06-06 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 7320

PILOT DECIDED TO MAKE A PL ON FIRST FLIGHT OF THE DAY DUE TO INCREASING VIBES FROM THE MAIN ROTOR. BLACK SMOKE COMING FROM ENG NO SECONDARY INDICATIONS. THE HMU WAS CHANGED OUT THE NIGHT BEFORE. HMU WAS FRESH OUT OF OVERHAUL FROM STANDARD AERO. MX ARRIVED AND LOOKED OVER THE ACFT. DID NOT FIND ANYTHING VISIBLY WRONG WITH ANY BEARINGS MR HUB SWASH PITCH LINKS BELLCRANKS SERVOS ETC. PERFORMED A GROUND RUN ON THE ACFT AND THE ENG WAS SURGING AND COMPRESSOR WAS POPPING AND STALLING BLACK SMOKE WAS VISIBLE. PILOT PUT ACFT IN MANUAL MODE AND THE SURGING WENT AWAY. BACK IN AUTO THE SURGING STARTED AGAIN. MX PUT ON THE OLD HMU THAT WAS REMOVED THE NIGHT BEFORE BACK INTO THE ACFT. RUN UP OCF COMPLETE WITH NO VIBRATIONS ISSUES. PROBABLE CAUSE IS THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE OVERHAULED HMU INTERNALLY.

Source: SDR K2D2018F00000 · FAA SDRS
E B · 2018-06-05 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 7320

PILOT DECIDED TO MAKE A PL ON FIRST FLIGHT OF THE DAY DUE TO INCREASING VIBES FROM THE MAIN ROTOR. BLACK SMOKE COMING FROM ENGINE, NO OTHER SECONDARY INDICATIONS. THE HMU (HYDROMECHANICAL UNIT) WAS CHANGED OUT THE NIGHT BEFORE. HMU WAS FRESH OUT OF OVERHAUL. MAINTENANCE DID NOT FIND ANYTHING VISIBLY WRONG WITH ANY BEARINGS, M/R HUB, SWASH, PITCH LINKS, BELLCRANKS, SERVOS, ETC. PERFORMED A GROUND RUN ON THE AIRCRAFT AND THE ENGINE WAS SURGING AND COMPRESSOR WAS POPPING AND STALLING, BLACK SMOKE WAS VISIBLE. PILOT PUT AIRCRAFT IN MANUAL MODE AND THE SURGING WENT AWAY. BACK IN AUTO AND THE SURGING STARTED AGAIN. MAINTENANCE INSTALLED THE OLD HMU T. ENGINES RUN UP, OPS CHECK FLIGHT COMPLETE WITH NO VIBRATIONS AND NO SURGING. ALL INDICATIONS NORMAL. REPLACED WITH A NEW HMU.

Source: SDR K2DA201806190001 · FAA SDRS
E · 2017-09-05 Matched by certificate designator
N402SH · ATA 6320

THE PILOT EXPERIENCED A WHINE IN THE ENGINE AND DECIDED TO LAND THE ACFT. UPON LANDING, THE ENG CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. WHEN MX ARRIVED ENG OIL WAS PRESENT ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE ACFT. THE PT SUPPORT OIL PRESSURE FITTING LINE WAS FOUND COMPLETELY SHEARED FROM THE BASE OF THE FITTING, CAUSING ALL OF THE ENG OIL TO EXIT THE ENG. THE FWD GEARBOX CHIP PLUG HAD A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF METAL ON IT AS WELL DUE TO OIL STARVATION. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE FAILED FITTING COULD BE THE RESULT OF A MANUFACTURING DEFECT. THERE WERE NO EARLY SIGNS OF FATIGUE OR FAILURE WITH THE PART AND THE FAILURE DID SEEM TO HAPPEN ALL AT ONE TIME.

Source: SDR K2DA201711140001 · FAA SDRS
K · 2017-09-04 Matched by certificate designator
N402SH · ATA 7261

THE PIC EXPERIENCED A WHINE IN THE ENGINE AND DECIDED TO LAND THE AIRCRAFT. UPON LANDING, THE ENG CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. WHEN MAINTENANCE ARRIVED ENGINE OIL WAS PRESENT ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE PT SUPPORT OIL PRESSURE FITTING LINE WAS FOUND COMPLETELY SHEARED FROM THE BASE OF THE FITTING, CAUSING ALL OF THE ENGINE OIL TO EXIT THE ENGINE. THE FORWARD GEARBOX CHIP PLUG HAD A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF METAL ON IT AS WELL DUE TO OIL STARVATION.

Source: SDR 2017F00210 · FAA SDRS
K J · 2017-09-04 Matched by certificate designator
N402SH · ATA 7261

THE PILOT IN CHARGE EXPERIENCED A WHINE IN THE ENGINE AND DECIDED TO LAND THE AIRCRAFT. ON LANDING, THE ENG CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE PILOT REPORTED THAT ALL OF HIS GAUGES WERE READING NORMAL BUT HE DECIDED TO SHUT THE ENGINE DOWN IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE OF THE SOUND. MX OBSERVED ENGINE OIL WAS PRESENT ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE PT SUPPORT OIL PRESSURE FITTING LINE WAS FOUND COMPLETELY SHEARED FROM THE BASE OF THE FITTING, CAUSING ALL OF THE ENGINE OIL TO EXIT THE ENGINE. THE FORWARD GEARBOX CHIP PLUG HAD A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF METAL ON IT AS WELL DUE TO OIL STARVATION. THERE WERE NO EARLY INDICATIONS OF FATIGUE OR FAILURE WITH THE OIL PRESSURE FITTING. SUSPECT A MANUFACTURING DEFECT OR A POOR WELD.

Source: SDR K2DA201709080001 · FAA SDRS
O · 2017-01-05 Matched by certificate designator
N2066W · ATA 6410

DURING PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION FOUND TAIL ROTOR BLADE PN. 500P3100-105 SN. C774 LEADING EDGE ABRASION STRIP DELAMINATED.

Source: SDR 2017FA0000004 · FAA SDRS
O · 2016-12-23 Matched by certificate designator
N506PH · ATA 6410

TAIL ROTOR BLADEWAS FOUND IN A DELAMINATED STATE DURING A POST FLIGHT INSPECTION. THE ABRASION STRIP HAD DELAMINATED FROM THE LEADING EDGE OF THE BLADE. THIS BLADE HAD BEEN INSTALLED FOR 3 DAYS AND ONLY HAD 7.1 HRS ON IT FROM REPAIR. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DELAMINATION IS IMPROPER CURE TIME FOR THE BONDING ADHESIVE, IMPROPER MIXING OF THE BONDING ADHESIVE, AND OR IMPROPER BEND RADIUS TO METAL LEADING EDGE CAUSING IT NOT SEAT PROPERLY AGAINST THE BLADES CONTOURED LEADING EDGE. TO PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE OF THE TAIL ROTOR BLADE ABRASION STRIP DELAMINATION, WOULD RECOMMEND FOLLOWING PROPER PROCEDURES WHEN REPAIRING A BLADE AND RE-APPLYING THE ABRASION STRIP.

Source: SDR 2017FA0000409 · FAA SDRS
J · 2016-07-04 Matched by certificate designator
N58243 · ATA 7200

AIRCRAFT PERFORMED A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING FOR AN ENGINE CHIP LIGHT WHILE CONDUCTING AN AIR TOUR. THERE WERE NO SECONDARY INDICATIONS AND THE AIRCRAFT LANDED SAFELY. AFTER CLEARING THE CHIP LIGHT IAW THE MANUAL, THE AIRCRAFT WAS FLOWN BACK TO BASE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE TURBINE WAS MOST LIKELY THE CAUSE OF THE PARTICLES ON THE CHIP PLUG. THE TURBINE WAS REPLACED AND THE AIRCRAFT FLEW A LONG OPERATIONAL CHECK FLIGHT AND TWO TOURS WITH NO DISCREPANCIES. AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE MECHANIC PULLED THE ENGINE CHIP PLUGS AND NOTICED SOME SMALL METAL FLAKES THAT WERE ALL WITHIN LIMITS. AS A PRECAUTION, THE COMPANY DECIDED TO GO AHEAD AND CHANGE THE ENGINE GEARBOX AND COMPRESSOR AS WELL. WHEN THE OLD ENGINE WAS REMOVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND SPLIT, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE COMPRESSOR SPUR ADAPTER GEARSHAFT HAD A WORN JOURNAL AND THE 2 1/2 BEARING IN THE GEARBOX WAS SPALLED, THUS THE METAL ON OUR CHIP PLUGS. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE 2 1/2 BEARING HAD FAILED AND CAUSED THE WORN JOURNAL ON THE COMPRESSOR SPUR ADAPTER GEARSHAFT.

Source: SDR K2DA20160707146 · FAA SDRS
O · 2016-06-14 Matched by certificate designator
N58243 · ATA 8300

THE COMPRESSOR WAS REMOVED FROM THE ENGINE GEARBOX AND IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE COMPRESSOR SPUR ADAPTER GEARSHAFT JOURNAL HAD A WORN AREA WHERE METAL WAS REMOVED. AFTER INSPECTION OF THE GEARBOX, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE 2.5 BEARING HAD FAILED AND WAS THE CAUSE OF THE WORN COMPRESSOR SPUR ADAPTER GEARSHAFT. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE BEARING FAILURE IS THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE OR EITHER IT FAILED DUE TO HIGH TIME. THERE IS NOT A LOT TO RECOMMEND TO PREVENT RECURRENCE AS THESE BEARINGS SEEM TO FAIL OVER TIME BUT TO PUT A LIFE LIMIT ON THEM. SUGGEST THAT A THOROUGH VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE 2.5 BEARING TAKE PLACE DURING THE ENGINE 300 HR INSPECTIONS.

Source: SDR K2D2016F00002 · FAA SDRS
J · 2016-03-25 Matched by certificate designator
N808PH · ATA 7200

DURING NORMAL CRUISE FLIGHT, THE PILOT REPORTED THE ENG CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE PILOT PERFORMED A POWERED PRECAUTIONARY LANDING ON A PRIVATE, CLEARED LOT WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER INVESTIGATION OF THE CHIP PLUGS, BY A CERTIFICATED MECHANIC, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT BOTH BOTTOM & TOP PLUGS WERE COVERED WITH SMALL TO MEDIUM METAL PIECES. THE PLUGS WERE CLEANED & REINSTALLED & AN ENG START WAS ATTEMPTED. THE CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON STARTUP, THE START WAS ABORTED. THE ACFT REMAINED OVERNIGHT UNDER GUARD & WAS RECOVERED BY CRANE & LOWBOY TRUCK ON THE MORNING OF 03 25 2016 & ACFT RETURNED TO THE HANGER FOR ENG CHANGE & FURTHER INVESTIGATION. NO DAMAGE SUSTAINED TO THE ACFT OR PAXS.

Source: SDR K2DA2016032520151 · FAA SDRS
O · 2016-03-05 Matched by certificate designator
N506PH · ATA 6410

UPON THE DAILY INSPECTION, A COIN TAP TEST WAS PERFORMED ON THE TAIL ROTOR BLADES. TAIL ROTOR BLADE, PN 500P3100-105, SN C519 WAS DISCOVERED TO BE DELAMINATED. THE DELAMINATION CONSISTS OF A 1.5 INCH AREA OF THE LE ABRASION STRIP ON THE OTBD SIDE OF THE BLADE .5 INCHES FROM THE TIP. THE BLADE HAD ACCUMULATED 275.4 FLIGHT HOURS SINCE IT WAS INSPECTED, REPAIRED & HAD THE LE ABRASION STRIP REPLACED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DELAMINATION IS IN PROPER MIXING OF THE ABRASION STRIP BONDING ADHESIVE, IMPROPER CURING OF THE BONDING ADHESIVE, OR IMPROPER CONTOURING OF THE LE ABRASION STRIP, BENT AT THE WRONG DEGREE. TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF DELAMINATION TO THE LE ABRASION STRIP, THE BONDING ADHESIVE WAS MIXED & CURED PROPERLY & THAT THE LE ABRASION STRIP WAS BENT TO THE CORRECT ANGLE.

Source: SDR K2DA20160308001 · FAA SDRS
O · 2015-12-31 Matched by certificate designator
N506PH · ATA 6410

AFTER THE DAY`S FLIGHTS AND DURING THE DAILY INSPECTION WE FOUND, BY TAP TEST, THE L/E OF 1 OF THE TAIL ROTOR BLADES WAS DELAMINATED IN VARIOUS PLACES, VARYING IN LENGTH FROM .5 TO 2 INCHES.

Source: SDR K2D2016011200001 · FAA SDRS
O · 2015-12-31 Matched by certificate designator
N506PH · ATA 6410

DURING DAILY INSPECTION, AFTER THE DAYS FLIGHTS, ONE OF THE TAIL ROTOR BLADES WAS FOUND TO HAVE VARIOUS SPOTS, VARYING IN LENGTH FROM .5 INCHES TO 2 INCHES, WHERE THE LE WAS DELAMINATING FROM THE BLADE, PN 500P3100-105, SN C700. WE TAP TEST THE LE DAILY.

Source: SDR K2DA20160107001 · FAA SDRS
O · 2015-12-13 Matched by certificate designator
N58243 · ATA 6410

ON SUNDAY 12 13 15, A TAIL ROTOR BLADE, PN 500P3100-105, SN C922, 491.6 TSR, WAS FOUND IN A DELAMINATED STATE, DURING A PREFLIGHT INSPECTION. THE LE HAD DELAMINATED FROM THE BLADE ABOUT 2" IN LENGTH. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DELAMINATION IS IMPROPER CURE TIME FOR THE BONDING ADHESIVE, IMPROPER MIXING OF THE BONDING ADHESIVE & OR IMPROPER BEND RADIUS TO METAL LE CAUSING IT TO NOT SEAL PROPERLY AGAINST THE BLADE`S CONTOURED LE. TO PREVENT A RE-OCCURRENCE OF THE TAIL ROTOR BLADE LE DELAMINATION.

Source: SDR K2D2016F00000 · FAA SDRS
O · 2015-12-13 Matched by certificate designator
N58243 · ATA 6410

DURING PREFLIGHT INSPECTION, FOUND TAIL ROTOR BLADE, PN 500P3100-105, SN C922 LE DELAMINATED FOR APPROX 2 INCHES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BLADE.

Source: SDR K2DA2015121501 · FAA SDRS
J · 2015-05-31 Matched by certificate designator
N508PH · ATA 6320

DURING CRUISE FLIGHT, THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. AN UNSCHEDULED PRECAUTIONARY LANDING WAS MADE IN AN OPEN FIELD WITHOUT INCIDENT. FOLLOWED HELICOPTER MM TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES AND FOUND THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION OIL PUMP FAULTY. REPLACED THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION PUMP WITH A SERVICEABLE UNIT. RETURNED ACFT TO SERVICE.

Source: SDR K2D2015F00000 · FAA SDRS
J · 2015-05-31 Matched by certificate designator
N508PH · ATA 6320

DURING CRUISE FLIGHT THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION LOW OIL PRESS LIGHT ELIMINATED. AN UNSCHEDULED PRECAUTIONARY LANDING WAS MADE IN AN OPEN FIELD WITHOUT INCIDENT. FOLLOWED MM TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES & FOUND THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION OIL PUMP FAULTY. REPLACED THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION PUMP WITH A SERVICEABLE UNIT. RETURNED THE ACFT TO SERVICE.

Source: SDR K2DA20150602001 · FAA SDRS
J · 2015-05-31 Matched by certificate designator
N508PH · ATA 6320

DURING CRUISE FLIGHT, THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT ELIMINATED. AN UNSCHEDULED PRECAUTIONARY LANDING WAS MADE IN AN OPEN FIELD WITHOUT INCIDENT. FOLLOWED MM TROUBLE SHOOTING PROCEDURES AND FOUND THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION OIL PUMP FAULTY. REPLACED THE MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION PUMP WITH A SERVICEABLE UNIT. RETURNED THE ACFT TO SERVICE.

Source: SDR K2DA2015FA0000256 · FAA SDRS
O · 2014-10-26 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 5320

DURING ROUTINE SCHEDULED MX, A CRACK WAS FOUND IN THE FUSELAGE AFT UPPER LT CHANNEL PN 206-031-314-145. THE CRACK IS LOCATED WHERE THE CHANNEL & THE AFT UPPER LT LONGERON ARE RIVETED TOGETHER. THE CRACK SPANS THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE CHANNEL. PROBABLE CAUSE IS NORMAL WEAR & TEAR.

Source: SDR K2D2014F00000 · FAA SDRS
O · 2014-10-25 Matched by certificate designator
N407W · ATA 5320

DURING ROUTINE SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, A CRACK WAS FOUND IN THE FUSELAGE AFT UPPER LT CHANNEL. THE CRACK IS LOCATED WHERE THE CHANNEL AND THE AFT UPPER LT LONGERON ARE RIVETED TOGETHER. THE CRACK SPANS THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE CHANNEL.

Source: SDR K2DA407WH01 · FAA SDRS
N · 2014-07-01 Matched by certificate designator
N506PH · ATA 6320

MAIN ROTOR TRANSMISSION LOW OIL PRESS LIGHT ILLUMINATED IN FLIGHT PREFORMED PRECAUTIONARY LANDING. TRANSMISSION OIL PRESS SWITCH INOPERATIVE. REPLACED PRESS SWITCH RAN ENG, OPERATIONS CHECKED GOOD & LEAK CHECKED GOOD, RETURNED TO SERVICE.

Source: SDR K2DA20140701001 · FAA SDRS
J · 2014-04-27 Matched by certificate designator
N508PH · ATA 6320

TRANSMISSION OIL PRESS LIGHT DURING FLIGHT. PRECAUTIONARY LANDING PREFORMED. TRANSMISSION OIL PUMP INPUT SHAFT NOT PROPERLY SEATED & WORN. REPLACED INPUT SHAFT PN 10807-2 IAW MD CSP-COM-5 CH 63-20-25. PERFORMED GND RUN & LEAK CHECK. RETURNED TO SERVICE.

Source: SDR K2DA20140427001 · FAA SDRS
J · 2012-12-14 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 6320

TRANSMISSION CHIP LIGHT DURING FLIGHT. PRECAUTIONARY LANDING PREFORMED. MX DISPACHED WITH COMPANY ACFT AND PASSENGERS WERE FLOWN FOR CONTINUATION OF THE FLIGHT. FOUND SMALL METAL PARTICALS ON LOWER CHIP PLUG, CLEANED PLUG PERFORMED PENALTY RUN WITHOUT FURTHER LIGHT OR METAL PARTICALS.

Source: SDR K2DA20121214 · FAA SDRS
J · 2012-09-02 Matched by certificate designator
N506PH · ATA 7200

ENGINE CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED DURING FLIGHT. PRECAUTIONARY LANDING PERFORMED AND ENGINE SHUTDOWN. MX DISPATCHED WITH COMPANY ACFT AND PASSENGERS WERE FLOWN FOR CONTINUATION OF THE FLIGHT. CHIP DETECTORS SHOWED METAL PARTICLES ON THE LOWER CHIP PLUG OF MEDIUM QUANTITY. CHIP PLUG WAS CLEARED AND PENALTY RUN COMPLETED WITHOUT FURTHER LIGHTS AND CHIP DETECTORS WERE CLEAN. ACFT WAS RELEASED FOR FERRY FLIGHT. NO FURTHER CHIP LIGHTS OR METAL PARTICLES ON THE LOWER OR UPPER PLUGS. INITIAL NUMBER OF CHIPS VIEWED ON THE CHIP PLUG WERE OF A SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH QUANTITY TO WARRANT REPLACEMENT OF THE ENGINE AS A COMPLETE UNIT. ACFT ENGINE WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED, AND INCIDENT ENGINE WAS SENT TO O/H FACILITY AS A COMPLETE UNIT FOR EVALUATION.

Source: SDR K2DA201209070502 · FAA SDRS
M J · 2012-05-25 Matched by certificate designator
N1607A · ATA 7230

PILOT NOTICED A SLOWLY INCREASING TURBINE OUTLET TEMPERATURE (TOT) DURING FLIGHT. PILOT PERFORMED A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING WHEN THE TEMPERATURE INCREASE CONTINUED. UPON LANDING AN EXCEEDANCE WAS RECORDED ON THE TEMPERATURE GUAGE. MX DISPATCHED FOR TROUBLESHOOTING. INITIAL INSPECTION REVEALED HOLE IN RT COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE TUBE ON THE INSIDE PORTION ORIENTED TOWARD THE ENGINE. MX R & R THE DISCHARGE TUBE AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE IAW MM 72-50-00.

Source: SDR K2DA 20120502 · FAA SDRS
O · 2012-04-25 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 7250

TURBINE RUBBING SOUND DETECTED ON SHUTDOWN. TURBINE SECTION REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR INSPECTION. INSPECTION FOUND NR 1 AND NR 2 TURBINE WHEELS RUBBING DUE TO NR 2 NOZZLE WARPING. BOTH TURBINE WHEELS AND NR 2 NOZZLE UNSERVICEABLE.

Source: SDR K2DA201205310001 · FAA SDRS
F · 2011-10-23 Matched by certificate designator
N500PH · ATA 2730

ELECTRICAL TRIM FAILURE IN FLIGHT RESULTING IN A FULL RT DEFLECTION ON THE TRIM ACTUATOR. PRECAUTIONARY LANDING CONDUCTED AT AIRPORT OF ORIGIN. ACFT TOWED TO MX FACILITY. INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE TRIM SWITCH LOCATED ON THE CYCLIC HAD BECOME STUCK IN THE FULL RT POSITION RESULTING IN TRIM MOTOR ACTIVATION TO FULL RIGHT. REPLACED TRIM SWITCH WITH SERVICEABLE PART.

Source: SDR K2DA2012F00002 · FAA SDRS
E · 2011-08-23 Matched by certificate designator
N500PH · ATA 6510

PILOT NOTICED A VIBRATION & METAL ON METAL BANGING NOISE WHEN ACCELERATING FROM GROUND IDLE TO FLT IDLE. PERFORMED EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN & NOTICED TAIL ROTOR APPEARED TO BE TURNING INDEPENDENT OF MAIN ROTOR. INSPECTION REVEALED THE T/R DRIVE SHAFT HAD SHEARED AT AFT END OF PLENUM TUBE. UPON TEARDOWN, DISCOVERED SPOT WELDS ON THE AFT SUPPORT OF T/R DRIVE SHAFT HAD BROKEN, ALLOWING SHAFT TO CONTACT TUBE. DRIVE SHAFT TUBE REPLACED. AFTER REPAIRS & DURING BALANCING TAIL ROTOR, FOUND ELASTOMERIC BEARINGS IN T/R FORK ASSY CAUSED OUT OF LIMITS VIBRATION. T/R FORK ASSY REPLACED. TAIL ROTOR BALANCED & AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE.

Source: SDR K2DA20110823001 · FAA SDRS
E · 2010-07-04 Matched by certificate designator
N402SH · ATA 6210

LOWER MAIN ROTOR BLADES SKIN DELAMINATION FROM BLADE STATION 196 TO BLADE STATION 210.

Source: SDR 2010F00141 · FAA SDRS
R J · 2010-03-04 Matched by certificate designator
N500PH · ATA 7532

PILOT NOTED LOW POWER AND HIGH TOT. DURING CRUISE FLIGHT.

Source: SDR 2010F00067 · FAA SDRS
K · 2008-08-06 Matched by certificate designator
N500PH · ATA 7320

ON OR AROUND 5:00 PM, WEDNESDAY, 6 AUGUST, 2008, WHILE CONDUCTING A POST FLIGHT INSP, DISCOVERED SOME OIL LEAKAGE IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT. AS HE WAS INVESTIGATING LEAKAGE, NOTICED THAT THE FUEL FILTER PRESSURE SWITCH HAD PLAYED BETWEEN TWO BODY HALVES AND HAD SOME FUEL LEAKAGE. AT WHICH TIME, GROUNDED HELICOPTER, RESCHEDULED OUR FLIGHTS FOR NEXT DAY, AND ORDERED THE PART TO REPAIR THE FAULT. AT THIS TIME, HAVE NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS INCIDENT BUT DID INFORM THE MECHANIC TO USE CAUTION IN TORQUING THE LINES AND FITTINGS THAT CONNECT THIS PART TO THE ENGINE. (K)

Source: SDR K2D2008F00000 · FAA SDRS
D · 2005-01-28 Matched by certificate designator
N142MK · ATA 6410

REF: K2DA320J TAIL ROTOR BLADE ABRASION STRIP AND TIP CAP DEPARTED BLADE ASSY, INFLIGHT. (WP13200506018) (K)

Source: SDR K2D2005F00000 · FAA SDRS
O · 2000-07-05 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 7332

REPLACED FUEL PRESSURE INDICATOR WITH NEW FROM BELL HELICOPTER. (X)

Source: SDR 20000803SH001 · FAA SDRS
O · 2000-06-16 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 6510

WHILE C/W BELL A3B-407-00-35, FOUND 4 EACH BEARINGS TO BE ROUGH. SUBMITTER STATED THESE WERE NOT THE OIL COOLER BEARINGS AS REFERENCED IN AD 2000-02-12. (X)

Source: SDR 20000731SH027 · FAA SDRS
O · 2000-06-16 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 6510

WHILE C/W BELL A3B-407-00-35, FOUND 4 EACH BEARINGS TO BE ROUGH. SUBMITTER STATED THESE WERE NOT THE OIL COOLER BEARINGS AS REFERENCED IN AD 2000-02-12. (X)

Source: SDR 20000731SH028 · FAA SDRS
O · 2000-06-16 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 6510

WHILE C/W BELL A3B-407-00-35, FOUND 4 EACH BEARINGS TO BE ROUGH. SUBMITTER STATED THESE WERE NOT THE OIL COOLER BEARINGS AS REFERENCED IN AD 2000-02-12. (X)

Source: SDR 20000731SH029 · FAA SDRS
O · 2000-06-16 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 6510

WHILE C/W BELL A3B-407-00-35, FOUND 4 EACH BEARINGS TO BE ROUGH. SUBMITTER STATED THESE WERE NOT THE OIL COOLER BEARINGS AS REFERENCED IN AD 2000-02-12. (X)

Source: SDR 20000731SH030 · FAA SDRS
O · 2000-02-09 Matched by certificate designator
N407WH · ATA 5510

REPLACED WITH NEW SLATS FROM BELL HELICOPTER. C/W BELL ASJ 407-99-32. (X)

Source: SDR 20000622SH021 · FAA SDRS

Linked aircraft

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N402SHOperator named in NTSB report
N402SHMatched by certificate designator
N407WHBELL 4072001Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N430STBELL 4302000Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N430STBELL 4302000Valid RegistrationOperator named in NTSB report
N437MYBELL 4071996Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N508PHMCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER 369EValid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N545PHOperator named in NTSB report
N545PHMatched by certificate designator
N551CROperator named in NTSB report
N58243HUGHES 369DValid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N593CMCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER 369EValid RegistrationOperator named in NTSB report
N807PHBELL 4072005Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N808PHBELL 4071997Valid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator
N8366FHUGHES 369DValid RegistrationMatched by certificate designator