SC AVIATION, INC.

DURING CLIMB OUT APPROACHING FL180, THE PF NOTICED THE OIL PRESSURE ON THE LEFT ENGINE FLUCTUATING PLUS OR MINUS 6 PSI (36-42PSI). CONTINUED THE CLIMB WHILE MONITORING, THE OIL PRESSURE CONTINUED TO FLUCTUATE BUT WORSENED AS WE REACHED OUR CRUISE OF FL330. WE CONTINUED TO MONITOR AND WERE DISCUSSING WHERE WE MAY GO IF NEEDED. THE LOWEST IT GOT WAS 26PSI WHILE FLUCTUATING UP TO 30. THEN WE DECLARED THE EMERGENCY AND GOT DIRECT TO KSDF. THROUGH THE DESCENT OIL PRESSURE SOMEWHAT STABILIZED AND WITH LOWER ALTITUDE AND POWER SETTING WE REACHED A STABLE 33-35 PSI. WE LANDED WITH NO ISSUES. AFTER LANDING DOING THE WALK AROUND, A SIGNIFICANT LEAK FROM THE LEFT ENGINE WAS FOUND. MX INVESTIGATION FOUND OIL CAP NOT REINSTALLED AFTER ENGINE OIL SERVICING.

CREW REPORTED OBSERVING THE #2 ENGINE OIL PRESSURE DECREASE STEADILY ON THE GAUGE FROM NORMAL TO APPROXIMATELY 16 PSI CREW DID NOT NOTE A MASTER WARNING INDICATION LIGHT FOR OIL PRESSURE UNTIL AFTER COMPLETING THE ENGINE SHUTDOWN.. CREW INITIATED AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE WAS ABLE TO CLEAN THE CONNECTOR TO THE TRANSDUCER AND THE SYSTEM PASSED OPERATIONAL CHECKS.

LOST AIRSPEED INDICATOR DURING DESCENT IN EXCESSIVE/SEVERE ICING. ALSO RECEIVING A PITOT/VANE HEAT FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT. PERFORMED VISUAL INSPECTION OF PILOTS/COPILOT'S PITOT/STATIC PROBES. PERFORMED TEST OF PILOT/COPILOT PITOT PROBE AND STATIC PLATE HEAT. PERFORMED OPERATIONAL TEST OF #1/#2 ADC. PERFORMED LEAK TESTING OF PILOTS/COPILOT'S PITOT SYSTEM AND FOUND LEAK RATE WITHIN LIMITS. PERFORMED DRAINING OF PITOT/STATIC LINES FROM AIRCRAFT KEEL. ALL TESTING PERFORMED WITH NO DISCREPANCIES NOTED IAW AMM 34-10-05 AND 34-11-19.

METAL FUEL LINE ON #2 ENGINE FAILED LINE P/N 3061249-2 CAUSING LOSS OF FUEL QUANTITY. ENROUTE TO EUROPE. CREW DIVERTED TO CYQX

UPON LANDING INTO KVNY CREW EXPERIENCED AN INTERMITTENT LOSS OF LEFT SIDE BRAKING FORCE CONSISTENT WITH ANTISKID ACTIVATION. RUNWAY WAS DRY AND CREW WAS APPLYING NORMAL BRAKE EFFORT. ISSUE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY VERIFIED TO OCCUR WITH ANTI SKID SELECTED OFF. TROUBLESHOOTING IS ONGOING.

#2 BRAKE ASSEMBLY LOCKED UP WHEN TOWING AIRCRAFT INTO HANGAR. UPON REMOVAL AND INSPECTION OF BRAKE ASSEMBLY IT WAS FOUND THAT BRAKE PADS HAD SEPARATED FROM THE STATOR ASSEMBLY'S. THIS APPEARS TO BE CAUSED BY IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE RIVETS. BRAKE UNIT HAS CSO: 70

HAD THE #3 BRAKE ASSY FAIL DURING TOWING OPERATIONS CAUSING THE BRAKE TO LOCK UP AND SHED PARTS. UPON INSPECTION AFTER REMOVAL AND A SECOND FAILURE IN THE FLEET WE NOTED THAT IT APPEARS THAT THE RIVETS THAT HOLD THE BRAKE FRICTION MATERIAL WERE INSTALLED INCORRECTLY DURING OVERHAUL. BOTH BRAKE ASSYS WERE OVERHAULED BY SOUTHWIND AVIATION AND SOUTHWIND HAS BEEN NOTIFIED BY SC AVIATION OF THE POSSIBLE ISSUES.

UPON INSPECTING THE BRAKES ON THIS AIRCRAFT THE BRAKE FRICTION MATERIAL BACKINGS CAN BE SEEN TO HAVE STARTED TO PULL AWAY FROM THE BACKINGS. THIS BRAKE HAS 886 LANDINGS ON IT AND IS NOT EVEN CLOSE TO THE MAX WEAR LIMITS THE WEAR MEASUREMENTS ARE PIN HAS .2" PROTRUDING AND PLATE TO HOUSING MEASUREMENT IS 1.9".

THIS SDR IS TO ADD TO THE PREVIOUS SDR'S THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED FOR THIS ISSUE. THIS ONE GIVES AN EXAMPLE OF A FAILURE THAT OCCURS AS A RESULT OF THE UNUSUAL WEAR OF THE FRICTION PADS. THIS BRAKE HAD THE FRICTION BACKING CURL WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS BEING PUSHED BACKWARDS WITH THE TUG. YOU CAN SEE IN THE PICTURES THAT ONCE THIS OCCURS THE RESULT IS THAT THE BRAKE PRESSURE PLATES GET SPREAD OUT AND THIS CAUSES THE WHEEL TO LOCK UP. PLEASE SEE ATTACHED PHOTOS. BASED OFF OF THE INSPECTION OF THE OTHER BRAKES THIS IS OCCURRING PRIOR TO THE WEAR INDICATOR PIN SHOWING THE BRAKES TO BE WORN OUT. THE BRAKE ON THE OTHER AXEL S/N ZW150 HAS THE SAME CYCLES ON IT AND STILL SHOWS .125" OF PIN AND A MEASUREMENT FROM PRESSURE PLATE TO HOUSING OF 2.06".

I AM FILLING THIS SDR OUT DUE TO A TREND THAT WE HAVE NOTICED IN OUR FLEET OF 12 HAWKER 125 SERIES AIRCRAFT. WE HAVE HAD A FEW CASES OF BRAKES THAT HAVE LOCKED UP DURING AIRCRAFT TOWING. THIS HAS OCCURRED WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS PUSHED BACKWARDS. ONCE THE ISSUE WAS RECOGNIZED AND DETERMINED NOT TO BE AN ISOLATED EVENT WE STARTED GATHERING DATA. THE CONCLUSION OF THE DATA THE WE COLLECTED IS POINTING TO AN ISSUE WITH THE RAPCO HEAT PACKS P/N RFS1897K. WHAT WE HAVE FOUND IS THAT PRIOR TO THE BRAKES REACHING THE MAXIMUM WEAR INDICATION THE FRICTION PADS WILL FAIL. THIS CAUSES THE FRICTION BACKING TO CURL AND EXPAND THE BRAKE CAUSING THE TIRE TO LOCK UP. THE AHA1897 BRAKE HAS A WEAR INDICATOR PIN THAT PROTRUDES THRU A BOSS TO INDICATE WEAR. UNFORTUNATELY, ONCE THE BRAKE FAILS THERE IS NO WAY TO GET AN ACCURATE READ OF THIS PIN OR EVEN A MEASUREMENT AS THE PRESSURE PLATE IS DISPLACED ONCE THE BRAKE FAILS. WE ARE IN THE PROSSES OF MEASURING AND INSPECTING ALL BRAKES IN OUR FLEET. DURING THIS INSPECTION WE ARE REMOVING THE TIRES AND INSPECTING THE PAD WEAR VISUALLY IF DIMENSION X LISTED IN THE HAWKER 800A MM 32-40-114 FIG 604 IS MORE THAT 1.8”. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT OUR AIRCRAFT DO HAVE THE WEAR PINS CHECKED EVERY TIME THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS BACK AT HOME BASE UNDER NORMAL OPERATION. UPON DOING OUR INSPECTION ON ONE OF OUR AIRCRAFT N79TS IT WAS FOUND THAT THE #1 BRAKE WAS STARTING TO CURL. THIS BRAKE S/N NU313 HAD CSO: 1408 AND THE WEAR PIN WAS SHOWING APPROXIMATELY .20” OF LIFE LEFT. THE #2 BRAKE WAS ALSO INSPECTED IT TOO SHOWED APPROX. .20” OF LIFE LEFT AND HAD CSO: 1408. OUT OF THE 35 BRAKES THAT WE HAVE INSPECTED AND RECORDED MEASUREMENTS WE HAVE 5 THAT WE HAVE CHANGED DUE TO THE FRICTION BACKINGS APPEARING TO SHOW SIGNS OF CURLING OF THOSE BRAKES THE CLOSEST PIN SHOWS .125” OF LIFE LEFT.

THIS IS A FOLLOW ON TO SDR G13A120420181. THIS BRAKE IS IN ABOUT TO HAVE A FAILURE PLEASE SEE ATTACHED PHOTS SHOWING THE UNUSUAL WEAR AND THE AMOUNT OF BRAKE WEAR PIN STILL SHOWING. THIS IS SHOWING APPROXIMATELY .2". REFERENCE THE SDR G13A120420181 FOR FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE WE ARE OBSERVING. PLEASE ALSO NOT THAT WE HAVE HAD 1 AIRCRAFT IN OUR FLEET RECENTLY THAT THE BRAKES WENT TO FULL LIFE WITH NO UNUSUAL WEAR AND THOSE BRAKES HAD THE OEM AH089881 HEAT PACKS INSTALLED.

AUTOPILOT ELEVATOR TRIM SERVO MOTOR REPLACED AFTER INSPECTION FOUND 1 CABLE GUIDE BROKEN OFF. REPLACEMENT SERVO MOTOR INSTALLED AND DURING OPS CHECK, FOUND SERVO MOTOR TO RUN OPPOSITE OF DESIGN. REMOVED SERVO MOTOR AND BENCH CHECKED TO VERIFY BY APPLYING VOLTAGE. SERVO MOTOR RAN BACKWARDS. NEW SERVO MOTOR INSTALLED, OPS CHECK NORMAL, AND ACFT RETURNED TO SERVICE.

AUTOPILOT ELEVATOR TRIM SERVO MOTOR REPLACED AFTER INSPECTION FOUND 1 CABLE GUIDE BROKEN OFF. REPLACEMENT SERVOMOTOR INSTALLED AND DURING OPS CHECK, FOUND SERVOMOTOR TO RUN OPPOSITE OF DESIGN. REMOVED SERVO MOTOR AND BENCH CHECKED TO VERIFY BY APPLYING VOLTAGE. SERVO MOTOR RAN BACKWARDS. NEW SERVO MOTOR INSTALLED, OPS CHECK NORMAL, AND ACFT RETURNED TO SERVICE.

ON DESCENT THE ENG FUEL PRESS LIGHT ILLUMINATED, SHORTLY AFTER THE ENG SHUTDOWN. ABLE TO RE-LIGHT ENG & CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AIRPORT. ON SHORT FINAL THE LIGHT CAME BACK ON & THE ENG SHUT DOWN AGAIN. THE LANDING WAS UNEVENTFUL.

INVESTIGATED REPORTED ENGINE ANTI-ICE SYS FAIL INDICATION. FOUND (1) HEATING ELEMENT OPEN IN RT INBD WING L/E ANTI-ICE PANEL. ALSO NOTED FAULT IN RT WING L/E ANTI-ICE JUNCTION BOX CURRENT SENSOR CS10. FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED THE WIRING TERMINALS, ATTACHING HARDWARE, AND ADJACENT WIRING FOR THE RT INBD WING ANTI-ICE SEVERELY CORRODED AND DAMAGED AT THE AIRFRAME GROUND POINTS GND076 AND GT006. REQUIRED REPAIR/REPLACEMENT OF THE AIRFRAME GROUND POINTS AND WIRING, REPLACEMENT OF THE CS10 CURRENT SENSOR, AND REPLACEMENT OF THE RT INBD WING L/E PANEL. DUE TO FINDINGS INSPECTED THE LT WING INBD ANTI-ICE WIRING AIRFRAME GROUND CONNECTIONS GND75 AND GND79 AND FOUND CORRODED ALSO, TO A LESSER EXTENT. REPLACED THE WIRING TERMINALS AND ATTACHING HARDWARE AS REQUIRED AT GND75 AND GND79 LT WING L/E ANTI-ICE WIRING GROUNDING CONNECTIONS. INTEGRATED ENGINE ANTI-ICE/INBD WING ANTI-ICE SYS CHECKS SATISFACTORY FOLLOWING REPAIRS. THE PHASE 5 3-YEAR/1200 HR. INSP GUIDE ITEM A531003 REQUIRES A GENERAL INSP OF TAILCONE WIRING IAW THE MM TASK CODE 53-20-04-210. THE AREAS INVOLVED ARE NOT EASILY ACCESSIBLE FOR INSPECTIONS OR REPAIRS. RECOMMEND MFG INVESTIGATE IF AN ISOLATED OCCURRENCE OR WHETHER AN ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC INSP GUIDE ITEM FOR THE INBD L/E ANTI-ICE WIRING NEEDS TO BE ADDED TO THE PHASE 5 INSP GUIDE OR INSPECTED MORE FREQUENTLY.

SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF, THE CO-PILOT PFD FAILED. CREW WENT TO REVERSIONARY MODE AND CONTINUED IAW CHECKLIST. UPON APPROACH WHILE ON FINAL THE PILOT SIDE PFD DISPLAY ALSO FAILED. THE CREW THEN SWITCHED PILOT INFORMATION TO THE MFD AND LANDED THE ACFT IN VFR CONDITION WITH NO ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS OR FAILURES. IT WAS LATER CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE PFD'S WERE NOT WORKING AND THE MFD COULD BE INSTALLED IN EITHER PFD LOCATIONS AND WOULD FUNCTION NORMALLY. THE PFD'S WERE SENT OUT TO AN AUTHORIZED REPAIR FACILITY TO BE EVALUATED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT BOTH PFD FAILURES WERE DUE TO FAILED POWER SUPPLIES INSIDE THE UNITS.

PROPELLER WAS INSTALLED IMPROPERLY. SNAP RING THAT HOLDS ON PROP NUT AND CRANKSHAFT EXTENSION WAS NOT INSTALLED. THIS ALLOWED CRANKSHAFT EXT TO UNSCREW AND LET PROP GOVERNOR PRESSURE OF 180 LBS TO BE PUT ON ENGINE AND PROPELLER. THIS CAUSED PROPELLER AND ENG TO LEAK OIL. (K)

FOLLOWING REMOVAL OF SATCOM ANTENNA FROM UPPER FUSELAGE FOR INSPECTION, NOTICED FOOTPRINT OF PREVIOUSLY REMOVED NR 1 VHF ANTENNA. UPON INSPECTION OF VHF ANTENNA FOOTPRINT, FOUND NUMEROUS APPARENT MECHANIC INDUCED GOUGES ON FUSELAGE OUTER SKIN. DAMAGE WAS APPARENTLY CAUSED BY IMPROPER REMOVAL OF PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED VHF ANTENNA. REPAIR WAS TO BLEND OUT GOUGES IAW DER EVALUATION. (K)

THE WINDSHIELD ON THE PILOT`S SIDE CRACKED DURING FLIGHT AT F/L 41,000 FT ON 4/24/2007. THE WINDSHIELD HAD 3104.6 TT. (K)

DFW - DURING OVERNIGHT MAINTENANCE, LEFT AFT SERVICE DOOR EMERGENCY EXIT LIGHT INOPERATIVE. REPLACED LEFT AFT SERVICE DOOR EMERGENCY EXIT LIGHT. SYSTEM GROUND CHECKED NORMAL OPERATION. (M)

IN CRUISE, LEFT HYD QTY LOW ON EICAS FOLLOWED PROCEED TO DEPRESS SYSTEM EXTENDED GEAR AND FLAPS USING ALTERNATE SYSTEM. REPLACED WORN SEAL ON FLAP/SLAT DEPRESSURIZATION CONTROL MODULE SOLENOID. SERVICED HYDRAULIC LT SYSTEM TO NORMAL PRESS, LT HYDRAULIC SYSTEM OPS CHECK OK, NO LEAKS NOTED. (M)