RUSTS FLYING SERVICE INC

Operated by Rust's Flying Service, Inc (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from rising terrain while maneuvering at low altitude.

Operated by Rust's Flying Service , Inc (per NTSB report)

A partial loss of power during takeoff climb for undetermined reasons.

Operated by Rusts Flying Service (per NTSB report)

An in-flight loss of thrust due to an uncommanded feathering of the propeller for reasons that could not be determined.

Operated by Rust's Flying Service (per NTSB report)

The airplane’s float contacted an undetected submerged gravel bar during landing which resulted in a nose over.

Operated by Rust's Flying Service, INC (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the landing roll which resulted in a runway excursion and collision with a ditch.

Operated by Rusts Flying Service (per NTSB report)

The airplane's floats impact with an ocean wave or swell, which exceeded the design load specifications of the flying wire assemblies and resulted in a partial separation of the float assemblies.

Operated by RUSTS FLYING SERVICE INC (per NTSB report)

The total loss of engine power during cruise flight due to a fractured crankshaft.

Operated by Rust's Flying Service Inc. (per NTSB report)

The pilot's inadvertent activation of the main landing gear brakes during the recovery from a bounced landing.

Operated by Rust Flying Service (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the landing roll. Contributing to the accident was an inadvertent ground-loop.

Operated by Rust's Flying Service Inc. (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control of the airplane during an aborted takeoff.

Operated by RUST'S FLYING SERVICE, INC. (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed which resulted in an inadvertent stall. Factors associated with this accident were the pilot's unfamiliarity with the geographic area, the low clouds, his becoming disoriented, and the blind canyon into which he flew. An additional factor was the intentionally disabled stall warning system.

Operated by RUST'S FLYING SERVICE (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT'S IMPROPER HANDLING OF THE AIRCRAFT (PROLONGED YAWING MANEUVER DURING STEP TAXI TURN), WHICH RESULTED IN UNCOVERING OF THE FUEL TANK OUTLETS AND SUBSEQUENT FUEL STARVATION DURING TAKEOFF.

Operated by RUST'S FLYING SERVICE (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE IN-FLIGHT PLANNING AND INADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR THE WIND CONDITIONS. AN INITIAL TAIL WIND AND LATER A CROSSWIND WERE FACTORS IN THE ACCIDENT.

THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN AN ADEQUATE AIRSPEED, THE TURN TO REVERSE COURSE MANEUVER PERFORMED AT THE REDUCED AIRSPEED AND POOR PREFLIGHT PLANNING. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WERE THE MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN AND THE DOWNDRAFT CONDITIONS.

Sanction: $1,500 · case closed 2004-09-27

Part: BOLT — SHEARED (ZONE 700) · airframe 22,317 hrs · 5,297 cycles

PILOT REPORTED ON PREFLIGHT THAT THE RH MAIN SKI BOLT WAS LOOSE AND SUSPECTED BROKEN. INSPECTED AND VERIFIED THE MAIN SKI ATTACH BOLT C3US156-3 WAS BROKEN.

Part: FORK — CRACKED (ZONE 700) · airframe 13,793 hrs

UPON INSPECTION AND CLEANING OF THE ABI 3413-01K TAIL WHEEL FORK ASSY, A CRACK WAS DISCOVERED. PHOTOS UPON REQUEST.

Part: EXHAUST VALVE — NONE (ENGINE) · airframe 28,316 hrs

PILOT REPORTED: NORMAL: WEIGHT AND BALANCE CHECK, PREFLIGHT, FUELING (35 FRNT 35 CTR 05 REAR) PAX LOADING/BRIEFING, TAXI FOR SE DEPART, AND RUN UP. PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST: FUEL SELECTOR CTR TANK, FLAPS AND TRIM SET TO TAKEOFF, WATER RUDDERS RETRACTED, CARB HEAT 1/2 SELECTED CLEARED BY TOWER FOR SE WITH E OPTION DEPARTURE NORMAL TO RUN, AIRBORNE PRIOR TO THE ISLAND, POWER AND RPM REDUCED TO CLIMB AND ESTABLISH 150/MIN. INTO LAKE SPENARD AT 200 FT ALT, ENGINE BEGAN TO RUN ROUGH FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY DISTINCT COUGH/CHUG, LOSS OF POWER FOLLOWED. STRAIGHT AHEAD IS LAKE FRONT HOTEL. I DESCENDED LEFT (PULLED THE MIXTURE) AND HEADED FOR THE NORTH SHORE OF LAKE SPENARD AND THOUGHT I WOULD BE ABLE TO LAND AND STOP IN THE RAPIDLY DISAPPEARING WATER. HOWEVER, THE REALITY OF A STRONG 1/4 TAILWIND QUICKLY BECAME APPARENT AND I PUSHED THE NOSE FOR A STEEPER DECENT (I NEEDED TO GET ONTO THE WATER ASAP) AND WHAT I KNEW WOULD BE A HARD WATER LANDING. I HIT AND BOUNCED BACK INTO THE AIR BUT THIS DISSIPATED MUCH SPEED AND ENERGY. I LANDED AGAIN 50 FT FROM THE SHORE AND AIMED FOR THE ONLY SLIP ON THE NORTH SIDE THAT WAS CURRENTLY UNOCCUPIED. WE RAN UP ON THE DOCK AT APPROX 25 MPH, THE LEFT FLOAT RAN OVER A PARTLY SUBMERGED CONCRETE TIE DOWN, THE LEFT WING TIP HIT A BIRCH TREE; THESE TWO ACTIONS SPUN THE AIRPLANE 90 DEG LEFT. NOW FULLY OUT OF THE WATER WE SKIDDED SIDEWAYS FOR 5 FT. THIS ACTION BENT THE SPREADER BARS AND ROLLED THE RIGHT FLOAT UNDER. WHEN WE STOPPED SKIDDING, I PULLED THE MAIN FUEL CUTOFF LEVER AND ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY INJURIES. DOORS WERE OPENED BY CONCERNED BYSTANDERS AND EGRESS BEGAN. I SPOKE ON THE RADIO WITH LHD TOWER.

Part: TAIL WHEEL — DETACHED (MLG) · airframe 20,401 hrs

TAILWHEEL ASSEMBLY PN-C3UT144-9 BROKE FREE FROM THE AIRFRAME JUST AFTER TAKE OFF. THE TAILWHEEL ATTACH BOLT HAD BEEN REPAIRED.

Part: BRACKET — CRACKED (TAILWHEEL) · airframe 16,109 hrs

CRACKS WERE DISCOVERED IN BOTH LH AND RH TAILWHEEL STEERING BELLCRANK BRACKETS DURING ROUTINE INSPECTION. PN-0712039-1. THESE BRACKETS HOLD THE BELLCRANK THAT COMBINES THE INPUT FOR AIR RUDDER AND TAIL WHEEL STEERING. CRACKS ORIGINATED IN BOTH BRACKETS FROM THE INBOARD ATTACH BOLT HOLE. THESE BRACKETS WERE BOTH REPLACED WITH NEW CESSNA BRACKETS PN-0712039-1. METAL FATIGUE IS SUSPECTED. NO HIDDEN DAMAGE WAS NOTED WHEN THE OLD BRACKETS WERE REMOVED.

Part: MOUNT BRACKET — DEFORMED (MLG) · airframe 27,212 hrs

MOUNT BRACKET HAS ELONGATION OF ALL ATTACHMENT HOLES. AND EXHIBITS CORROSION.

Part: TIE ROD — CORRODED (FLOATS)

ALL 4 LOWER FLOAT TIE-ROD (FLYING WIRES) WIRE PULLS SHOW SIGNS OF CORROSION AND ATTACHMENT HOLE ELONGATION.

Part: CYLINDER HEAD — SEPARATED (CYLINDER) · airframe 29,174 hrs

THE CYLINDER HEAD SEPARATED FROM THE BARREL ON CYLINDER NR 9.

Part: G SWITCH — NO TEST (ELT) · airframe 11,216 hrs · 1 cycles

ELT FAILED THE G SWITCH TEST IDURING SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE.

Part: G SWITCH — NO TEST (ELT) · airframe 16,776 hrs · 1 cycles

ELT G SWITCH FAIED DURING SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE.

Part: CYLINDER HEAD — SEPARATED (ENGINE) · airframe 16,621 hrs · 1 cycles

NR 1 CYLINDER HEAD SEPARATION, PRECAUTIONARY LANDING RESULTING IN NO OTHER DAMAGE.

Part: STUD — FAILED (NR 1 CYLINDER) · airframe 23,540 hrs

THREE MINUTES AFTER TAKEOFF, THE PILOT EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF POWER AND SLIGHT OIL ON THE WINDSHIELD IN HIS FLOAT EQUIPED ACFT. RETURNED TO THE WATER TAKEOFF AREA UNDER ITS OWN POWER. VISUALLY DETERMINED THAT 6 OF THE 10 CYLINDER BASE STUD ATTACHMENTS FOR CYLINDER NR 1 HAD FAILED.

Part: STEERING UNIT — FAULTY (TLG) · airframe 24,458 hrs · 1 cycles

TAIL WHEEL STEERING UNIT CAUSES YAW DAMPENER TO TURN ON UN-COMMANDED. TAIL WHEEL STEERING UNIT HAS AN ELEC COIL THAT IS UNPROTECTED BY A DIODE. THE COLLAPSE OF THE ELEC COILS FIELD CAUSES THE SENSITIVE YAW DAMPENER TO TURN ON UN-COMMANDED.

Part: STEERING UNIT — FAULTY (TLG) · airframe 14,131 hrs · 1 cycles

THE ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH AN ELEC TAIL WHEEL STEERING UNIT, THAT IS CONTROLLED BY THE PILOT BY THE USE OF A TOGGLE SWITCH. THE OFF ACTIVATION OF THE TAIL WHEEL STEERING SWITCH CAUSED THE INSTALLED AUTOPILOT YAW DAMPENER TO TURN ON UN-COMMANDED. THE ACFT WIRING SCHEMATIC SHOWS THAT THE TAIL WHEEL STEERING UNIT CONTAINS A COIL TYPE CLUTCH THAT IS ACTIVATED WHEN THE PILOT SELECTS STEER OR LOCK, THE ELEC FIELD OF THIS CLUTCH COIL COLLAPSES WHEN THE TAIL WHEEL STEERING SWITCH IS SELECTED TO THE OFF POSITION, THIS IS NORMAL, HOWEVER, THIS COIL SHOULD BE PROTECTED WITH THE USE OF A DIODE TO BLOCK THE BACK FEED THAT CAN EFFECT SENSITIVE EQUIP. MOST COILS IN THE AVIATION INDUSTRY ARE PROTECTED WITH DIODES.

Part: YAW DAMPER — ACTIVATED (AUTOPILOT SYS) · airframe 24,080 hrs

AUTOPILOT WAS RECENTLY INSTALLED THAT HAD A YAW DAMPENER AS AN OPTION. UPON THE TAKEOFF ROLL, THE PILOT CLAIMS THAT THE YAW DAMPENER CAME ONLINE, UNCOMMANDED, CAUSING A LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL.

Part: G SWITCH — INOPERATIVE (ZONE 100) · airframe 16,507 hrs

ELT G SWITCH WILL NOT ACTIVATE DURING TESTING.

Part: G SWITCH — INOPERATIVE (ELT) · airframe 18,628 hrs

ELT G SWITCH WILL NOT ACIVATE DURING TESTING. REMOTE PILOT ACTIVATED SWITCH WORKS INTERMITTENTLY.

Part: CYLINDER HEAD — CRACKED (ENGINE) · airframe 14,823 hrs

ENGINE CYLINDER HEAD IN THE NR 2 POSITION CRACKED, IN FLIGHT, CAUSING ENGINE ROUGHNESS AND PARTIAL POWER LOSS. PILOT MADE EMERGENCY LANDING OFF AIRPORT.

Part: CYLINDER HEAD — CRACKED (NR 2) · airframe 14,823 hrs

ENGINE CYLINDER HEAD IN THE NR 2 POSITION CRACKED, IN FLIGHT, CAUSING ENGINE ROUGHNESS AND PARTIAL POWER LOSS. PILOT MADE EMERGENCY LANDING OFF AIRPORT.

Part: ELT — DEFECTIVE (CABIN) · airframe 12,286 hrs

THE INSTALLED ME406 ELT G-SWITCH WOULD NOT ACTIVATE DURING ROUTINE MX. THE ELT WAS TESTED IAW THE MM. ALL FLASH CODES WERE NORMAL DURING REMOTE SWITCH ACTIVATION. ALL FLASH CODES WERE NORMAL WHEN THE ELT WAS REMOVED FROM THE ACFT AND THE ARM SWITCH WAS ACTIVATED THE RESET. THE G-SWITCH TEST FAILED. THIS TEST IS PREFORMED USING A JUMPER WIRE CONNECTED TO THE CONNECTOR PLUG PORT. THE JUMPER ITSELF WAS TESTED AND TESTED NORMAL. THE ELT WAS DEEMED UNAIRWORTHY AND RETURNED TO THE MFG FOR REPAIR.

Part: SPAR — CRACKED (LT ELEVATOR)

PILOT REPORTED A CRACK FOUND ON THE LT ELEVATOR WHILE PERFORMING A PREFLIGHT INSPECTION. THE ELEVATOR WAS REMOVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT FOR CLOSER INSPECTION. THE CRACK WAS IN THE FORWARD SPAR AND HAD ORIGINATED FROM UNDER THE OB ATTACH FITTING. FATIGUE. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: NDT AT SPECIFIC TIME IN SERVICE INTERVALS. (K)

Part: CYLINDER — CRACKED (NR 2)

CYLINDER HEAD HAS A CRACK. BEGINNING AT INTAKE PORT AND EXTENDING TO UPPER SPARK PLUG HOLE. (K)

Part: CASTING — BROKEN (LT MLG)

SKIPLANE LANDED ON GLACIER. AFTER LANDING, AIRCRAFT TAXIED OVER A SNOW COVERED CREVASSE. PILOT HEARD A LOUD BANG. THE AIRCRAFT LANDED TO THE LEFT AS HE STOPPED. PILOT UNLOADED PASSENGER, AND INVESTIGATED THE LT GEAR BOX AREA. INVESTIGATION OF THIS AREA REVEALED A BROKEN OUTER GEAR BOX CASTING AND SMALL TEAR IN LT HAND DOORPOST SKIN, CAUSED BY BROKEN CASTING AND UPWARD MOVEMENT OF THE LT MAIN LANDING GEAR LEG. EXCESSIVE STRESS TO LT HAND GEAR LEG BY TAXING THROUGH COVERED CREVASSE. AVOID UNDUE STRESS TO MLG BY TAXING ON EVEN SURFACES WHILE EQUIPPED WITH WHEEL SKIS. (K)

Part: REINFORCEMENT — UNSERVICEABLE (HORIZONTAL STAB)

THE AFT ATTACH POINTS OF THIS 185 HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ARE STRUCTURALLY REINFORCED WITH AN INTERNAL REINFORCEMENT TRIANGLE BRACKET, PN 0732106, AND 0732106-1. CRACKS IN THESE REINFORCEMENTS WERE FOUND AROUND THE WASHERS OF THE ATTACH HARDWARE, AND IN THE RADIUS OF THE ANGLE. IDENTIFICATION OF THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY OBSERVING EXCESSIVE FORE AND AFT MOVEMENT OF THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER WHILE OBSERVING THE REAR ATTACH FITTING. IF THE FITTING SHOWS SIGNS OF GAP BETWEEN THE SKIN AND FITTING WHILE TESTING THE MOVEMENT FORE AND AFT, THIS IS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE INTERNAL REINFORCEMENT TRIANGLE BRACKETS. THIS AREA IS MOST EASILY INSPECTED BY REMOVING THE ELEVATORS AND USING

Part: REINFORCEMENT — UNSERVICEABLE (HORIZONTAL STAB)

THE AFT ATTACH POINTS OF THIS HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ARE STRUCTURALLY REINFORCED WITH AN INTERNAL REINFORCEMENT TRIANGLE BRACKET, PN 0732106 AND 0732106-1. CRACKS IN THESE REINFORCEMENTS WERE FOUND AROUND THE WASHERS OF THE ATTACH HARDWARE, AND IN THE RADIUS OF THE ANGLE. IDENTIFICATION OF THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY OBSERVING EXCESSIVE FORE AND AFT MOVEMENT OF THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER WHILE OBSERVING THE REAR ATTACH FITTING. IF THE FITTING SHOWS SIGNS OF GAP BETWEEN THE SKIN AND FITTING WHILE TESTING THE MOVEMENT FORE AND AFT, THIS IS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE INTERNAL REINFORCEMENT TRIANGLE BRACKETS. THIS AREA IS MOST EASILY INSPECTED BY REMOVING THE ELEVATORS AND USING ADEQU

Part: SENSOR — FAILED (AIR DISTRIBUTION)

INTERMITTENT IN-FLIGHT 'RUDDER KICK' AND BLEED AIR MANIFOLD TEMP SPLITS REPORTED. TROUBLESHOOTING DID NOT REVEAL ANY PROBLEMS, A PHYSICAL INSPECTION OF FAN AIR SYS TEMP PROBES REVEALED A DEFECTIVE RT SIDE ANTICIPATOR 'LAGGED' ELEMENT HOUSING.

Part: SELECTOR — MALFUNCTIONED (CABIN PRESSURE)

CABIN PRESSURIZATION SELECTOR. LANDING ALTITUDE TAPE FAILED. TAPE/RHEOSTAT SLIPPED INTERNALLY. TAPE DISPLAYED A DIFFERENT ALTITUDE THAN WAS BEING CONTROLLED; THERE WAS APPROX 1,000 FOOT ERROR. THIS ERROR CAUSED CABIN ALTITUDE AT LANDING TO BE APPROX 1,400 FEET BELOW FIELD ELEVATION. THE CONCERN IS THE ACFT IS PRESSURIZED GREATER THAN NORMAL AND PLUG TYPE EMERGENCY EXIT WINDOWS AND DOORS CANNOT BE OPENED UNTIL THE PRESSURIZATION IS EQUALIZED.

Part: CONNECTOR — FAILED (VHF COMM)

INTERMITTENT VHF COMMUNCATION RECEPTION DURING TAXI, TAKEOFF, AND LANDING. TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED A 'COLD SOLDER JOINT' BETWEEN CENTER CONNECTION AND ANTENNA COAX CABLE CENTER CONDUCTOR.

Part: SELECTOR — FAILED (COCKPIT)

CABIN PRESSURIZATION SELECTOR. LANDING ALTITUDE TAPE FAILED. TAPE/RHEOSTAT SLIPPED INTERNALLY. TAPE DISPLAYED DIFFERENT ALT THAN WAS ACTUALLY BEING CONTROLLED; THERE WAS APPROX 1,000 FOOT ERROR. ERROR CAUSED CABIN ALT AT LANDING TO BE APPROX 1,400 FEET BELOW FIELD ELEV. THE CONCERN IS THE ACFT IS PRESSURIZED GREATER THAN NORMAL AND PLUG TYPE EMERG EXIT WINDOWS AND DOORS CANNOT BE OPENED UNTIL PRESSURIZATION IS EQUALIZED. SUBMITTER STATED THERE IS NO KNOWN IN-SERVICE MAINT OR INSP THAT CAN PREVENT THIS. FAILURE EVIDENT TO CREW AND AFM PROCEDURES COVER MANUAL PRESS CNTRL TO EQUALIZE CABIN PRESS. ENG EVAL OF INTERNAL COUPLING OF TAPE-TO-RHEOSTAT SHOULD BE DONE TO SEE IF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS NEED TO BE MADE.

Part: CYLINDER — SEPARATED (CYL HEAD, NR 2)

NR 2 CYLINDER HEAD SEPARATED FROM BARREL. AIRCRAFT IN CRUISE, PRECAUTIONARY LANDING MADE WITHOUT INCIDENT. SUBMITTER RECOMMENDED UNTHREADING OF CYLINDER HEAD/BARREL AT OVERHAUL OR MANUFACTURE OF NEW CYLINDER ASSY. (X)

Part: RELAY — SEPARATED (TRU)

RELAY 339A1K6 (AUX AC POWER) HAD A LOOSE C1 TERMINAL POST THAT RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF THE C-PHASE DURING EXTERNAL AC POWER OPERATION. SYMPTOMS WERE LOW TRU OUTPUT VOLTAGE AND POOR BATTERY CHARGING. WHEN REMOVING THE RELAY, TEMRINAL POST B1 SEPARATED FROM THE RELAY. FAILED RELAY, HARTMAN P/N DH-31DA HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPLACED FOR LOOSE TERMINALS THAT CAUSED APU POWER PROBLEMS. A DIRECT REPLACEMENT OF THE HARTMAN RELAY IS LEACH P/N ZC-B3N-018. THE -018 LEACH RELAY HAS IMPROVED CONTACT RETENTION TO PREVENT SEPARATION. THE LEACH RELAY WAS THE -018 P/N AND IS ALSO APPROVED FOR INSTALLATION IN THE POWER DIST BOX AS K1 (LAC2) AND K2 (RAC2) MAKING IT THE PREFERRED PART FOR SPARE STOCK.

Part: ARM — CORRODED (LT RUDDER)

WHEN REMOVING LT RUDDER PEDAL AND ARM ASSYS TO ACCESS FIREWALL INSIDE OF RUDDER ARM, TUBE WAS FOUND BADLY CORRODED. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSION ON OUTSIDE OF TUBE. THE TUBE IS MOUNTED VERTICALLY AND IS OPEN ON TOP AND SEALED ON BOTTOM. ANY WATER THAT ENTERS TUBE IS TRAPPED. WATER PROBABLY CAME FROM PILOT'S BOOTS DURING SEAPLANE OPERATIONS AND MAY HAVE BEEN SALTWATER. SUBMITTER RECOMMENDS SEALING UPPER END OF TUBE TO PREVENT WATER ENTRY.

Part: BRACKET — CRACKED (LT H STAB SPAR)

LEFT HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ATTACH FITTING ON STABILIZER SPAR FOUND CRACKED. INTERGRANULAR CORROSION EVIDENT ON THE COMPLETE LENGTH OF CRACK. PART IS HIGHLY LOADED AND SUBJECT TO STRESS CORROSION. SUBMITTER STATED THIS FITTING SHOULD BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY DURING THE REPETITIVE INSPECTIONS REQUIRED BY AD 92-24-02. THESE FITTINGS ARE REMOVED FOR THE INSPECTION OF SPAR.

Part: BULKHEAD — CORRODED (EMPENNAGE)

AFTER REMOVING HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ATTACH BRACKET, C2FS543A, TO INCORPORATE MOD 2/1338, BULKHEAD FOUND PERFORATED BY CORROSION. DAMAGE WAS NOT APPARENT UNTIL FITTING WAS REMOVED. ALL AREAS ON TAIL WHERE STEEL FITTINGS ARE RIVETED TO ALUMINUM STRUCTURE SHOULD BE SUSPECT. AIRPLANE IS OPERATED AS A SEAPLANE AND IS OCCASIONALLY OPERATED IN SALT WATER.

Part: SPAR DOUBLER — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

HORIZONTAL STABILIZER REAR SPAR DOUBLERS EXTENDING FROM STATION ZERO TO 40 ON UPPER AND LOWER FLANGES OF SPAR WERE FOUND CORRODED UNDER ELEVATOR HINGE BRACKETS AND REAR ATTACH FITTING. STEEL BRACKETS RIVETED TO ALUMINUM STRUCTURE ON SEAPLANES ARE SUBJECT TO CORROSION. DOUBLERS WERE REPLACED. ALL PARTS IPOXY PRIMED.

Part: RIB — CORRODED (LT ELEV)

LEFT ELEVATOR TIP RIB WAS FOUND PERFORATED BY CORROSION UNDER MASS BALANCE WEIGHTS C2TE-113 AND DASH 115. ONLY ONE FASTENER WAS RETAINING THE WEIGHTS. THE LEAD WEIGHTS ARE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ALUMINUM RIB AND ARE RETAINED BY STEEL SCREWS. THE CONDITIONS ARE PERFECT FOR CORROSION.