QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC

Operated by Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (per NTSB report)

Operated by QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT REPORTED THAT AFTER DEPARTURE HE RECEIVED A SLOW SPEED INDICATION WITH AN ACCOMPANYING STICK SHAKER AND ORAL WARNING EVEN THOUGH HE WAS WELL ABOVE THE STALL SPEED FOR HIS CONFIGURATION, THE PILOT RETURNED THE AIRCRAFT TO HIS DEPARTURE POINT AND LANDED THE AIRCRAFT WITHOUT INCIDENT. POST THE AIRCRAFT’S LANDING MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE AIRCRAFT AND FOUND THE LEFT ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA) PROBE IN A FAILED STATE. THE FAILED AOA PROBE WAS REPLACED WITH A SERVICEABLE AOA PROBE, AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

THE PILOT NOTICED AN ENGINE VIBRATION ON DECENT INTO READING REGIONAL AIRPORT. THE #1 STARTER- GENERATOR PART NUMBER A 23085-025, SERIAL NUMBER Y0090 WAS FOUND TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE VIBRATION. THIS STARTER-GENERATOR WAS PREVIOUSLY OVERHAULED AND HAD BEEN IN SERVICE FOR 679.1 HOURS AND 801 LANDINGS BEFORE REMOVAL. THE STARTER-GENERATOR AND ENGINE WERE INSPECTED, AND AN OVERHAULED STARTER-GENERATOR UNIT WAS INSTALLED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. UPON CLOSER EXAMINATION THE REAR BEARING WAS THE CAUSE OF THE VIBRATION, THE VENDOR WAS CONTACTED AND A MORE COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION WILL FOLLOW.

THE PC-12 AIRCRAFT WAS IN TRANSITION FROM KGNV (GAINESVILLE FL) TO KVDF (TAMPA FL) WHEN THE PILOT EXPERIENCED A FAILURE OF THE GENERATOR 1 BUSS, THE AIRCRAFT WENT INTO LOAD SHED, THE PILOT LANDED AT KVEF AND CONTACTED MAINTENANCE. THE MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN FOUND THAT THE STARTER- GENERATOR FAILED AND WAS REPLACED AFTER THE REQUIRED PRATT AND WHITNEY INSPECTIONS ON THE ENGINE WERE COMPLETED AND AN OPERATIONAL CHECK WAS FOUND SATISFACTORY. A FURTHER REVIEW OF THE START-GENERATOR REVEALED EXCESSIVE PLAY AT THE REAR BEARING THAT ALLOWED THE FAN TO CONTACT THE SHROUD ASSY. THE SUPPLIER WAS CONTACTED FOR THE FAILURE.

THE AIRCRAFT WAS MOVED TO MAINTENANCE FOR A RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR ACTUATOR INDICATION PROBLEM, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS INTERNAL TO THE ACTUATOR AND A REPLACEMENT ACTUATOR WAS ORDERED. DURING REMOVAL OF THE FAILED ACTUATOR, THE TECHNICIAN NOTICED THAT THE ROTATIONAL BEARING ON THE ACTUATOR THAT WAS BEING REMOVED WAS NO LONGER SECURE IN THE ACTUATOR CYLINDER HOUSING AT THE WING ATTACHING LOCATION. THE BEARING IS SECURED USING A SWAGED ATTACHMENT PROCESS IN THE CYLINDER HOUSING. THE BEARING FELL OUT OF THE CYLINDER HOUSING END AND WITH A CLOSER LOOK IT WAS NOTED THAT THE SWAGE ON ONE SIDE OF THE BEARING WAS MORE PRONOUNCED THEN THE OTHER. AT THIS POINT THE REPLACEMENT ACTUATOR WAS BEING REVIEWED PRIOR TO THE INSTALLATION, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE OVERHAULED REPLACEMENT ACTUATOR HAD A LOOSE OUTER BEARING HOUSING AT THE PISTON SHAFT END WHICH IS EASILY ROTATED BY HAND WITHIN THE ROD END, THIS IS ALSO SECURED USING A SWAGING PROCESS. WE HAVE CONTACTED EATON AEROSPACE GROUP WITH THE PROBLEM AND REQUESTED A REPLACEMENT ACTUATOR.

DURING A ROUTINE PILATUS 1200HR INSPECTION THE NOSE GEAR ACTUATOR UPPER ATTACH BRACKET (P/N 553.10.12.326) WAS FOUND CRACKED. THE PART WAS ORIGINAL WITH A TOTAL TIME OF 15,712.7 AND A CYCLE COUNT OF 17,880 BEFORE THE PART WAS FOUND DEFECTIVE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS REPAIRED WITH THE INSTALLATION OF A PARTS REPAIR KIT BEING INSTALLED (P/N 500.40.12.002). THIS KIT INSTALLS AN IMPROVED NLG ACTUATOR ATTACHMENT BRACKET PER PILATUS SPECIAL REPAIR PROCEDURES RM07274.

THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN ROUTE TO KROA FROM KLZU AT AN ALTITUDE OF 25,000 ON JULY 13, 2024, WHEN THE PILOT EXPERIENCED AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT FAILURE MASTER WARNING (ECU FAILURE). THE PILOT CONFIRMED THE LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONING, THE PILOT THEN CONTINUED TO THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SECTION WITHIN THE PILOTS OPERATING HANDBOOK AND REQUESTED TO DESCEND ALTITUDE WITH ATC, FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURES WITH NO POSITIVE OUTCOME HE PROCEEDED TO COMMUNICATE WITH ATC THAT HE NEEDED TO DESCEND TO BELOW 10,000 FT. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THE PIC AND ATC DECLARED AN EMERGENCY DUE TO THE ALTITUDE DEVIATION EFFECTING ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC IN THE AREA. THE PILOT DESCENDED TO A SAFE OPERATING ALTITUDE AND PULLED THE ECS EMERGENCY SHUTOFF. THE PILOT CONTINUED TO LAND AT KROA. ONCE ON THE GROUND THE PILOT COMMUNICATED WITH DISPATCH AND MAINTENANCE CREWS, AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PILOT COULD FOLLOW THE MEL PROCEDURES AND CONFIGURE THE AIRCRAFT FOR UNPRESSURIZED FLIGHT TO MOVE THE AIRCRAFT TO A MAINTENANCE LOCATION FOR REPAIR. THE AIRCRAFT WAS REPOSITIONED TO KRDG FOR A MAINTENANCE EVENT.

DURING FLIGHT THE AHRS SYSTEM RESET WHILE ENCOUNTERING SEVERE TURBULENCE REQUIRING EMERGENCY ACTION. ALL SYSTEMS EVENTUALLY CAME BACK ONLINE AFTER EXITING THE TURBULENCE AND THE FLIGHT CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER ISSUE.

DURING A SCHEDULED INSPECTION CRACKING WAS FOUND ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE HEATED LIP ASSEMBLY, THE CRACKING WAS IDENTIFIED BY VISUAL INSPECTION. THE PILATUS PC-12 REPAIR INVOLVES REPLACEMENT OF THE ENTIRE HEATED ANTI-ICE LIP ASSEMBLY P/N 530.24.12.151, OR P/N 530.24.12.155 THE HEATED LIP ASSY. SEEMS TO HAVE A CONSISTENT FAILURE RATE AROUND 4000 HOURS OF OPERATION. WE HAVE REPLACED SEVERAL HEATED LIP ASSEMBLIES WITHIN OUR FLEET. THIS CURRENT LIP WAS ON SINCE 1/2019 AND HAD ACCUMULATED A TOTAL TIME IN SERVICE OF 6,103.3.

DURING A SCHEDULED INSPECTION CRACKING WAS FOUND ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE HEATED LIP ASSEMBLY, THE CRACKING WAS IDENTIFIED BY VISUAL INSPECTION. THE PILATUS PC-12 REPAIR INVOLVES REPLACEMENT OF THE ENTIRE HEATED ANTI-ICE LIP ASSEMBLY P/N 530.24.12.151, OR P/N 530.24.12.155 THE HEATED LIP ASSY. SEEMS TO HAVE A CONSISTENT FAILURE RATE AROUND 1500- 4000 HOURS OF OPERATION. WE HAVE REPLACED SEVERAL HEATED LIP ASSEMBLIES WITHIN OUR FLEET. THIS CURRENT LIP WAS ON SINCE 12/2020 AND HAD ACCUMULATED A TOTAL TIME IN SERVICE OF 4,167.4.

AIRCRAFT N465QD MSN:465 FAILED TO START AT MEM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE #1 STARTER- GENERATOR PART NUMBER A 23085-029, SERIAL NUMBER P1043 WAS FOUND TO BE FAILED DUE TO THE GENERATOR BRUSH ASSEMBLY BROKE IN THE HOUSING SHORTING THE STARTER-GENERATOR. THIS STARTER-GENERATOR WAS OVERHAULED AND IS A LOW TIME UNIT. THE STARTER-GENERATOR HAD BEEN IN SERVICE FOR ONLY 308.7 HOURS AND 288 LANDINGS BEFORE FAILURE. THIS TYPE OF FAILURE IS CONCERNING SINCE IT IS ADDRESSED IN THE PRATT AND WHITNEY MAINTENANCE MANUAL FOR THE PT6A-67B AS A POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR ENGINE REMOVAL, FORTUNATELY THIS STARTER-GENERATOR WAS MODIFIED TO A 23085-029 BY GOODRICH SB23085-025-24-01 TO PREVENT AN ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE DAMAGE (EDD) AND DID NOT DAMAGE THE DRIVE BY BINDING. THE STARTER-GENERATOR AND ENGINE WERE INSPECTED, AND AN OVERHAULED STARTER-GENERATOR UNIT WAS INSTALLED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

DURING A SCHEDULED INSPECTION IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE WAS EXHAUST GAS STREAKING IN THE ENGINE INLET COMING FROM THE AFT EDGE OF THE STAINLESS STEEL HEATED DEICE LIP. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION IT WAS FOUND THAT THE HEATED DEICE LIP WAS CRACKED AROUND THE SUPPLY DUCT WHERE THE ENGINE EXHAUST ENTERS THE BACK OF THE DEICE LIP. THIS ALLOWED EXHAUST GASES TO ESCAPE INSIDE THE COWLING AND TO BE DRAWN DOWN THE ENGINE INLET CREATING A DEFINED STREAK IN THE INLET. THIS FAILURE HAS BEEN FOUND IN SEVERAL OTHER OF OUR FLEET OF AIRCRAFT. THE PILATUS APPROVED REPAIR, UNDER PILATUS SERVICE BULLETIN 71-003, WAS TO INSTALL AN UPGRADED DEICE LIP TO PC-12 MSN 181-260. THIS PARTICULAR SERVICE BULLETIN WAS INCORPORATED AT THE FACTORY ON MSN 261 AND SUBSEQUENT. PER SB 71-003 THE LIP WAS REPLACED TO PREVENT SMALL CRACKS FROM PROPAGATING ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE LIP ASSY. OUR ENTIRE FLEET OF PC-12 AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN UPGRADED TO THE NEW STYLE DEICE INLET LIP, P/N 530.24.12.151, OR P/N 530.24.12.155. THIS REPAIR HAS NOT PREVENTED THE DEICE LIP FROM CRACKING ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE DEICE LIP ASSEMBLY. ALSO, THE FREQUENCY OF FAILURE HAS REMAINED CONSISTENT AROUND 1400-4000 HOURS OF OPERATION BEFORE FAILURE.

DURING A PRE-TAKE OFF MAGNETO CHECK THE PILOT OBSERVED HIS #2 ENGINE RIGHT MAGNETO HAD A 1100 RPM DROP AND WAS FAILING HIS MAGNETO CHECK. THE PILOT THEN RETURNED THE BEECH BARON 58 TO MAINTENANCE. THE MAINTENANCE TEAM COMPLETED A RUN-UP OF THE AIRCRAFT CONFIRMING THAT THE MAGNETO HAD A PROBLEM. MAINTENANCE REMOVED THE EFFECTED MAGNETO AND OPENED IT FOR INSPECTION AND FOUND THAT THE MAGNETO TIMING GEAR HAD ENCOUNTERED THE COIL CASE GROUNDING WIRE AND RUBBED THROUGH IT OPENING THE CIRCUIT WHICH FAILED THE COIL. BECAUSE THE MAGNETOS WERE SO CLOSE TO THE 500-HOUR INSPECTION THE LEFT MAGNETO WAS ALSO OPENED FOR INSPECTION, IT WAS THEN FOUND THAT THE EXACT SAME PROBLEM EXISTED IN THAT MAGNETO. THE BACKGROUND ON THIS IO550-C71B WAS THAT IT WAS OVERHAULED BY TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL WITH A 478.7 TSO AND THE MAGNETOS WERE NEW AT OVERHAUL. THE LEFT MAGNETO P/N 10-500556-1 WITH A S/N OF D19GA114 AND THE FAILED MAGNETO WITH THE SAME P/N AND A S/N OF D19GA108.

DURING A FUEL NOZZLE AND FLOW DIVIDER CHANGE IT WAS NOTED THAT A O-RING WAS FOUND TO BE BROKEN. THIS O-RING WAS FOUND BROKEN PRIOR TO INSTALLATION ON THE FLOW DIVIDER POSITION. THE O-RING WAS SUPPLIED WITH A FUEL NOZZLE KIT FROM HERITAGE TURBINES, INC. P/N AS-3209-009 LOT # B439-2022-06-17 CURE DATE 2Q22. THE SUPPLIER WAS CONTACTED AND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NO OTHER FAILURES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. THIS WAS THE SECOND FAILURE FOUND BY OUR ORGANIZATION, SEE SDR Q5QA20230222002 DATED 2/27/2023.

FUEL INLET ADAPTOR ASSEMBLY WAS REPLACED ON THE ENGINE. SUBSEQUENT ENGINE RUN-UP AND LEAK CHECK WAS SATISFACTORY. HOWEVER, A FUEL LEAK WAS NOTED THE FOLLOWING DAY UNDER THE FUEL FLOW DIVIDER. INSPECTION DISCLOSED THAT ONE OF THE O-RINGS USED TO INSTALL THE FLOW DIVIDER TO THE ENGINE CASE WAS BROKEN. A NEW O-RING WAS INSTALLED AND NO FURTHER LEAKAGE WAS NOTED. NOTE, THE O-RING WAS NOT "PINCHED" DURING INITIAL ASSEMBLY. THE INLET ADAPTOR ASSEMBLY WAS OVERHAULED BY HERITAGE TURBINES, INC., WO RO-6427-PC12, WHO SUPPLIED THE O-RINGS.

DURING AN INSPECTION OF THE TAIL SECTION OF N36TA, THE AFT-MOST FUSELAGE BULKHEAD ASSEMBLY, FS 272.0, WAS NOTED CRACKED AT THE LEFT LOWER AND RIGHT LOWER RADII ONLY ON THE DOUBLER P/N 002-440024-11 (SEE ATTACHED PHOTO).

DURING AN INSPECTION OF THE TAIL SECTION OF N2143J, THE AFT-MOST FUSELAGE BULKHEAD ASSEMBLY, FS 272.0, WAS NOTED CRACKED AT THE LEFT LOWER AND RIGHT LOWER RADII.

THE NOSE LANDING GEAR UPPER DRAG BRACE THAT WAS INSTALLED, P/N 532.20.12.140, REQUIRES A 300 FLIGHT HOUR OR 400 HOUR LANDING INSPECTION (CALLED OUT IN THE PC-12 MAINTENANCE MANUAL, CHAPTER 4). THIS DRAG BRACE IS ALSO ADDRESSED IN A PILATUS SERVICE BULLETIN SB 32-014 REV 4. WE HAD RECENTLY ACQUIRED THIS AIRCRAFT AND THROUGH RECORDS RESEARCH, DISCOVERED THE PERIODIC INSPECTION HAD NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH AND IT WAS BEING TRACKED BY THE WRONG PART NUMBER 532.20.12.297. WE REPLACED THE DRAG BRACE WITH THE CURRENT P/N 532.20.12.297 WHICH HAS NO PERIODIC INSPECTION AND IS LIFE LIMITED AT 25000 FH OR 30000 LH. IN ADDITION TO THIS AIRCRAFT, WE HAD TWO ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, MSN 567 AND 589, WITH THIS COMPONENT TRACKED AS HAVING THE CURRENT BRACE P/N 532.20.12.297 WHEN THE BRACE INSTALLED WAS ACTUALLY P/N 532.20.12.289, WHICH ALSO REQUIRES THE 300 FH OR 400 FH INSPECTION. THE DRAG BRACE ON BOTH AIRCRAFT FAR EXCEEDED THEIR LIFE LIMIT. UNFORTUNATELY THIS OVERSIGHT RESULTED IN THE NOSEGEAR FAILURE ON MSN 589. WE FEEL THE INFORMATION PILATUS PROVIDES ON THIS DRAG BRACE IS INSUFFICIENT AND SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO DETAIL PHYSICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE .140 AND .289 DRAG BRACES VS THE CURRENT P/N .297. IT WOULD ALSO BE BENEFICIAL TO INCLUDE INFORMATION ON WHAT P/N DRAG BRACE WAS INSTALLED BY AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER AT MANUFACTURE.

THE PILOT REPORTED LH ALTERNATOR WAS INOPERATIVE. THE PILOT LANDED AT AN ALTERNATIVE AIRPORT WITHOUT INCIDENT. A TECHNICIAN'S INSPECTION DISCLOSED THAT THE ALTERNATOR BRUSH ASSEMBLY HAD ONE BRAIDED LEAD BROKEN AT THE TERMINAL BLOCK. THE BRUSH ASSEMBLY WAS REPLACED AND AN OPERATIONAL CHECK WAS SATISFACTORY. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL ALTERNATOR FAILURES WITH THE SAME CONDITION, BROKEN BRUSH LEADS. WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE CONNECTOR CRIMPS AT BOTH THE BRUSH END AND THE TERMINAL END ARE OVER-CRIMPED. ADDITIONALLY, THE FIBERGLASS SLEEVING OVER BOTH LEADS ARE UNNECESSARILY LONG, CAUSING UNDUE STRAIN AT BOTH ENDS OF THE BRAIDED WIRE. WE INSPECTED OUR STOCK OF THESE BRUSH ASSEMBLIES AND FOUND ALL 5 SETS WITH THE SAME CONDITION. WE TRIMMED BACK THE SLEEVING SLIGHTLY ON THOSE SETS AS A PREVENTATIVE MEASURE.

PILOT REPORTED UPON SELECTING GEAR DOWN FOR A SCHEDULED LANDING THE GEAR ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT CAME ON AND THE GEAR FELL OUT OF THE GEAR WELL. THE PILOT PERFORMED AN EMERGENCY EXTENSION PROCEDURE AND THE GEAR LOCKED DOWN. HE THEN LANDED THE AIRCRAFT WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE DISCLOSED THAT THE HIGH CURRENT RELAY FAILED. THE RELAY WAS REPLACED AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

DURING A DESCENT, THE PILOT EXPERIENCED A LOUD BANG COMING FROM THE FRONT OF THE AIRCRAFT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PILOT NOTED THE NOSE GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT. THE TOWER CONFIRMED DURING A LOW APPROACH AT KBNA THAT THE NOSE GEAR WAS ABOUT HALFWAY DOWN. THE PILOT PERFORMED AN EMERGENCY LANDING AND THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO A REST ON TWO PROPELLER BLADES. AN INSPECTION OF THE NOSEGEAR DISCLOSED THAT THE RH AFT DRAG LINK WAS BROKEN ABOUT MID-SPAN.

DURING A CYLINDER CHANGE FOUND THE PISTON PIN ALUMINUM END CAP PLUG WAS BROKEN IN TWO PIECES. THERE WAS NO ABNORMAL WEAR ON THE CONNECTING ROD PISTON PIN BUSHING, AND THE BUSHING DIMENSIONS ARE WITHIN SPEC. NO METAL CONTAMINATION WAS FOUND IN THE FILTER OR ENGINE OIL SUMP.

PILOT EXPERIENCED A FLAP FAILURE ON APPROACH FOR LANDING. THE FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND PAST 0 DEGREES AND THE FLAP MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS TRIPPED. THE PILOT LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. TROUBLESHOOTING DISCLOSED THAT THE MOTOR HAD A BURNED ELECTRICAL SMELL. ADDITIONALLY, THE FLAP PCB BOARD WAS SHORTED. THE FLAP DRIVE MOTOR AND PCB BOARD WAS REPLACED. SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONAL CHECKS WERE SATISFACTORY.

DURING FREON AIR-CONDITIONING OPERATION THE 125 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKER CONTACTS BURNT CLOSED AND BURNED A HOLE THROUGH THE OUTER PROTECTIVE BODY OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER.

THE PILOT WAS CRUISING IN BAD WEATHER WHEN HE EXPERIENCED SEVERE TURBULENCE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE #1 AHRS FAILED, INDICATING A RED X ACROSS THE SCREEN. THE PILOT DECLARED AN EMERGENCY AND DIVERTED INTO BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA AIRPORT (BHM). UPON APPROACH INTO BHM, THE #1 AHRS ENERGIZED AND OPERATED NORMALLY THROUGHOUT APPROACH AND LANDING. SUBSEQUENT GROUND TESTS OF THE SYSTEM WERE ALL NORMAL. AFTER MAINTENANCE DETERMINED NO FAULTS FOUND WITH THE #1 AHRS SYSTEM, THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO HOME BASE.

PILOT NOTED ON RUN-UP THAT THE #2 ENGINE LH MAGNETO WAS MISFIRING. THE MAGNETO WAS REPLACED WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. TROUBLESHOOTING DISCLOSED THE MAGNETO POINT GAP HAD APPARENTLY SHIFTED AND THE INTERNAL MAGNETO TIMING WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUT OF LIMITS. IN ADDITION, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT AN INCORRECT P/N MAGNETO WAS INSTALLED. ALTHOUGH THE FORM 8130-3 LISTED A P/N 10-500556-1 MAGNETO (THE CORRECT P/N FOR THIS AIRCRAFT), S/N D20GA041, THE MAGNETO DATA PLATE SHOWS A P/N 10-500556-101 MAGNETO, SAME S/N, WHICH IS A PRESSURIZED MAGNETO AND NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS AIRCRAFT/ENGINE. THE CONTINENTAL MOTORS MAGNETO WAS PURCHASED NEW FROM BOEING.

PILOT NOTED THE LANDING GEAR WARNING LIGHT ANNUNCIATOR WAS ON AND THE LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT EXTEND TO THE DOWN AND LOCKED POSITION. PILOT EXTENDED THE LANDING GEAR WITH THE EMERGENCY EXTENSION HAND PUMP AND LANDED WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. THE HYDRAULIC POWER PACK ELECTRICAL CONTACTOR WAS REPLACED AS A CORRECTIVE ACTION.

PILOT OBSERVED A NOSE GEAR UNSAFE (WARNING) INDICATION AFTER TAKEOFF. ATTEMPTED TO RETRACT A SECOND TIME WITH THE SAME RESULTS. THEN EXTENDED THE LANDING GEAR TO A DOWN AND LOCKED CONDITION AND SAFELY RETURNED TO THE AIRPORT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AN INSPECTION DISCLOSED THE NOSE GEAR SHOCKSTRUT WAS SEIZED IN AN INTERMIDIATE POSITION, PREVENTING THE NOSE GEAR TO FULLY RETRACT. UPON DISASSEMBLY THE TECHNICIAN DISCOVERED THE SHOCK STRUT BARREL NUT WAS EXTREMELY CORRODED INTERNALLY CAUSING THE SHOCKSTRUT TO SEIZE.

PILOT OBSERVED A LOW HYDRAULIC PRESSURE INDICATION WHILE TAXING AND RETURNED TO BLOCK. TROUBLESHOOTING DETERMINED THE HYDRAULIC PUMP ELECTRICAL CONTACTOR WAS AT FAULT. INSTALLED A REPAIRED CONTACTOR AND PERFORMED NUMEROUS HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AND LANDING GEAR RETRACTION CHECKS. HYDRAULIC SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECKS WERE FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY.

DURING CRUISE FLIGHT, THE PILOT NOTED THAT THE GEAR HAD UNLOCKED FROM THE UP AND LOCKED POSITION AND OBSERVED A HYDRAULIC LOW PRESSURE CAS MESSAGE. THE PILOT DIVERTED TO BIRMINGHAM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, KBHM, WHERE HE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TO BE TOWED OFF OF THE ACTIVE RUNWAY. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE HYDRAULIC POWER PACK WAS FAILED. THE POWER PACK WAS REPLACED BY EMBRAER TECHNICIANS AND APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE TO RETURN TO HOME BASE, KRDG. THIS WAS THE 14TH POWER PACK INSTALLED IN THIS AIRCRAFT SINCE THE SPOILER INSTALLATION MODIFICATION PER EMBRAER S/B 500-00-0009 ON APRIL 2015.

WHILE PERFORMING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, THE TECHNICIAN DISCOVERED AN UNUSUAL SOUND COMING FROM THE LH FLAP DRIVE SYSTEM. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE SOUND WAS COMING FROM THE OUTBOARD FLAP FLEX SHAFT WHICH WAS ALSO VISIBLY CHATTERING. REPLACING THE CABLE ELIMINATED THE PROBLEM. THE RH OUTBOARD FLAP FLEX SHAFT WAS ALSO REPLACED SINCE IT HAD THE SAME P/N AND TOTAL TIME. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THESE CABLES ONLY HAD 2047 HOURS TOTAL TIME AND 2572 TOTAL CYCLES. THEY HAVE A PUBLISHED LIFE LIMIT OF 10,000 HOURS OR 13,500 CYCLES.

PILOT NOTED AFTER ENGINE START THAT GENERATOR 2 WAS TRIPPED OFF LINE. THE PILOT MEL'D GENERATOR 2 AND RETURNED TO HOME BASE. A TECHNICIAN NOTED UPON AN INSPECTION OF GENERATOR 2 THAT THE RING TERMINAL ATTACHED TO THE GENERATOR OUTPUT POST (B+) WAS SEVERELY HEAT DAMAGE DUE TO HIGH RESISTANCE. THE TECHNICIAN REPLACED THE RING TERMINAL AND, AS A PRECAUTION, REPLACED THE GENERATOR 2. NO FURTHER ACTION WAS REQUIRED. GENERATOR 2 OPERATIONAL CHECK WAS SATISFACTORY.

LINE PERSONNEL NOTED A WOBBLE IN THE LEFT MAIN WHEEL WHILE TOWING THE AIRCRAFT OUT OF THE HANGAR. FURTHER INSPECTION DISCLOSED A VERY LARGE CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK ON THE OUTBOARD WHEEL HALF INSIDE OF THE TIRE BEAD AREA.

DURING TAXIING, PILOT EXPERIENCED A HYDRAULIC HI TEMP CAS MESSAGE ALONG WITH THE HYDRAULIC PUMP CYCLING ON/OFF VERY RAPIDLY AND HYDRAULIC PRESSURE INDICATION VARYING BETWEEN 1700-3600 PSI. PILOT RETURNED TO BLOCK AND SHUT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT.

PILOT REPORTED THAT THE CABIN ALTITUDE STARTED TO CLIMB HIGHER THAN SET UNCOMMANDED. DURING AIRCRAFT DESCENT, THE CABIN AIR INDICATION WOULD FLUCTUATE, CLIMBING AND DESCENDING. INSPECTION DISCLOSED A PRESSURIZATION DUCT IN THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT HAD SEPARATED.

PILOT POWERED UP THE AIRCRAFT AND IMMEDIATELY NOTED THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WAS CYCLING CONTINUOUSLY. PILOT PROCEEDED TO SHUT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT. CORRECTIVE ACTION INVOLVED INSTALLING AN OVERHAULED POWERPACK. OPERATIONAL CHECK WAS SATISFACTORY.

REAR SPAR CARRY THROUGH IS CRACKED.THE CRACK RADIATES FROM THE LOWER RIGHT MOST OUTBOARD FASTENER OF THE FUSELAGE REAR WING ATTACH FITTING. THE LENGTH OF THE CRACK IS APPROXIMATELY 5/16" AND CAN BE SEEN WITHOUT MAGNIFICATION. THE CRACK WAS CONFIRMED WITH EDDY CURRENT EQUIPMENT.

PILOT REPORTED THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WAS RAPIDLY CYCLING WHILE IN CRUISE FLIGHT. PILOT EXTENDED THE LANDING GEAR NORMALLY AND HYDRAULIC OPERATION RETURNED TO NORMAL. PILOT LANDED AT HIS DESTINATION WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CORRECTIVE ACTION INVOLVED REPLACING THE HYDRAULIC POWER PACK. SUBSEQUENT LANDING GEAR RETRACTION OPERATIONAL CHECKS WERE SATISFACTORY.

PILOT EXPERIENCED THE HYDRAULIC PUMP CYCLING CONTINUOUSLY TO HOLD PRESSURE, FOLLOWED BY PARTIAL GEAR EXTENSION. THE PILOT EXTENDED THE LANDING GEAR USING EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. CORRECTION ACTION INVOLVED REPLACING THE HYDRAULIC POWER PACK ASSEMBLY. SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONAL CHECKS WERE SATISFACTORY.

PILOT NOTED THE LEFT MAIN TIRE WAS FLAT ON LANDING. REMOVED FAILED WHEEL ASSEMBLY AND INSTALLED A REPLACEMENT OVERHAULED WHEEL ASSEMBLY WITH NEW TIRE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

INSPECTION DISCLOSED WING STRINGER ON LOWER RH WING WAS CRACKED INBOARD AND OUTBOARD OF RIB AT W.S 108.5

INSPECTION DISCLOSED LEFT FLAP SPAR WAS CRACKED ALONG UPPER FLANGE CORNER AT OUTBOARD FLAP TRACK BRACKETRY.

DURING A ROUTINE INSPECTION OF THE ALTERNATOR DRIVE HUB, THE INSPECTOR NOTED THE CASTELLATED NUT RETAINING THE DRIVE HUB WAS LOOSE (THE COTTER PIN THROUGH THE CASTELLATED NUT WAS STILL IN PLACE). INSPECTION AFTER REMOVAL OF THE DRIVE HUB ASSEMBLY DISCLOSED EXCESSIVE WEAR ON THE THRUST WASHER, DRIVE HUB GEAR AND DRIVE HUB HOUSING FACE. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE HUB REQUIRES A LUBRICATED TORQUE OF THE CASTELLATED NUT OF 300 TO 450 INCH POUNDS (PUBLICATION M-16). THE DRIVE HUB ASSEMBLY WAS OVERHAULED WITH 396.8 HOURS SINCE INSTALLATION. REPLACED THE DRIVE HUB WITH A NEW DRIVE HUB, NEW THRUST WASHER AND NEW DRIVE KEY.

THE LT ALTERNATOR WAS REMOVED FOR ROUTINE INSPECTIONS. AFTER REMOVING THE COVER FROM THE BACK OF THE ALTERNATOR, THE TECHNICIAN NOTED SOME GREEN DISCOLORATION ON ONE OF THE DIODES. FURTHER INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED THE DIODE WIRE WAS BROKEN OFF OF THE DIODE BASE. THE SAME WIRE WAS DISCOVERED BROKEN OFF AT THE TOP OF AN ADJACENT DIODE. REPLACED THE ALTERNATOR.

PILOT REPORTED LT ALTERNATOR WAS INTERMITTENT (INDICATOR LIGHT WAS FLASHING). INSPECTION DISCLOSED A CRACKED SOLDER JOINT ON THE ALTERNATOR AT THE BASE OF THE A+ OUTPUT TERMINAL.

PILOT EXPERIENCED A TOTAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE. WITHOUT HYDRAULIC PRESSURE, THE LANDING GEAR FELL OUT AND CYCLED TO DOWN AND LOCKED. THE PILOT DIVERTED AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT UTILIZING EMERGENCY BRAKES. REPLACED THE HYDRAULIC PUMP ASSEMBLY. THIS IS THE 4TH HYDRAULIC PUMP FAILURE IN THIS AIRCRAFT. GROUND SPOILER, SPEED BRAKE FUNCTION, AND NEW HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED.

WHEN THE PILOT DEPARTED AND BEGAN THE TAXI, IMMEDIATELY NOTICED A PROBLEM AND SHUTDOWN. DISCOVERED THE RT WHEEL & TIRE ASSEMBLY WAS COMPLETELY FLAT. AFTER THE WHEEL HAD BEEN REMOVED, AN INSPECTION DISCLOSED THAT THE ASSEMBLY O-RING WAS SLICED IN TWO PLACES. THERE IS ONLY ONE PROBABLE REASON WHY THE O-RING COULD HAVE BEEN DAMAGED IN THIS MANNER: THE O-RING WAS NOT FULLY SEATED IN THE WHEEL SEAL GROOVE IN THE TWO DAMAGED AREAS WHEN THE WHEEL WAS ASSEMBLED.

DURING A ROUTINE INSPECTION, THE FORWARD CARRY-THRU SPAR AFT WEB WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SMALL CRACK IN THE UPPER RH CORNER. BEECHCRAFT FRONT SPAR CARRY THRU STRUCTURE REINFORCEMENT DOUBLER KIT 58-4008 HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED. REPAIRS REQUIRED INSTALLATION OF AN ADDITIONAL DOUBLER ABOVE THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED KIT DOUBLER PER TEXTRON AVIATON ENGINEERING APPROVED DRAWING. NOTE: THIS IS THE SECOND BARON 58 WE HAVE DISCOVERED A CRACK IN THIS IDENTICAL LOCATION.

DURING A ROUTINE INSPECTION, THE FORWARD CARRY-THRU SPAR AFT WEB WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SMALL CRACK IN THE UPPER RH CORNER. BEECHCRAFT FRONT SPAR CARRY THRU STRUCTURE REINFORCEMENT DOUBLER KIT 58-4008 HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED. REPAIRS REQUIRED INSTALLATION OF AN ADDITIONAL DOUBLER ABOVE THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED KIT DOUBLER PER TEXTRON AVIATON ENGINEERING APPROVED DRAWING.

HYDRAULIC PUMP FAILED IN FLIGHT.

FUEL VENT DE-ICE SYSTEM WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERATIVE. DISCOVERED CIRCUIT BREAKER TO HAVE FAILED INTERNALLY.