MARTINAIRE AVIATION L.L.C.

Operated by Martinaire Aviation LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by MARTINAIRE AVIATION LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Martinaire Aviation LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Martinaire Aviation (per NTSB report)

Operated by MARTINAIRE AVIATION LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Martinaire Aviation, L.L.C. (per NTSB report)

Operated by MARTINAIRE AVIATION LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Martinaire Aviation, L.L.C. (per NTSB report)

Operated by Martinaire Aviation LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Martinaire Aviation, LLC (per NTSB report)

NOSE GEAR SHIMMY DAMPENER FAILS INTERNALLY CAUSING NOSE GEAR ASSEMBLY TO SHUDDER EXCESSIVELY DURING HIGH-SPEED SEGMENT OF TAKEOFF OR LANDING ROLL. SHUDDERING AND VIBRATION CAUSES CRACKS TO FORM ON ENGINE MOUNT RING ASSEMBLY.

PITCH TRIM SERVO LOCKS UP WITH AUTOPILOT ENGAGED

THE ROLL TRIM SERVO IS LOCKING UP.

WHILE FLYING AT 6000 HEADING TO DESTINATION ABOUT 20 MILES EAST OF KMWL THE COM/NAV # 2 STARTED SPARKING AND THEN THERE WAS SMOKE. THE PILOT SHUT THE UNIT OFF BUT THERE WAS STILL SMOKE PRESENT. THE PILOT THEN REQUESTED ATC TO DIVERT TO KMWL. SPARKS STOPPED AFTER A MINUTE BUT YOU COULD STILL SMELL THE BURNING IN THE CABIN. LANDED SAFELY AND AIRCRAFT IS SAFE AT KMWL. SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION ON SITE FOUND THE COM/NAV UNIT SCORCHED WITH NO DAMAGE NOTED TO THE SURROUNDING WIRING OR ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS.

PRIMARY STRUCTURAL ANGLED BULKHEAD P/N: 2612060-5, LOCATED AT F.S 474.4 WHICH INCLUDES THE LEFT AND RIGHT FORWARD HORIZONTAL STABALIZER FORWARD ATTACH POINTS WAS DISCOVERED TO BE CRACKED THROUGH THE WEBB, BELOW THE ELEVATOR CONTROL PUSHROD PASS THROUGH CUT OUT HOLE. THIS IS THE ORIGINAL BULKHEAD FROM AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE IN 1988 WITH AN AIRCRAFT TOTAL TIME OF 19,479.5 AND TOTAL AIRCRAFT LANDINGS OF 22,358

DURING THE LAST PHASE INSPECTION A CRACK WAS DISCOVERED IN THE LEFT ELEVATOR TORQUE TUBE.

A STANDARD BORESCOPE INSPECTION OF THE COMPRESSOR TURBINE BLADES WAS CONDUCTED WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRATT AND WHITNEY CANADA MAINTENANCE MANUAL. THE TECHNICIAN ELECTED TO DO AN ADDITIONAL INSPECTION OF THE BLADES THROUGH THE EXHAUST DUCT EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT REQUIRED PER PWC MM 72-00-00 D(3)M NOTE 1. SEVERAL TIP TRAILING EDGES WERE FOUND TO BE DISCOLORED, CHIPPED AND/OR MISSING. THE ENGINE WAS OPENED AT “C” FLANGE AND THE CT DISC REMOVED. THE DISC WAS SENT TO AN APPROVED ENGINE FACILITY AND THE BLADES WERE REMOVED FOR ADDITIONAL INSPECTION. THIS INSPECTION NOTED HOT CORROSION PRESENT ON THE TIP OF EACH BLADE. THE ENGINE HAS RECEIVED REGULAR TURBINE AND COMPRESSOR WASH/RINSES AS DESCRIBED BY THE MAINTENANCE MANUAL. THE ENGINE SHOWED NO SIGNS OF CORROSION DURING THE PREVIOUS BORESCOPE OF THE CT BLADES THROUGH THE EXHAUST AND NOZZLE PORTS CONDUCTED 200 HRS. PRIOR TO THIS EVENT.

DURING A PHASE INSPECTION THE TECHNICIAN FOUND THAT THE INSIDE OF THE THRESHOLD COVER WAS SEVERELY CORRODED DUE TO WEATHER.

FOUND RT HAND FWD HORIZONTAL ATTACH BOLT CORRODED WHILE PERFORMING MARTINAIRE FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE FCD-170301 HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS REPLACEMENT INSPECTION. REPLACING WITH NEW BOLT AND COATING WITH COR-BAN 27L BM53-36B CORROSION INHIBITING COMPOUND DURING INSTALLATION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE. REPEATING INSPECTION AT AIRCRAFT 4 YEAR INSPECTION INTERVALS. REFERENCE CESSNA MODEL 208 ILLUSTRATED PARTS CATALOG REVISION 21 DATED 03-01-2017 CHAPTER 55-10-00 FIGURE 01 SHEET 01 ITEM 2.

DURING A SCHEDULED INSPECTION IT WAS FOUND THAT ONE OF THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS HAD BEEN SHEERED IN HALF. CLOSER INSPECTION FOUND THE BOLT WAS SEVERELY CORRODED. THE OTHER THREE MOUNT BOLTS WERE REMOVED AND EXAMINED, ALL WERE CORRODED. A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE WAS INITIATED TO INSPECT AND REPLACE THE BOLTS.

WHILE PERFORMING FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE, CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE, CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

WHILE ON APPROACH TO HHW AND DESCENDING PRE-LANDING CHECK FOUND THE FLAPS WERE NOT COMPLETELY IN THE FULL UP POSITION. PILOT MOVED THE FLAP HANDLE TO THE UP POSITION WITH NO MOVEMENT OF THE INDICATOR NEEDLE. SUBSEQUENTLY SWITCHED OVER TO THE STANDBY FLAP SYSTEM AND IMMEDIATELY SMOKE CAME FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX NEXT TO HIS LEFT KNEE. FOUND THE FIRE DETECTION BREAKER HAD TRIPPED. SUCCESSFUL LANDING WITH NO OTHER PROBLEMS. INSP INSIDE THE BREAKER BOX FOUND THE PRIMARY FLAP WIRE HAD MELTED FROM THE FLAP BREAKER, WHICH NEVER TRIPPED, TO THE LIMIT SWITCHES IN THE FUSELAGE OVERHEAD. ALSO THE FIRE DETECTION WIRE WHICH RAN ALONGSIDE THE FLAP POWER WIRE HAD MELTED CAUSING THE FIRE DETECT BREAKER TO TRIP. THE SHORT IN THE WIRING THAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM WAS BECAUSE OF CHAFING OF THE PRIMARY FLAP SYSTEM POWER WIRE TO THE MOTOR HAD CHAFED ON A BOLT NEXT TO THE FLAP LIMIT SWITCHES. A COMPLETE INSPECTION OF THE WIRING BUNDLE FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO THE FLAP PRIMARY MOTOR IS BEING CONDUCTED TO SEE IF ANY OTHER HIDDEN DAMAGE IS PRESENT.

ENGINE THROTTLE LEVER JAMMED UP AND WOULD NOT COME OUT OF REVERSE. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED, CHECKED RIGGING, LUBRICATED, PERFORMED A PERFORMANCE RUN, BUT COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. 2 FLIGHT LEGS LATER THE ENGINE WOULD NOT GO INTO FORWARD THRUST. MAINTENANCE AGAIN LOOKED AT THE ENGINE AND DURING THE ENGINE RUN, THE THROTTLE LEVER, AFTER BEING RUN UP TO POWER, WOULD NOT RETARD BACK TO THE FLIGHT IDLE GATE. THE INSPECTION FOUND OUT-OF-ROUND WEAR ON THE 2520569 BUSHING ATTACHED TO THE 3240570 LINKAGE CAUSING THE BUSHING TO HANG UP. LINKAGE ALSO SHOWED WEAR BETWEEN BUSHING AND THREADED END OF LINKAGE. REPLACEMENT OF BUSHING AND LINKAGE RESOLVED THE ISSUE.

WHILE THE ENGINE WAS SPLIT FOR A HOG SECTION INSPECTION AND PT VANE CHANGE IT WAS FOUND THAT 1 OF THE POWER TURBINE BLADES WERE CRACKED.

DURING A RECENT SCHEDULED INSPECTION, CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE SUPPORT DOUBLER EMANATING ACROSS THE LOWER LT MOUNT BOLT HOLE OF THE AFT ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT. ALSO SEVERAL ADJACENT RIVETS IN THIS DOUBLER WERE ALSO CRACKED ACROSS THEIR HOLES AND THE DOUBLER WAS DISTORTED. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE 2 SUPPORT ANGLE BRACKETS FOR THE AFT ELEVATOR MOUNT BRACKET WERE NOT INSTALLED, WHICH ALLOWED THE DOUBLER TO FLEX. HC

FOUND THE ENGINE DRIVEN FUEL PUMP DRIVE SPLINE HAD CORRODED. AIRFRAME FUEL SYS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF CONTAMINATION. FUEL PUMP OUTLET FILTER WAS CONTAMINATED & CHANGED, FUEL SYS PURGED AND FUEL NOZZLES CHANGED OUT. HC

PILOT REPORTED THE NR 1 AVIONICS SWITCH WAS STUCK AND THE NR 2 AVIONICS SWITCH WAS ALSO REPORTED INOPERATIVE WHEN PLACED IN THE ON POSITION. ON INSPECTION, FOUND THAT BOTH AVIONICS SWITCHES HAD FAILED. IT WAS ALSO LATER DETERMINED THAT THE 2 SWITCHES WERE WIRED INCORRECTLY WHEN REFERENCED TO THE WIRING DIAGRAM. THE WIRING WAS CONFIGURED SO THAT IF THE NR 2 SWITCH FAILED THE NR 2 BUSS COULD NOT BE ENERGIZED USING THE AVIONICS BUSS TIE SWITCH.

THE PILOT REPORTED THE NR1 AVIONICS SWITCH FOR ACFT WAS STUCK ON AND THE NR 2 AVIONICS SWITCH WAS INOPERATIVE. THE PILOT REPORTED THE CONDITION TO THE TOWER, SHUTDOWN ALL AVIONICS DUE TO OVERHEATING AND LANDED USING TOWER LIGHT SIGNALS. UPON INSPECTION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE NR 1 SWITCH HAD FUSED ITSELF IN THE ON POSITION AND THE NR 2 SWITCH WAS OPEN. WHEN REPLACEMENT SWITCHES WERE ORDERED MFG STATED THAT THE PART IAW THE IPC WAS NO LONGER PRODUCED. THE CURRENT PART USED WAS FOR A LATER SN AIRCRAFT. WHEN QUESTIONED FURTHER MFG ENGINEERING REPLACED THE SWITCH IN BY EO ON 2/21/1997.

DURING REPLACEMENT OF NR 1 AND NR 2 AVIONICS MASTER SWITCHES IT WAS NOTED THAT THE AVIONICS BUSS TIE SWITCH WAS MISSED WIRED. THE BUSS TIE SWITCH IS TO BE WIRED FROM THE OUTPUT OF AV NR 1 BUSS MASTER TO OUTPUT OF THE AV NR 2 BUSS MASTER. THIS AIRCRAFT TIE SWITCH WAS WIRED FROM THE INPUT OF THE AVNR 1 BUSS MASTER TO THE OUTPUT OF THE AVNR 2 MASTER. THIS ALLOWED THE BUSS TIE SWITCH TO POWER THE NR 2 AVIONICS BUSS WITHOUT EITHER BUSS MASTER SWITCH ON AND WOULD NOT ALLOW THE NR 1 BUSS TO BE CROSS TIED TO THE NR 2 BUSS IF THE NR 1 SWITCH HAD FAILED. THIS IS THE SECOND AIRCRAFT FOUND LIKE THIS AND BOTH AIRCRAFT APPEAR TO HAVE THE FACTORY INSTALLED SWITCHES AND WIRING IN THEM.

12.5" LONG HOSE TO THE SECONDARY EXHAUST WAS FOUND TO HAVE SWOLLEN UP INTERNALLY.

THE PILOT REPORTED AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF OIL WAS BEING CONSUMED, AND ON HIS INBD FLIGHT THE OIL PRESSURE GAUGE WAS FLUCTUATING. THERE WERE NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF AN EXTERNAL OIL LEAK. ON THE GROUND RUN MX ALSO NOTED THE TORQUE WAS FLUCTUATING. WHEN BLEED AIR WAS TURNED ON A FINE MIST OF OIL WAS EMITTED FROM THE HEATER VENTS. TROUBLESHOOTING FOUND THE ENGINE VENT LINE HAD COLLAPSED INTERNALLY PRESSURIZING THE CASE AND CAUSED THE OIL TO LEAK INTERNALLY INTO THE COMPRESSOR.

IN COMPLIANCE OF A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE DURING AN ENGINE INSPECTION, A MECHANIC CHECKING THE VENT LINE OF THE OVERBOARD ENGINE BREATHER, FOUND THE RUBBER SECTION SWOLLEN INTERNALLY. LEFT UNCHECKED TO THE POINT OF OBSTRUCTION, IT WOULD CAUSE THE ENGINE OF THIS ACFT TO START CONSUMING LARGE AMOUNTS OF ENGINE OIL AND COMPROMISE THE ENGINE BEARING SEALS RESULTING IN EXPENSIVE ENGINE REPAIRS. THE FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE MENTIONED ABOVE WAS GENERATED BY THIS ACFT OPERATOR TO ADDRESS THE CONDITION OF THESE AGING HOSE SECTIONS.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF, ENROUTE, ACFT EXPERIENCED AN ENGINE FLAMEOUT ACCOMPANIED BY A LOUD BANG. THE PILOT WAS ABLE TO SAFELY LAND WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENTS. MX INVESTIGATED AND FOUND THAT THE ENGINE HAD SUFFERED A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE, DESTROYING ALL ROTATING DISCS AND BLADES. THE ENGINE WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO VENDOR FOR BREAK DOWN AND INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE. AS OF THIS DATE THE ROOT CAUSE IS NOT KNOWN, BUT DAMAGE TO ONE OF THE L/E OF 1ST STAGE COMPRESSOR BLADE POINTS TO FOD. ENGINE IS CURRENTLY ON 8000 HR O/H EXTENSION PROGRAM. AT THE TIME OF FLAMEOUT THE ENGINE HAD 6464.9 TSO AND 1492.9 HRS SINCE LAST BLADE STRETCH. HOT SECTION INSP IS ON CONDITION.

WHILE IN CRUISE THE PILOT REPORTED ENGINE OIL INDICATORS SHOWING OIL PRESSURE LOWER AND TEMPERATURE HIGHER THAN NORMAL. LATER UPON REMOVAL AND INSPECTION OF THE ENGINE OIL COOLER VERNATHERM IT WAS NOTED THAT IT HAD STARTED TO COME APART DUE TO THE FAILURE OF AN INTERNAL SNAP RING. THIS CAUSED A RESTRICTION OF THE ENGINE OIL COOLING SYS RESULTING IN THE ABNORMAL READINGS. WHEN THE VERNATHERM WAS REPLACED THE ENGINE OIL PARAMETERS RETURNED TO NORMAL.

LT PROP HAS 1 BROKEN DEICE LEAD. LEAD HAS A BROKEN AND BURNED GROUND WIRE IN THE EXACT SOME PLACE AS PREVIOUS LEADS.

FOUND 3 DEFECTIVE LEADS ON RT PROP. ALL 3 FAILED AT THE GROUND WIRE AT THE SAME LOCATION AS PREVIOUS FAILED LEADS.