Martinaire Aviation L.L.C.

Operated by Martinaire Aviation LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by MARTINAIRE AVIATION LLC (per NTSB report)

The failure of the pilot of the second aircraft to maintain a safe distance from the lead airplane while taxiing, which resulted in a ground collision.

Operated by Martinaire Aviation LLC (per NTSB report)

The limitations of the see-and-avoid concept as a method for self-separation of aircraft, which resulted in an inflight collision. Contributing to the accident was the absence of collision avoidance technology on both aircraft.

Operated by Martinaire Aviation (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident were the inoperative attitude indicator and horizontal situation indicator on the pilot’s side of the cockpit, and the pilot’s failure to reference the flight instruments that were operative.

Operated by MARTINAIRE AVIATION LLC (per NTSB report)

Fracture of a compressor turbine (CT) blade due to operational overtemperatures and the failure of a maintenance technician to detect an existing crack in the CT blade during the last engine inspection.

Operated by Martinaire Aviation, L.L.C. (per NTSB report)

The pilot's improper decision to continue the landing when the airplane was not in a safe position to land, resulting in the collision with ground-based approach lighting.

Operated by MARTINAIRE AVIATION LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Martinaire Aviation, L.L.C. (per NTSB report)

The pilot's inadvertent controlled descent into terrain due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was lack of visual reference due to night conditions.

Operated by Martinaire Aviation LLC (per NTSB report)

The total loss of engine power as a result of a fractured compressor turbine blade due to fatigue cracking.

Operated by Martinaire Aviation, LLC (per NTSB report)

The pilot's loss of control as result of the gusting wind.

Operated by Martinaire Partners, L.P. — On-demand air taxi (135) Operator Does Business As: (per NTSB report)

The loss of total engine power due to damage of the compressor stator vanes caused by a foreign object. A contributing factor was an in-flight ingestion of bird(s).

The pilot's failure to verify that the cargo door was latched properly prior to flight and the subsequent in-flight opening of the door. A contributing factor was the box which departed the cargo compartment and struck the horizontal stabilizer.

The pilot's inadequate pre-flight inspection, which resulted in a decrease in airplane performance due to ice, and a subsequent hard landing.

Operated by MARTINAIRE INC. — On-demand air taxi (135) Operator Does Business As: (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT'S CONTINUED FLIGHT INTO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS. FACTORS WERE THE ICING CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT THE DESTINATION AIRPORT, AND THE PILOT'S INABILITY TO MAINTAIN VISUAL LOOKOUT DUE TO WINDSHIELD ICING.

Operated by MARTINAIRE,INC. (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO REMOVE ICE FROM THE AIRFRAME PRIOR TO TAKEOFF. FACTORS WERE FREEZING RAIN THE NIGHT BEFORE AND THE PILOTS' INCOMPLETE PREFLIGHT INSPECTION.

Operated by MARTINAIRE, INC. — On-demand air taxi (135) Operator Does Business As: (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT'S DISREGARD FOR THE ISSUED SAFETY ADVISORY.

Operated by MARTINAIRE (per NTSB report)

AN ENGINE FAILURE DUE TO A DISCONNECT IN THE MAGNETO DRIVE TRAIN CAUSED BY THE CRANKSHAFT GEAR NOT BEING PROPERLY INSTALLED AND SECURED DURING A RECENT ENGINE OVERHAUL.

Operated by MARTINAIRE, INC. (per NTSB report)

Operated by MARTINAIRE, INC. (per NTSB report)

Sanction: $12,150 · case closed 2015-06-19

Sanction: $20,000 · case closed 2009-06-19

Part: INDICATOR — OVERHEATED (ZONE 200) · airframe 15,735 hrs · 20,238 cycles

AIRCRAFT WAS OPERATING A PART 135 FLIGHT FROM KABI TO KDFW. DURING CRUISE FLIGHT AT APPROX 7,000 FT MSL NEAR THE BOOVE WAYPOINT, THE PILOT DETECTED AN ODOR CONSISTENT WITH SOMETHING BURNING. PILOT CLOSED CABIN VENTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ODOR ORIGINATED WITHIN THE ACFT. APPROX 1 TO TWO MINUTES LATER, THE ODOR BECAME STRONGER, & PILOT OBSERVED A SMALL PUFF OF SMOKE COMING FROM BENEATH INSTRUMENT PANEL & DISCOLORATION IN AREA OF TURN-AND-BANK INDICATORS. PILOT NOTIFIED ATC, DECLARED AN EMERGENCY, INITIATED AN IMMEDIATE DESCENT, & DIVERTED TO KSEP. ACFT LANDED SAFELY. MAINT INSPECTED ACFT & DETERMINED THAT COPILOT’S TURN-AND-BANK INDICATOR WAS SOURCE OF SMOKE & OVERHEATING. ACFT WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE. OPEN

Part: SHIMMY DAMPENER — FAILED (ZONE 700) · airframe 18,083 hrs

NOSE GEAR SHIMMY DAMPENER FAILS INTERNALLY CAUSING NOSE GEAR ASSEMBLY TO SHUDDER EXCESSIVELY DURING HIGH-SPEED SEGMENT OF TAKEOFF OR LANDING ROLL. SHUDDERING AND VIBRATION CAUSES CRACKS TO FORM ON ENGINE MOUNT RING ASSEMBLY.

Part: SERVO — LOCKED (ZONE 100) · airframe 15,068 hrs · 20,184 cycles

PITCH TRIM SERVO LOCKS UP WITH AUTOPILOT ENGAGED

Part: SERVO — BINDS (ROLL TRIM) · airframe 15,068 hrs · 20,184 cycles

THE ROLL TRIM SERVO IS LOCKING UP.

Part: RADIO — ABNORMAL (COCKPIT) · airframe 14,250 hrs · 20,184 cycles

WHILE FLYING AT 6000 HEADING TO DESTINATION ABOUT 20 MILES EAST OF KMWL THE COM/NAV # 2 STARTED SPARKING AND THEN THERE WAS SMOKE. THE PILOT SHUT THE UNIT OFF BUT THERE WAS STILL SMOKE PRESENT. THE PILOT THEN REQUESTED ATC TO DIVERT TO KMWL. SPARKS STOPPED AFTER A MINUTE BUT YOU COULD STILL SMELL THE BURNING IN THE CABIN. LANDED SAFELY AND AIRCRAFT IS SAFE AT KMWL. SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION ON SITE FOUND THE COM/NAV UNIT SCORCHED WITH NO DAMAGE NOTED TO THE SURROUNDING WIRING OR ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS.

Part: BULKHEAD WEB — CRACKED (ZONE 300)

PRIMARY STRUCTURAL ANGLED BULKHEAD P/N: 2612060-5, LOCATED AT F.S 474.4 WHICH INCLUDES THE LEFT AND RIGHT FORWARD HORIZONTAL STABALIZER FORWARD ATTACH POINTS WAS DISCOVERED TO BE CRACKED THROUGH THE WEBB, BELOW THE ELEVATOR CONTROL PUSHROD PASS THROUGH CUT OUT HOLE. THIS IS THE ORIGINAL BULKHEAD FROM AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE IN 1988 WITH AN AIRCRAFT TOTAL TIME OF 19,479.5 AND TOTAL AIRCRAFT LANDINGS OF 22,358

Part: TORQUE TUBE — CRACKED (LT ELEVATOR)

DURING THE LAST PHASE INSPECTION A CRACK WAS DISCOVERED IN THE LEFT ELEVATOR TORQUE TUBE.

Part: TURBINE BLADES — CORRODED (ENGINE) · airframe 13,824 hrs · 18,795 cycles

A STANDARD BORESCOPE INSPECTION OF THE COMPRESSOR TURBINE BLADES WAS CONDUCTED WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRATT AND WHITNEY CANADA MAINTENANCE MANUAL. THE TECHNICIAN ELECTED TO DO AN ADDITIONAL INSPECTION OF THE BLADES THROUGH THE EXHAUST DUCT EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT REQUIRED PER PWC MM 72-00-00 D(3)M NOTE 1. SEVERAL TIP TRAILING EDGES WERE FOUND TO BE DISCOLORED, CHIPPED AND/OR MISSING. THE ENGINE WAS OPENED AT “C” FLANGE AND THE CT DISC REMOVED. THE DISC WAS SENT TO AN APPROVED ENGINE FACILITY AND THE BLADES WERE REMOVED FOR ADDITIONAL INSPECTION. THIS INSPECTION NOTED HOT CORROSION PRESENT ON THE TIP OF EACH BLADE. THE ENGINE HAS RECEIVED REGULAR TURBINE AND COMPRESSOR WASH/RINSES AS DESCRIBED BY THE MAINTENANCE MANUAL. THE ENGINE SHOWED NO SIGNS OF CORROSION DURING THE PREVIOUS BORESCOPE OF THE CT BLADES THROUGH THE EXHAUST AND NOZZLE PORTS CONDUCTED 200 HRS. PRIOR TO THIS EVENT.

Part: THRESHOLD — CORRODED (BS 307)

DURING A PHASE INSPECTION THE TECHNICIAN FOUND THAT THE INSIDE OF THE THRESHOLD COVER WAS SEVERELY CORRODED DUE TO WEATHER.

Part: BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZONTAL STAB)

FOUND RT HAND FWD HORIZONTAL ATTACH BOLT CORRODED WHILE PERFORMING MARTINAIRE FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE FCD-170301 HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS REPLACEMENT INSPECTION. REPLACING WITH NEW BOLT AND COATING WITH COR-BAN 27L BM53-36B CORROSION INHIBITING COMPOUND DURING INSTALLATION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE. REPEATING INSPECTION AT AIRCRAFT 4 YEAR INSPECTION INTERVALS. REFERENCE CESSNA MODEL 208 ILLUSTRATED PARTS CATALOG REVISION 21 DATED 03-01-2017 CHAPTER 55-10-00 FIGURE 01 SHEET 01 ITEM 2.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

DURING A SCHEDULED INSPECTION IT WAS FOUND THAT ONE OF THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS HAD BEEN SHEERED IN HALF. CLOSER INSPECTION FOUND THE BOLT WAS SEVERELY CORRODED. THE OTHER THREE MOUNT BOLTS WERE REMOVED AND EXAMINED, ALL WERE CORRODED. A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE WAS INITIATED TO INSPECT AND REPLACE THE BOLTS.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: BOLT — CORRODED (BS 464)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE, CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: MOUNT BOLT — CORRODED (HORIZ STAB)

WHILE PERFORMING A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE, CREATED TO INSPECT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER MOUNT BOLTS, IT WAS FOUND THAT ALL FOUR OF THEM WERE CORRODED.

Part: CIRCUIT BREAKER — FAILED (ZONE 100) · airframe 14,790 hrs · 18,570 cycles

WHILE ON APPROACH TO HHW AND DESCENDING PRE-LANDING CHECK FOUND THE FLAPS WERE NOT COMPLETELY IN THE FULL UP POSITION. PILOT MOVED THE FLAP HANDLE TO THE UP POSITION WITH NO MOVEMENT OF THE INDICATOR NEEDLE. SUBSEQUENTLY SWITCHED OVER TO THE STANDBY FLAP SYSTEM AND IMMEDIATELY SMOKE CAME FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX NEXT TO HIS LEFT KNEE. FOUND THE FIRE DETECTION BREAKER HAD TRIPPED. SUCCESSFUL LANDING WITH NO OTHER PROBLEMS. INSP INSIDE THE BREAKER BOX FOUND THE PRIMARY FLAP WIRE HAD MELTED FROM THE FLAP BREAKER, WHICH NEVER TRIPPED, TO THE LIMIT SWITCHES IN THE FUSELAGE OVERHEAD. ALSO THE FIRE DETECTION WIRE WHICH RAN ALONGSIDE THE FLAP POWER WIRE HAD MELTED CAUSING THE FIRE DETECT BREAKER TO TRIP. THE SHORT IN THE WIRING THAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM WAS BECAUSE OF CHAFING OF THE PRIMARY FLAP SYSTEM POWER WIRE TO THE MOTOR HAD CHAFED ON A BOLT NEXT TO THE FLAP LIMIT SWITCHES. A COMPLETE INSPECTION OF THE WIRING BUNDLE FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO THE FLAP PRIMARY MOTOR IS BEING CONDUCTED TO SEE IF ANY OTHER HIDDEN DAMAGE IS PRESENT.

Part: BUSHING — FAILED (FCU)

ENGINE THROTTLE LEVER JAMMED UP AND WOULD NOT COME OUT OF REVERSE. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED, CHECKED RIGGING, LUBRICATED, PERFORMED A PERFORMANCE RUN, BUT COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE PROBLEM. 2 FLIGHT LEGS LATER THE ENGINE WOULD NOT GO INTO FORWARD THRUST. MAINTENANCE AGAIN LOOKED AT THE ENGINE AND DURING THE ENGINE RUN, THE THROTTLE LEVER, AFTER BEING RUN UP TO POWER, WOULD NOT RETARD BACK TO THE FLIGHT IDLE GATE. THE INSPECTION FOUND OUT-OF-ROUND WEAR ON THE 2520569 BUSHING ATTACHED TO THE 3240570 LINKAGE CAUSING THE BUSHING TO HANG UP. LINKAGE ALSO SHOWED WEAR BETWEEN BUSHING AND THREADED END OF LINKAGE. REPLACEMENT OF BUSHING AND LINKAGE RESOLVED THE ISSUE.

Part: BLADES — CRACKED (POWER SECTION)

WHILE THE ENGINE WAS SPLIT FOR A HOG SECTION INSPECTION AND PT VANE CHANGE IT WAS FOUND THAT 1 OF THE POWER TURBINE BLADES WERE CRACKED.

Part: MOUNT — CRACKED (FS 452.6)

DURING A RECENT SCHEDULED INSPECTION, CRACKS WERE FOUND IN THE SUPPORT DOUBLER EMANATING ACROSS THE LOWER LT MOUNT BOLT HOLE OF THE AFT ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT. ALSO SEVERAL ADJACENT RIVETS IN THIS DOUBLER WERE ALSO CRACKED ACROSS THEIR HOLES AND THE DOUBLER WAS DISTORTED. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE 2 SUPPORT ANGLE BRACKETS FOR THE AFT ELEVATOR MOUNT BRACKET WERE NOT INSTALLED, WHICH ALLOWED THE DOUBLER TO FLEX. HC

Part: PUMP — CORRODED (NR 1 ENGINE)

FOUND THE ENGINE DRIVEN FUEL PUMP DRIVE SPLINE HAD CORRODED. AIRFRAME FUEL SYS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF CONTAMINATION. FUEL PUMP OUTLET FILTER WAS CONTAMINATED & CHANGED, FUEL SYS PURGED AND FUEL NOZZLES CHANGED OUT. HC

Part: SWITCH — FAILED (COCKPIT) · airframe 8,916 hrs · 14,045 cycles

PILOT REPORTED THE NR 1 AVIONICS SWITCH WAS STUCK AND THE NR 2 AVIONICS SWITCH WAS ALSO REPORTED INOPERATIVE WHEN PLACED IN THE ON POSITION. ON INSPECTION, FOUND THAT BOTH AVIONICS SWITCHES HAD FAILED. IT WAS ALSO LATER DETERMINED THAT THE 2 SWITCHES WERE WIRED INCORRECTLY WHEN REFERENCED TO THE WIRING DIAGRAM. THE WIRING WAS CONFIGURED SO THAT IF THE NR 2 SWITCH FAILED THE NR 2 BUSS COULD NOT BE ENERGIZED USING THE AVIONICS BUSS TIE SWITCH.

Part: SWITCH — FAILED (COCKPIT) · airframe 8,916 hrs · 14,045 cycles

THE PILOT REPORTED THE NR1 AVIONICS SWITCH FOR ACFT WAS STUCK ON AND THE NR 2 AVIONICS SWITCH WAS INOPERATIVE. THE PILOT REPORTED THE CONDITION TO THE TOWER, SHUTDOWN ALL AVIONICS DUE TO OVERHEATING AND LANDED USING TOWER LIGHT SIGNALS. UPON INSPECTION IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE NR 1 SWITCH HAD FUSED ITSELF IN THE ON POSITION AND THE NR 2 SWITCH WAS OPEN. WHEN REPLACEMENT SWITCHES WERE ORDERED MFG STATED THAT THE PART IAW THE IPC WAS NO LONGER PRODUCED. THE CURRENT PART USED WAS FOR A LATER SN AIRCRAFT. WHEN QUESTIONED FURTHER MFG ENGINEERING REPLACED THE SWITCH IN BY EO ON 2/21/1997.

Part: BUSS — MISWIRED (ELECTRICAL SYS) · airframe 8,916 hrs · 14,045 cycles

DURING REPLACEMENT OF NR 1 AND NR 2 AVIONICS MASTER SWITCHES IT WAS NOTED THAT THE AVIONICS BUSS TIE SWITCH WAS MISSED WIRED. THE BUSS TIE SWITCH IS TO BE WIRED FROM THE OUTPUT OF AV NR 1 BUSS MASTER TO OUTPUT OF THE AV NR 2 BUSS MASTER. THIS AIRCRAFT TIE SWITCH WAS WIRED FROM THE INPUT OF THE AVNR 1 BUSS MASTER TO THE OUTPUT OF THE AVNR 2 MASTER. THIS ALLOWED THE BUSS TIE SWITCH TO POWER THE NR 2 AVIONICS BUSS WITHOUT EITHER BUSS MASTER SWITCH ON AND WOULD NOT ALLOW THE NR 1 BUSS TO BE CROSS TIED TO THE NR 2 BUSS IF THE NR 1 SWITCH HAD FAILED. THIS IS THE SECOND AIRCRAFT FOUND LIKE THIS AND BOTH AIRCRAFT APPEAR TO HAVE THE FACTORY INSTALLED SWITCHES AND WIRING IN THEM.

Part: HOSE — UNSERVICEABLE · airframe 12,612 hrs

12.5" LONG HOSE TO THE SECONDARY EXHAUST WAS FOUND TO HAVE SWOLLEN UP INTERNALLY.

Part: VENT LINE — COLLAPSED (ENGINE)

THE PILOT REPORTED AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF OIL WAS BEING CONSUMED, AND ON HIS INBD FLIGHT THE OIL PRESSURE GAUGE WAS FLUCTUATING. THERE WERE NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF AN EXTERNAL OIL LEAK. ON THE GROUND RUN MX ALSO NOTED THE TORQUE WAS FLUCTUATING. WHEN BLEED AIR WAS TURNED ON A FINE MIST OF OIL WAS EMITTED FROM THE HEATER VENTS. TROUBLESHOOTING FOUND THE ENGINE VENT LINE HAD COLLAPSED INTERNALLY PRESSURIZING THE CASE AND CAUSED THE OIL TO LEAK INTERNALLY INTO THE COMPRESSOR.

Part: VENT LINE — CORRODED (ENGINE) · airframe 12,272 hrs · 14,989 cycles

IN COMPLIANCE OF A FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE DURING AN ENGINE INSPECTION, A MECHANIC CHECKING THE VENT LINE OF THE OVERBOARD ENGINE BREATHER, FOUND THE RUBBER SECTION SWOLLEN INTERNALLY. LEFT UNCHECKED TO THE POINT OF OBSTRUCTION, IT WOULD CAUSE THE ENGINE OF THIS ACFT TO START CONSUMING LARGE AMOUNTS OF ENGINE OIL AND COMPROMISE THE ENGINE BEARING SEALS RESULTING IN EXPENSIVE ENGINE REPAIRS. THE FLEET CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE MENTIONED ABOVE WAS GENERATED BY THIS ACFT OPERATOR TO ADDRESS THE CONDITION OF THESE AGING HOSE SECTIONS.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120.0, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120.0, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120.0, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120.0, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: SUPPORT — CRACKED (FS 120, LBL 10)

THE LEFT PULLEY SUPPORT WEB BELOW THE FLOOR AT FS 120.0, LBL 10.0 CRACKED FROM THE FWD ELEVATOR BELLCRANK MOUNT BOLT ACCESS HOLE TO THE END OF THE WEB.

Part: ENGINE — FAILED

SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF, ENROUTE, ACFT EXPERIENCED AN ENGINE FLAMEOUT ACCOMPANIED BY A LOUD BANG. THE PILOT WAS ABLE TO SAFELY LAND WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENTS. MX INVESTIGATED AND FOUND THAT THE ENGINE HAD SUFFERED A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE, DESTROYING ALL ROTATING DISCS AND BLADES. THE ENGINE WAS REMOVED AND SENT TO VENDOR FOR BREAK DOWN AND INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE. AS OF THIS DATE THE ROOT CAUSE IS NOT KNOWN, BUT DAMAGE TO ONE OF THE L/E OF 1ST STAGE COMPRESSOR BLADE POINTS TO FOD. ENGINE IS CURRENTLY ON 8000 HR O/H EXTENSION PROGRAM. AT THE TIME OF FLAMEOUT THE ENGINE HAD 6464.9 TSO AND 1492.9 HRS SINCE LAST BLADE STRETCH. HOT SECTION INSP IS ON CONDITION.

Part: VERNATHERM — DETACHED · airframe 9,467 hrs · 13,259 cycles

WHILE IN CRUISE THE PILOT REPORTED ENGINE OIL INDICATORS SHOWING OIL PRESSURE LOWER AND TEMPERATURE HIGHER THAN NORMAL. LATER UPON REMOVAL AND INSPECTION OF THE ENGINE OIL COOLER VERNATHERM IT WAS NOTED THAT IT HAD STARTED TO COME APART DUE TO THE FAILURE OF AN INTERNAL SNAP RING. THIS CAUSED A RESTRICTION OF THE ENGINE OIL COOLING SYS RESULTING IN THE ABNORMAL READINGS. WHEN THE VERNATHERM WAS REPLACED THE ENGINE OIL PARAMETERS RETURNED TO NORMAL.

Part: LEAD — BROKEN (PROP DEICE) · airframe 25,031 hrs · 33,637 cycles

LT PROP HAS 1 BROKEN DEICE LEAD. LEAD HAS A BROKEN AND BURNED GROUND WIRE IN THE EXACT SOME PLACE AS PREVIOUS LEADS.