Air Methods Corp.

Operated by AIR METHODS LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Air Methods LLC (per NTSB report)

Tail rotor blade impact from an unidentified object at an undetermined time.

Operated by AIR METHODS LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by Air Methods LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR METHODS LLC (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR METHODS LLC (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control during the initial climb at night from a confined area landing zone, that resulted in an impact with a tree, a loss of control, and a subsequent impact with terrain.

Operated by AIR METHODS LLC — On-demand air taxi (135) Operator Does Business As: JeffSTAT (per NTSB report)

The sUAS operator’s failure to see and avoid a helicopter, resulting in a midair collision between the helicopter and the sUAS.

The separation of the outer span of a tail rotor blade during flight as a result of localized intergranular corrosion due to a diminished protective coating at a critical location on the tail rotor blade surface that, combined with cyclic loading, resulted in fatigue crack propagation initiated at a corrosion site.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s delayed corrective inputs while maneuvering, which resulted in a loss of control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s use of multiple sedating medications.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to ensure the throttle was properly positioned before commencing an approach to land, which resulted in a low rotor rpm condition and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was a worn throttle detent.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s acute incapacitation by a syncopal episode, which resulted in the helicopter departing controlled flight and colliding with terrain.

Operated by Air Methods Corp (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s decision to continue the landing without having visually identified wires that were known to be in the vicinity of the landing zone, which resulted in a collision with the wires while attempting an off-airport landing in dark night visual meteorological conditions.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The fuelers improper action during the refueling process.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

An inflight attitude upset for undetermined reasons that resulted in a rotor system overspeed, a reduction of power from both engines, and a subsequent hard landing.

Operated by AIR MEATHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from ground equipment during landing.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s improper decision to approach the airport and enter a low altitude hover with a gusting quartering tailwind, which resulted in a loss of tail rotor effectiveness during a turn at a low altitude.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to maintain sufficient altitude above terrain while operating in reduced visibility due to snow showers.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain situational awareness during takeoff from a confined area, which resulted in the helicopter rotors striking tree branches.

Operated by Air Methods Corp (per NTSB report)

The ambulance driver’s failure to see the helicopter’s rotating main rotor blades in dark night conditions, which resulted in the ambulance’s inadvertent collision with the helicopter. Contributing to the accident was the ambulance driver's failure to follow procedures when approaching the helicopter.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot's loss of helicopter control as a result of fatigue during cruise flight at night.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The restricted cyclic control movement for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination and testing of the cyclic control system did not reveal any evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

Maintenance personnel’s failure to properly secure the tail rotor drive shaft cover, which resulted in the cover departing the helicopter in flight.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

An in-flight loss of control due to bird strikes.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

A failure of the rear bearing in the No. 2 engine, which (1) created multiple and likely unexpected and confusing cockpit indications, resulting in the pilot's improper diagnosis and subsequent erroneous shutdown of the No. 1 engine, and (2) the resulting degraded the performance of the No. 2 engine, until it ultimately lost power. The complete loss of engine power likely occurred at an altitude and/or airspeed that was too low for the pilot to execute a successful emergency autorotative landing.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

Fuel starvation due to the pilot’s failure to turn on the fuel transfer pump switches during takeoff, which led to a total loss of engine power. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's improper decision to activate the annunciator panel’s dimming function during dusk, which prevented him from seeing the illuminated fuel transfer pump caution light indicating that the pumps were off and the illuminated caution lights for low fuel in the supply tanks.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain helicopter control while landing, which resulted in a hard landing and subsequent roll over.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

Maintenance personnel’s failure to properly secure the left vertical fin cowling during recent maintenance, which resulted in its separation and subsequent contact with the tail rotor system during flight.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The improper locking of the rear passenger door by the specialty nurse, which resulted in the door separating from the helicopter in flight.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The pilot's loss of helicopter control in mountainous terrain as the result of operating the helicopter outside the performance envelope of its hydraulic system and encountering the servo transparency phenomenon. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to perform low-level, high-speed maneuvers through mountainous terrain.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

Airbus Helicopters' dual-hydraulic AS350 B3e helicopter's (1) preflight hydraulic check, which depleted hydraulic pressure in the tail rotor hydraulic circuit, and (2) lack of salient alerting to the pilot that hydraulic pressure was not restored before takeoff. Such alerting might have cued the pilot to his failure to reset the yaw servo hydraulic switch to its correct position during the preflight hydraulic check, which resulted in a lack of hydraulic boost to the pedal controls, high pedal forces, and a subsequent loss of control after takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to perform a hover check after liftoff, which would have alerted him to the pedal control anomaly at an altitude that could have allowed him to safely land the helicopter. Contributing to the severity of the injuries was the helicopter's fuel system, which was not crash resistant and facilitated a fuel-fed postcrash fire.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The pilot's decision to land during unfavorable wind conditions, which resulted in a loss of control due to settling with power. Contributing to the accident were the lack of an adequate approach path due to numerous obstructions and the lack of available guidance regarding the helicopter's performance capabilities in the right quartering tailwind condition.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The pilot's inability to identify the power line during the initial approach in night visual meteorological conditions and his subsequent failure to avoid the power line once he identified it on final approach.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to reposition the yaw servo hydraulic switch to the “on” position during the pretakeoff hydraulic system check, which resulted in a complete lack of hydraulic boost to the tail rotor system and increased the load required to move the control pedals and led to the pilot’s subsequent inability to manipulate the control pedals and his loss of yaw control.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The loss of engine power due to ice ingestion. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s delayed decision to install the helicopter's engine inlet cover until after the engine had been exposed to moisture and freezing temperatures and their inadequate daily preflight/airworthiness checks, which did not detect the ice formation.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The inadvertent encounter with inclement weather, including snow, freezing rain, and reduced visibility conditions,  which led to the pilot’s spatial disorientation and loss of aircraft control.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The main rotor blade’s contact with the vertical stabilizer during the engine shutdown in strong, gusty wind conditions.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to confirm that the helicopter had adequate fuel on board to complete the mission before making the first departure, his improper decision to continue the mission and make a second departure after he became aware of a critically low fuel level, and his failure to successfully enter an autorotation when the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident were (1) the pilot's distracted attention due to personal texting during safety-critical ground and flight operations, (2) his degraded performance due to fatigue, (3) the operator's lack of a policy requiring that an operational control center specialist be notified of abnormal fuel situations, and (4) the lack of practice representative of an actual engine failure at cruise airspeed in the pilot's autorotation training in the accident make and model helicopter.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

The in-flight separation of the tail rotor drive shaft cover as a result of maintenance personnel not ensuring that it was secured after a maintenance inspection; also causal was the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection of the helicopter.

Operated by Air Methods Corp. (per NTSB report)

The instructor pilot did not maintain adequate helicopter control while maneuvering, which resulted in a hard landing.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

The pilot's impairment during cruise flight due to a recurring stroke. Contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's inadequate oversight of the pilot's known medical condition.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

An interruption of fuel to the engine due to air in the fuel lines, which resulted in an engine flameout and the total loss of engine power. The reason for air in the fuel line resulting in an engine flameout could not be determined because postaccident testing did not reveal the mechanism that would lead to such a result.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from a highway marker sign while maneuvering.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

The repair station technician did not properly install the fuel inlet union during reassembly of the engine; the operator’s maintenance personnel did not adequately inspect the technician's work; and the pilot who performed the post maintenance check flight did not follow the helicopter manufacturer's procedures. Also causal were the lack of requirements by the Federal Aviation Administration, the operator, and the repair station for an independent inspection of the work performed by the technician. A contributing factor was the inadequate oversight of the repair station by the Federal Aviation Administration, which resulted in the repair station performing recurring maintenance at the operator’s facilities without authorization.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

The unintentional movement of the jettison handle in-flight due to the pilot’s dropping of a manual that impacted the handle and released the door window, which then impacted the horizontal stabilizer. Contributing to the accident was the jettison handle guard not being installed by maintenance personnel.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

The improper installation of the engine-to-main gear box flex coupling, which resulted in the failure of the flex coupling and a loss of power to the rotor system during takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the mechanic who removed the engine's failure to follow the operator’s maintenance procedures. Also contributing was the Quality Assurance inspector's failure to follow the operator’s post-maintenance inspection requirements.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

The improper use of the throttle by the pilot receiving instruction, and the check pilot's inadequate supervision and delayed remedial action, which resulted in the collision with terrain.

Operated by Air Methods Corp (per NTSB report)

The loss of directional control for undetermined reasons.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation Inc. (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to maintain control of the helicopter during the practice hovering autorotation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of experience in night vision goggle helicopter operations.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The flight crewmembers’ failure to secure the patient using the available over-the-shoulder restraints and the encounter with clear-air turbulence during cruise descent.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP (per NTSB report)

An inadvertent in-flight collision with a duck.

Operated by Air Methods Corp. (per NTSB report)

Both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on approach to the helipad. Contributing to the accident were the failure of N407GA’s pilot to follow flight arrival route guidelines, and the failure of N407MJ’s pilot to follow communications guidelines requiring him to report his position within a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to ensure that both engine switches were in the FLIGHT position for takeoff.

Operated by Air Methods Corp (per NTSB report)

The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from trees along the top of a ridgeline due to inadequate preflight planning, insufficient altitude, and the lack of a helicopter terrain awareness and warning system. Member Sumwalt did not approve this brief and probable cause. Member Sumwalt filed a dissenting statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident.

Operated by Air Methods, Inc. (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to execute a go-around when a normal approach to the intended landing point could not be maintained. An additional cause was the excessive descent rate that developed during the approach. Contributing factors were the tailwind condition and the tree line.

Operated by Air Methods Corporation (per NTSB report)

The pilot's improper decision to attempt VFR flight into known instrument flight conditions and failure to maintain altitude clearance resulted in an in-flight collision with trees and the ground.

Operated by Air Methods (per NTSB report)

the pilot's failure to perform a preflight inspection. Contributing to the accident was the transmission cowling that disconnected during the landing.

Operated by Air Methods Corp. (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance with the parked helicopter while performing a hovering turn.

Operated by Air Methods, Incorporated (per NTSB report)

the dual student pilot's failure to maintain control of the helicopter. Factors contributing to the accident were inadequate supervision by the instructor pilot, the high wind, the gusts, and the crosswinds.

Operated by AIR MIDWEST INC (per NTSB report)

the airplane's loss of pitch control during take-off. The loss of pitch control resulted from the incorrect rigging of the elevator system compounded by the airplane's aft center of gravity, which was substaintially aft of the certified aft limit. Contributing to the cause of the accident were (1) Air Midwest's lack of oversight of the work being performed at the Huntington, West Virginia, maintenance station; (2) Air Midwest's maintenance procedures and documentation; (3) Air Midwest's weight and balance program at the time of the accident; (4) the Raytheon Aerospace quality assurance inspector's failure to detect the incorrect rigging of the elevator control system; (5) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) average weight assumptions in its weight and balance program guidance at the time of the accident; and (6) the FAA's lack of oversight of Air Midwest's maintenance program and its weight and balance program.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORP — On-demand air taxi (135) Operator Does Business As: Miami Children's Hospital (per NTSB report)

The flight crew's diverted attention, inadequate visual lookout, and failure to ensure adequate main rotor clearance. Factors in the accident were the continued operation, with known obstructions in the area, and the failure of the FAA to initially certify the operation prior to its commencement.

Operated by Air Methods — On-demand air taxi (135) Operator Does Business As: (per NTSB report)

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the landing roll. An icy runway and a snow bank were factors.

Pilot's failure to maintain adequate separation from terrain during the initial climb. Factors include spatial disorientation and a dark moonless night.

Operated by AIR METHODS (per NTSB report)

flight by the pilot into known adverse weather conditions, and his failure (or inability) to maintain sufficient clearance or altitude from mountainous terrain. Related factors were: darkness, heavy snow, high winds, the pilot's perception of pressure that was induced by the conditions and events, and mountainous terrain.

loss of power as a result of an intake valve failure due to improper maintenance performed during the major engine overhaul, and pilot misjudgment of the flare during autorotation.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORPORATION — On-demand air taxi (135) Operator Does Business As: AIR CARE I (per NTSB report)

FAILURE OF THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND TO PROPERLY USE THE HELICOPTER'S PERFORMANCE DATA. FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: THE ADVERSE TERRAIN AND HIGH DENSITY ALTITUDE.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORPORATION (per NTSB report)

AN ENCOUNTER WITH CLEAR AIR TURBULENCE.

Operated by AIR MIDWEST INC. (per NTSB report)

FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO MAINTAIN CLEARANCE. A FACTOR WAS THE BRIGHT SUN.

Operated by AIR METHODS CORPORATION (per NTSB report)

THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE MAIN ROTOR RPM PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. FACTORS WERE: THE DISCONNECTED ENGINE TO TRANSMISSION DRIVE SHAFT AND THE INADEQUATE INSPECTION BY COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.

Operated by AIR METHODS, INC. (per NTSB report)

IMPROPER PLANNING/DECISION BY THE PILOT, WHICH RESULTED IN FUEL EXHAUSTION DUE TO AN INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF FUEL. DARKNESS WAS A RELATED FACTOR.

Operated by AIR MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR MIDWEST INC (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Operated by AIR-MIDWEST (per NTSB report)

Sanction: $20,000 · case closed 2024-06-07

Sanction: $10,000 · case closed 2016-05-12

Sanction: $65,000 · case closed 2016-05-12

Sanction not stated · case closed 2017-08-15

Sanction: $400,000 · case closed 2017-08-15

Sanction: $3,000 · case closed 2013-09-06

Sanction: $3,000 · case closed 2013-09-06

Sanction not stated · case closed 2016-05-12

Sanction: $100,000 · case closed 2016-05-12

Sanction not stated · case closed 2011-07-15

Sanction not stated · case closed 2011-07-15

Sanction: $1,000 · case closed 2001-10-12

Part: ATTACH ANGLE — CORRODED (ZONE 100) · airframe 9,244 hrs · 24,667 cycles

CORROSION DAMAGE OF VARYING DEPTHS WAS FOUND ON THE LOWER LT AND RT BROOM CLOSET ATTACHMENT ANGLES (P/N: L533M1052317), AS WELL AS THE AFT ATTACHMENT ANGLE (P/N: L533M1052318)

Part: FRAME — CORRODED (ZONE 100) · airframe 4,548 hrs · 12,501 cycles

CORROSION ON THE COLLECTIVE SPLIT FRAME ON FWD AND AFT SIDE OF OPENING.

Part: CROSSBEAM — CHAFED (ZONE 100) · airframe 4,548 hrs · 12,501 cycles

GOUGE/CHAFE DAMAGE TO THE AFT LANDING GEAR ATTACHMENT FWD CROSSBEAM AND SUPPORT ANGLE.

Part: RIB — CHAFED (ZONE 300) · airframe 4,548 hrs · 12,501 cycles

CHAFE DAMAGE ON BL 1263 RIB ON RH SIDE OF HORIZONTAL STABILIZER.

Part: BLOWER MOTOR — BURNED OUT (ZONE 100) · airframe 8,558 hrs · 1,463 cycles

ODOR OF BURNT ELECTRICAL WIRING. FOUND SMELL COMING FROM AFT AC VENTS. FOUND CONDENSATION/WATER IN ELECTRICAL MOTOR. REPLACED AFT BLOWER MOTOR

Part: INDICATOR — INOPERATIVE (ZONE 200) · airframe 9,772 hrs · 30,894 cycles

RECEIVED AND INSTALLED REPLACEMENT MGT INDICATOR. APPLIED GROUND POWER AND THE UNIT PASSED THE LCD TEST. AFTER ENGINE START THE MGT INDICATED ZERO. AIRCRAFT WAS SHUTDOWN AND I PERFORMED AN MGT INDICATOR FUNCTIONAL CHECK WITH THE BARFIELD TURBINE TEMP TESTER. THE GAUGE WAS DEAD ACCURATE. I PUT EVERYTHING BACK TOGETHER AND WE RAN UP THE AIRCRAFT AGAIN. AFTER A NORMAL BATTERY START THE INDICATOR WOULD READ CORRECTLY AND THEN DROP TO ZERO AT RANDOM INTERVALS (ROUGHLY EVERY 10-15 SECONDS). THE FIRST REPLACEMENT GAUGE HAD SAT ON THE SHELF FOR ABOUT 6 YEARS. THE SECOND REPLACEMENT GAUGE WAS REPAIRED IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR. THIS AIRCRAFT HAD NO MGT INDICATION ISSUES BEFORE REPLACING THIS GAUGE FOR A DIM SCREEN.

Part: WIRE — CHAFED · airframe 9,790 hrs · 11,625 cycles

ERRONEOUS TORQUE INDICATION

Part: INDICATOR — DIM (DISPLAY) · airframe 9,772 hrs · 30,894 cycles

THE MGT INDICATOR WAS WRITTEN UP AS DIM. WE HAD A REPAIRED UNIT IN STOCK AND REPLACED THE INDICATOR. TWO POWER CYCLES WERE PERFORMED AND THE INDICATOR FUNCTIONED NORMALLY. THE PILOT THEN ATTEMPTED TO START THE AIRCRAFT AND ABORTED THE START AFTER A FEW SECONDS. THE MGT INDICATOR WE HAD JUST INSTALLED HAD FAILED. THE LCD SEGMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR DURING THE LCD TEST, AND IT WOULD INDICATE ERRONEOUS NUMBERS LIKE, '888088' FOR EXAMPLE.

Part: CIRCUIT BREAKER — TRIPPED (MLG) · airframe 6,306 hrs · 7,808 cycles

BUS TIE CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED AS LANDING GEAR WAS BEING RAISED

Part: BLOWER MOTOR — ODOR (ZONE 100) · airframe 7,829 hrs

FUMES IN CABIN/ COCKPIT DURING CRUISE FLIGHT SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF. RESULTED IN ABORTED FLIGHT AND RETURN TO BASE. REPLACED AFT BLOWER MOTOR

Part: BLOWER MOTOR — BURNED OUT (ZONE 200) · airframe 10,596 hrs · 22,493 cycles

SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE, TURNED ON THE BLOWER. AFTER A FEW MINUTES CREW REPORTED A BURNING RUBBER SMELL. I TURNED OFF THE BLOWER AND THE SMELL DISSIPATED. I TURNED ON THE AIR CONDITIONER TO SEE IF IT CAME BACK AND WE EXPERIENCED THE SAME SMELL. AFT BLOWER MOTOR WAS REPLACED AS REQUIRED FOR RTS.

Part: ELEC CONNECTOR — BURNED (EVAPORATOR) · airframe 8,555 hrs · 29,966 cycles

ON APPROACH PILOT AND CREW DETECTED FAINT ELECTRICAL SMELL NO SMOKE PRESENT. AMT DISCOVERED 1 EACH MOLEX CONNECTER WITH DISCOLORATION REPLAIRED DAMAGED WIRING.

Part: WARNING LIGHT — FALSE ACTIVATION (ZONE 200) · airframe 9,878 hrs

WHILE INFLIGHT DUAL FADEC MINOR CAUTION LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. NO OTHER INDICATIONS NOTED. LANDED SAFELY AT LOCAL AIRPORT. MECHANIC RESPONDED. PERFORMED FUNCTIONAL TEST, UNABLE TO DUPLICATE.

Part: UNKNOWN — ODOR (CABIN) · airframe 10,190 hrs · 30,078 cycles

DURING THE FLIGHT, AN ONGOING FUEL ODOR WAS PRESENT IN THE CABIN. BOTH CREW MEMBERS DETECTED THE ODOR, AND THE NURSE REPORTED BECOMING NAUSEATED FROM THE ODOR. AFTER SHUTDOWN, ENTERED THE AFT CABIN AND CONFIRMED THE FUEL ODOR WAS STILL PRESENT. THE ODOR WAS STRONGEST NEAR THE NURSE'S SEAT BELT ATTACHMENT POINT. RESEALED FUEL CHECK VALVE COMPARTMENT.

Part: DUAL TACHOMETER — DEGRADED (ZONE 100) · airframe 11,796 hrs · 30,590 cycles

NEEDLES ON DUAL TACH NOT ALIGNED WHILE RUNNING. FADEC DEGRADED/RESTART FAULT LIGHT ILLUMINATED AFTER STARTUP. REMOVED AND REPLACED DEFECTIVE DUAL TACH GAUGE.

Part: UNKNOWN — ODOR (CABIN) · airframe 4,971 hrs · 16,177 cycles

ELECTRICAL ODOR NOTICED DURING FLIGHT BACK TO BASE. PERFORMED OPS CHECKS. UNABLE TO DUPLICATE SMELL. RTS

Part: BEARING — FAULTED (HYD PUMP) · airframe 3,491 hrs · 12,957 cycles

PILOTS REPORT "AFTER ILLUMINATION OF THE HYD2 AND SERVO LIGHTS, NURSE AND MEDIC SAW WHITISH GRAY SMOKE FROM VICINITY IN FRONT OF THE CABIN TDFM RADIO CONTROL HEAD, NEAR THE O2 SHUT-OFF LEVER. I SMELLED A BURNT RUBBER SMELL BUT NEVER SAW ANY SMOKE WHEN I LOOKED DOWN AND TO MY RIGHT. THEY SPECIFICALLY STATED IT WAS NOT ACCUMULATING OR SPREADING IN THE CABIN. UPON ARRIVAL FOUND BELT DRIVEN HYDRAULIC PUMP DRIVE ASSY BEARING TO BE SEIZED CAUSING THE BELT TO MELT AND BREAK CAUSING THE SLIGHT SMOKE AND SMELL IN THE CABIN

Part: WARNING LIGHT — FALSE ACTIVATION (ZONE 200) · airframe 12,525 hrs · 36,935 cycles

XMSN CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED IN FLIGHT, INSPECTED AND PERFORMED SERVICEABILITY CHECK. OPERATIONAL CHECK PERFORMED AS WELL. RTS.

Part: ELEC CONNECTOR — PULLED (ZONE 100) · airframe 11,777 hrs · 9,204 cycles

RESTART FAULT AND FADEC DEGRADED LIGHTS ILLUMINATED ON TAKE OFF. PULLED FAULT ADAPTOR ELEC CONNECTOR. CLEANED AND REINSTALLED. CLEARED CODE, OPS GROUND RUN GOOD. NO DEFECTS NOTED.

Part: FADEC — FAILED (ZONE) · airframe 7,175 hrs · 25,394 cycles

NR 1 FADEC FAILURE IN FLIGHT

Part: TRANSMISSION — MAKING METAL · airframe 7,621 hrs · 24,729 cycles

XMSN CHIP ILLUMINATED AT PICKUP HOSPITAL. MISSION WAS ABORTED, DID NOT STARTUP WITH TRANSMISSION CAUTION. CONTACTED MECHANIC TO FIX ON STATION. INSPECTED CHIP CONFIRMED CAT C RTS

Part: OUTLET — ODOR (ZONE 200) · airframe 7,322 hrs · 16,838 cycles

FLIGHT CREW REPORTED SMOKE ODOR IN CABIN DURING FLIGHT.

Part: COMPRESSOR — SEIZED · airframe 2,968 hrs · 9,132 cycles

PIREP ON LBE 2441306, ITEM 2: VERY LOUD RUBBING SOUND FROM THE REAR/UPPER PORTION OF THE AIRCRAFT DURING CLIMB OUT. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A SMELL OF BURNING. DEFERRED PER AMC BH429 MEL ITEM 2100-04. DEFERRAL CLEARED ON LBE 2441306, ITEM 8: REPLACED COMPRESSOR ASSEMBLY. OPS CHECK GOOD. END

Part: PROBE — LEAKING (FUEL QTY) · airframe 7,214 hrs · 23,056 cycles

CREW STATES HEAVY FUEL ODOR IN AFT CABIN GOT WORSE IN FLIGHT. AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY OOS FOR REPAIRS. UPON INSPECTION FOUND LT LOWER FUEL QUANTITY PROBE NOT SEATED PROPERLY. REPLACED PROBE.

Part: GASKET — LEAKING (FUEL CAP) · airframe 1,476 hrs · 4,000 cycles

RAW FUEL ODOR INSIDE CABIN DURING FLIGHT, REPLACED FUEL FILLER PLUG GASKET.

Part: SUPPORT ANGLE — CRACKED (ZONE 200) · airframe 6,219 hrs · 17,881 cycles

CRACK FOUND ON SUPPORT ANGLE OF UPPER LEFT FUSELAGE TO TAILBOOM ATTACHMENT

Part: FLOOR PANEL — DAMAGED (ZONE 100) · airframe 4,497 hrs · 10,475 cycles

DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON THE COCKPIT FLOOR PANEL IN THE FORM OF IMPACT DAMAGE AND CORROSION. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND AN APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURE IS PROVIDED IN AIRBUS REPAIR DESIGN APPROVAL SHEET RDAS-EC135-53-2026-24444A DATED 16 JUL 2026, AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5321-EA-5737 INITIAL REVISION DATED 22 JUL 2026, AND AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5321-EA-5741 REV. 1 DATED 27 JUL 2026. FOR ALL OTHER INFORMATION PLEASE REFER TO WORK ORDER MG #759 ON FILE AT CRS#2A6R933B.

Part: BLOWER MOTOR — FAILED (ZONE 100) · airframe 10,117 hrs · 29,865 cycles

DURING DECELERATION ON APPROACH TO HOME BASE, BOTH AIR-CONDITIONING BLOWERS CEASED OPERATING. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, ALL OCCUPANTS DETECTED A BURNING PLASTIC ODOR IN THE AIRCRAFT. DEACTIVATED AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM MEL'D 2100-01. REPLACED FORWARD RT EVAPORATOR BLOWER MOTOR.

Part: OIL SYSTEM — LOW PRESSURE (ENGINE) · airframe 592 hrs · 1,642 cycles

UPON INITIATION OF VISUAL APPROACH, THE CREW ALERTING SYSTEM DISPLAYED AN ENGINE OIL PSI WARNING. ADJUSTED OIL PRESSURE, OPS CHECKED GOOD. ALL MAINTENANCE COMPLETED. AIRCRAFT RELEASED TO REVENUE SERVICE. #59613

Part: FUEL CAP — LEAKING · airframe 6,565 hrs · 17,566 cycles

FUEL SMELL IN CABIN ON RETURN FLIGHT BACK TO BASE FROM PHOENIX AZ, REPLACED FUEL CAP.

Part: UNKNOWN — ODOR (CABIN) · airframe 10,093 hrs · 29,810 cycles

ON TAKEOFF AND LANDING, STRONG FUEL/EXHAUST SMELL IN REAR CABIN.

Part: CHIP DETECTOR — CONTAMINATED (T/R GEARBOX) · airframe 11,221 hrs · 23,111 cycles

UPON LANDING TO TRANSLOAD A PATIENT, THE TGB CHIP LIGHT ILLUMINATED. DUE TO THIS INDICATION AND SUBSEQUENT ENGINE SHUTDOWN, WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE TRANSPORT OF THE PATIENT. THE PATIENT WAS THEN MOVED BY AMBULANCE. CHIP DETECTOR CLEANED, FINDINGS INDICATE NORMAL WEAR, OPS CHECK OKAY. RAMCO TO BE COMPLETED ON RETURN TO BASE. THIS AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO REVENUE SERVICE, REF # MEC-59060

Part: HEATER — FAILED (COCKPIT) · airframe 14,079 hrs · 15,774 cycles

DURING CRUISE FLIGHT, CABIN FUMES WERE DETECTED, FOLLOWED BY VISIBLE SMOKE. THE FLIGHT CREW EXECUTED THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND CHECKLISTS, WHICH INCLUDED SHUTTING DOWN ALL NON-ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS. TURNING OFF THE FOOT HEATER IMMEDIATELY AFTER DETECTING THE FUMES PREVENTED THEM FROM WORSENING. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE SMOKE SUBSIDED AND BEGAN TO DISSIPATE. THE REMAINING DESCENT, APPROACH, LANDING, AND TAXI WERE UNEVENTFUL. A POST-FLIGHT MAINTENANCE INSPECTION DETERMINED THAT THE FOOT HEATER WIRING AT THE CONNECTOR HAD OVERHEATED, MELTING THE PLASTIC CONNECTION COATING. AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY OOS AWT PARTS.

Part: UNKNOWN — ODOR (COCKPIT) · airframe 9,693 hrs · 11,482 cycles

PILOT SMELLED UNUSUAL ODOR/SMOKE IN COCKPIT DURING CLIMB OUT

Part: ANGLE — CRACKED (ZONE 200) · airframe 2,607 hrs · 7,000 cycles

A CRACK WAS DISCOVERED ON THE EQUIPMENT DECK COVER. THE DAMAGE IS APPROXIMATELY 10MM IN LENGTH. AN APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE DAMAGE IS AT F.S. 6100MM, W.L. 2600MM, AND L.B.L. 200MM. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PERFORMED TYPICAL DAMAGE REPAIR AND APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURES ARE PROVIDED IN AIRBUS HELICOPTERS SERVICE BULLETIN MBB-BK117 C-2-53-013, REVISION 0 DATED 2016-08-31.

Part: BLOWER — SMOKE (ZONE 100) · airframe 10,082 hrs · 8,935 cycles

SMOKE AND FUMES IN CABIN/COCKPIT FROM SUSPECTED AIR CONDITIONER BLOWER ISSUE

Part: ANGLE — CORRODED (ZONE 200) · airframe 9,472 hrs · 47,358 cycles

CORROSION DAMAGE WITH A MAXIMUM DEPTH OF 0.061” WAS DISCOVERED ON THE L/H INSTRUMENT PANEL CONSOLE FLOOR ANGLE (P/N: L311M1060234). A REPLACEMENT ANGLE WAS NOT AVAILABLE WITHIN THE SCHEDULED RETURN TO SERVICE TIMEFRAME; THEREFORE, A REPLACEMENT ANGLE WAS FABRICATED FROM 0.080” 2024-T3511 EXTRUSION AND WAS INSTALLED. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND AN APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURE IS PROVIDED IN AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-5633 REV. – DATED 06 MAY 2026 AND WAS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3 BY RYAN D. LEE DER-Y # 905240204 DATED 08 MAY 2026, DER SPECIFIC SEQUENCE # 26RL017AM.

Part: BATTERY — UNSERVICEABLE (ZONE 100) · airframe 7,144 hrs · 12,211 cycles

BATTERY LIGHT ON. COMPLETED BY PLACING REMOVED BATTERY ON BATTERY MINDER. INSTALLED SERVICEABLE BATTERY IAW ICA. RECORDED BATTERY VDC AT INSTALL / CHARGE COMPLETION. OP& RSQUO;S CHECK GOOD. CURRENT BATTERY VDC: 26.64 VISUALLY INSPECTED AIRCRAFT EXTERIOR FOR LIGHTNING STRIKE. NO DEFECTS NOTED. INSPECTED BATTERY, BATTERY HARNESS, CIRCUIT BREAKERS, GENERATOR AND MASTER ELECTRICAL BOX. NO DEFECTS NOTED. THIS AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO REVENUE SERVICE, REF #58142

Part: INVERTER — FAILED (SAS) · airframe 6,766 hrs · 23,067 cycles

INVERTER 1 AND SAS 1 CAUTION WARNING LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. PILOT ATTEMPTED TO RESET AND BOTH SYSTEMS FAILED AGAIN. PILOT DIVERTED TO CLOSEST SUITABLE AIRPORT TO PERFORM APPROPRIATE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE WHICH WAS A RUN-ON LANDING.

Part: UNKNOWN — ODOR (CABIN) · airframe 8,779 hrs · 26,596 cycles

RAW JET FUEL SMELL IN AIRCRAFT CABIN WHILE IN FLIGHT.

Part: FRAME — DENTED (ZONE 200) · airframe 6,330 hrs · 19,810 cycles

A LARGE DENT WAS DISCOVERED ON THE TRANSMISSION DECK SKIN AND CENTER BEAM PN: 355A21-2109-21. THE DAMAGE TO THE DECK SKIN IS APPROXIMATELY 0.060” DEEP AND 3.5” WIDE BY 2.5” LONG. THE DAMAGE TO THE CENTER BEAM HAS AN AREA OF 2.0” WIDE AND 1.3” HIGH ON THE VERTICAL WEB AFFECTING THE ENTIRE UPPER FLANGE. AN APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE DAMAGE IS AT F.S. 3541MM, W.L. -1765MM, AND L.B.L. 0MM. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPICAL DAMAGE REPAIR AND APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURES ARE PROVIDED IN AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 17-5330-EA-5613, INITIAL REVISION DATED 17 APR 2026 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3, SEQUENCE # 26RL013AM BY RYAN D. LEE DER: 905240204.

Part: SKIN — CORRODED (ZONE 100) · airframe 9,472 hrs · 47,358 cycles

MULTIPLE AREAS OF CORROSION DAMAGE OF VARYING DIMENSIONS AND DEPTHS WAS DISCOVERED ON THE AFT L/H FUSELAGE SKIN PANELS AROUND THE GROUND PORT, LOWER MAINTENANCE STEP, UPPER AND LOWER CLAMSHELL DOOR HINGE LOCATIONS AND SURROUNDING THE FUEL DOOR, AS WELL AS ON THE AFT R/H FUSELAGE SKIN PANELS AROUND THE LOWER MAINTENANCE STEP AND BELOW THE UPPER CLAMSHELL DOOR HINGE LOCATION. THE AFFECTED AREAS WERE REMOVED OF CORROSION AND MULTIPLE REPAIR DOUBLERS OF VARYING THICKNESSES WERE FABRICATED AND INSTALLED. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND APPROVED REPAIR INSTRUCTIONS IS PROVIDED IN AIRBUS REPAIR DESIGN APPROVAL SHEET RDAS-EC135-53-2026-1091, ISSUE A DATED 24 MAR 2026.

Part: BEARING — WORN (MAIN ROTOR HEAD) · airframe 2,545 hrs · 8,223 cycles

REQUESTED BY THE RAM TO INSPECT THE MRH SHEAR BEARINGS TO VERIFY TORQUE ON ATTACHING HARDWARE. FOUND THE BLUE BLADE SHEAR BEARING UPPER BOLT TO FAIL TORQUE CHECK, WITH THE BOLT ONLY BEING FINGER TIGHT. AFTER REMOVAL OF THE BOLT FOUND A SLIGHT STEP ON THE BOLT AND WEAR ON THE BOLT HOLE OF THE SHEAR BEARING.

Part: SKIN — CHAFED (ZONE 100) · airframe 9,472 hrs · 47,358 cycles

CHAFING DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE LOWER R/H FRAME 4 INBOARD SKIN LOCATED JUST FORWARD OF THE R/H HEATING DUCT OUTLET. THE CHAFING DAMAGE MEASURED 0.027” IN DEPTH AND APPROXIMATELY 0.2” X 0.6”. THE CHAFING DAMAGE WAS TRIMMED OUT AND A 0.040” 2024-T3 REPAIR DOUBLER WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURE IS PROVIDED IN AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-5582 REV – DATED 31 MAR 2026 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3 BY RYAN D. LEE, DER-Y # 905240204, DATED 01 APR 2026, DER SPECIFIC SEQUENCE # 26RL011AM.

Part: FRAME — CRACKED (ZONE 200) · airframe 9,472 hrs · 47,358 cycles

CRACKING DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED ON THE TAIL CONE UPPER FRAME 7 IN THE RADIUS ADJACENT TO THE SKIN FLANGE ON THE R/H SIDE. THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF THE CRACK WAS MEASURED AT 0.20”. THE CRACK WAS STOP DRILLED AND AN L-SHAPED REPAIR DOUBLER OF 0.050” ALUMINUM WAS FABRICATED AND INSTALLED, AND THE SPACE BETWEEN DOUBLER FLANGE AND UPPER FRAME 7 FLANGES WERE SHIMMED USING 2024-T3 TO ACCOMMODATE FOR THE EXISTING JOGGLE. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURES IS PROVIDED IN AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-5580 REV. – DATED 25 MAR 2026 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3

Part: ATTACH ANGLE — CORRODED (ZONE 100) · airframe 9,472 hrs · 47,358 cycles

CORROSION DAMAGE OF VARYING DEPTHS WAS FOUND ON THE LOWER L/H AND R/H BROOM CLOSET ATTACHMENT ANGLES, AS WELL AS THE AFT ATTACHMENT ANGLE. FOR THE LT AND RT ANGLES, REPLACEMENT ANGLES WERE FABRICATED FROM 0.050” 2024-T3511 EXTRUSION AND INSTALLED. FOR THE AFT ATTACHMENT ANGLE, A REPLACEMENT ANGLE WAS FABRICATED FROM 0.063” 2024-T3511 EXTRUSION AND INSTALLED. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURES IS PROVIDED IN AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-5592 REV. – DATED 27 MAR 2026 AND WAS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3

Part: FRAME ANGLE — CORRODED (ZONE 100) · airframe 9,472 hrs · 47,358 cycles

HEAVY CORROSION DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON THE FRAME 2 UPPER ANGLE (P/N: L533M1043223) ON TOP UNDER THE MAIN CABIN FLOOR. A REPAIR ANGLE WAS FABRICATED FROM 0.063” 2024-T3511 EXTRUSION AND INSTALLED IN PLACE. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE AND APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURES IS PROVIDED IN AIR METHODS ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION 23-5300-EA-5594 REV – DATED 03 APRIL 2026 AND IS SUBSTANTIATED BY FAA FORM 8110-3 BY RYAN D. LEE, DER-Y 905240204 DATED 07 APRIL 2026, DER SPECIFIC SEQUENCE # 25RL012AM.

Part: ENGINE — CONTAMINATED · airframe 4,943 hrs · 21,485 cycles

LAUNCHED FOR HOSPITAL TRANSFER. MEDIC SAID HE HAD SMOKE IN CABIN. ABORTED FLIGHT AND LANDED BACK AT BASE. AIRCRAFT INSPECTED AND RTS. SMELL DETERMINED TO BE FROM THE COMP WASH PREVIOUS TO THE FLIGHT.

Part: ANTENNA — WRONG PART (ZONE 200) · airframe 9,472 hrs · 47,358 cycles

THE TECHNISONIC TDFM 9100 MULTI-BAND TRANSCEIVER AND RC-9100 REMOTE CONTROLLER SYSTEM WERE INSTALLED ON THIS ACFT UTILIZING THE CERTWORKS STC SR01052DE. PER THE 337, THE EXISTING CI 177-1 VHF ANTENNA FROM THE TDFM 6158 INSTALL WAS RETAINED FOR USE WITH THE TDFM 9100 SYS. AT SOME POINT, THE CI 177-1 ANTENNA WAS REMOVED BY UNKNOWN PERSONS AND A CI 292-2 WAS INSTALLED IN ITS PLACE. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE CI 292-2 ANTENNA IS NOT SUPPORTED FOR THE VHF FREQUENCY RANGE REQUIRED FOR THE TDFM-9100 SYS, BUT A CI 292-3 IS CALLED OUT FOR IN STC SR01052DE DRAWING CW0620-1096 REV IR AND WOULD SUPPORT THE PROPER VHF FREQUENCY RANGE OF 138-174 MHZ. A CONFORMITY 337 HAS BEEN CREATED TO CONFORM AND DOCUMENT THE INSTALLATION OF A CI 292-3 ANTENNA TO THE CERTWORKS STC SR01052DE DRAWING CW0620-1096 REV IR FOR THE TDFM 9100 INSTALLATION ON AN EC135 AS WELL AS AIR METHODS WIRING DIAGRAM “EC135 TDFM 9100 WIRING DIAGRAM”, DRAWING SE233-0248-0351 REV -.

Part: TRANSMISSION — MAKING METAL · airframe 87 hrs · 203 cycles

TRANSMISSION CHIP LIGHT IN FLIGHT. DRAINED AND FLUSHED SYSTEM. OPS CHECKS GOOD RTS,